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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation proposes the adoption of the concept of tragedy as a theological 
category, as a way to address the traditional problem of suffering in the natural world, 
customarily known as the problem of natural evil. The theological utilization of the 
concept of tragedy enables a Christian doctrine of creation to remain accountable to the 
structures and processes of the natural world, including evolutionary development. 
Many traditions evince an awareness of the intractability of suffering in nature 
and there have been various religious responses to it. Within some Christian 
communities, the discovery by Charles Darwin (1809–1882) of evolution by natural 
selection proved disruptive to established ways of addressing that issue. This disruption 
has been especially significant in the area of theological interpretations of creation. This 
is the case in part because of the way evolutionary theory reveals the role of starvation, 
predation, and constrained stochasticity in the development of ecosystems and organisms. 
Theological responses to evolution within the Christian tradition have typically failed to 
come to terms with these features of biological evolution.  
 v 
However, Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905–1988), Donald MacKinnon (1913–
1994), and Rowan Williams (b. 1950) have, in different ways, shown how theological 
interpretations of tragedy can achieve a high degree of realism in regard to suffering, 
respecting the unique characteristics of individual experiences while situating suffering in 
a theologically meaningful frame of reference. These thinkers have also identified an 
awareness of tragedy within the Christian tradition itself, particularly as it is reflected in 
liturgical practices.  
This dissertation employs these insights to address the issue of suffering in the 
natural world, in order to contribute to a realist Christian doctrine of creation. The 
theological category of tragedy does not solve the problem of natural evil. But it has the 
double virtue of attending closely to the specifics of the natural world and maintaining a 
principled tension between experiences of suffering and Christian claims about the 
possibility of redemption. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The purpose of the present chapter is to describe the theoretical background of the 
state of mainstream Christian theology in 1859 regarding the issue of natural evil; that is, 
the evil that is not a result of a direct moral fault, but is suffered as a result of the state of 
the world being as it is. To cover so broad a swath of territory necessarily entails omitting 
contributions in the interest of concision. Specifically, these omissions include pivotal 
commentators on Scripture; important antique writers, such as Plato, the Stoics, Epicurus, 
and Cicero; and the views of the ideological opponents of the orthodox tradition as it 
developed, such as the Manicheans. 
Second, the concentration on the Christian tradition is a severe limitation for a 
constructive project. Religious responses to the problem of suffering can be seen 
throughout much religious literature, globally. Max Weber identified the problem of 
suffering as one of the motivating factors of the advent of the phenomenon of religion in 
all human societies, and posited that answers to that problem are a significant 
contribution to the specific traits of individual religions.1 Even if his interpretation 
reflects a passé religious perennialism, it is nonetheless undoubtedly true that reflections 
on suffering are a constituent part of most religious traditions. This dissertation, however, 
will only trace the history of responses in the Western Christian tradition. This not a 
judgment of relative value but a matter of expediency, since the goal is to describe the 
intellectual climate in which Darwin’s work was received. Many, though not all, of the 
                                                 
1
 Max Weber, “The Social Psychology of the World Religions,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 
ed. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. Gerth and Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 
275–277. 
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theological and philosophical responses to Darwinism were in cultures for which this 
heritage was the prevailing ethos.2 
Third, it must be acknowledged up front that to utilize the term “theodicy” as 
applicable to a genre of thought before the eighteenth century is anachronistic, given the 
term’s coinage by G. W. Leibniz in response to specific challenges and the intellectual 
currents of his day. The term will be used in this dissertation for the purposes of 
convenience, and in line with contemporary usage in the relevant scholarly literature. 
However, I am sharply aware of the limitations of the term and will be careful to avoid 
imputing modern concerns to intellectual worlds to which they are not native.  
The Book of Job: From the whirlwind 
The book of Job has served as the ur-text for reflections on the problem of evil for 
centuries, and exegetical commentaries on Job are countless; David Clines posits that 
there are more commentaries on Job than any other book of the Hebrew scriptures save 
the Psalms.3 Part of the reason for this fascination is that Job seems to challenge the 
prevailing ethos of the rest of that canon. In the bulk of those texts, retribution is the 
primary rationale given for the travails of the people. The suffering of Israel, in this view, 
is a consequence of Israel’s failure to maintain a proper covenant relationship with God: 
Israel falls away; God punishes Israel for its transgressions; and Israel eventually repents 
and returns to the Lord. The book of Job, however, addresses another type of situation: 
                                                 
2
 See Thomas F. Glick, ed., The Comparative Reception of Darwinism (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1988) for descriptions of the diversity of responses around the world, though the book is still 
primarily limited to the West. 
3
 David J. A. Clines, Job 1–20, Word Biblical Commentary 17 (Dallas, Tex.: Word Books, 1989), xxx. 
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the suffering of those who are not guilty of any transgression at all but who nonetheless 
fall victim to terrible misfortune. The book as a whole serves as a continuous discussion 
of this doctrine of retribution. In the following section, I will outline the issues of 
suffering as they are articulated in Job. There is an unsettled, and unsettling, account of 
Job’s experience contained in the book, and I will show how the book’s narratives 
express a dialectical and “polyphonic”4 approach to suffering, one that is similar to the 
approach that will be offered in this dissertation. In addition, and of specific interest for 
this project, the speeches by God at the end of the book suggest a particular approach to 
an understanding of the natural world, including the most brutal aspects of it. 
Scholars typically separate Job into two non-concurrent sections: the prose 
prologue and epilogue (Chapters 1–2 and 42:7-17), and the poetic dialogue that comes in 
between. The prose prologue sets the scene for the action that is to follow, using language 
that reads like a folk tale: “There was once a man in the land of Uz whose name was Job” 
(1:1).5 Job was “blameless and upright,” and he “feared God [translating El] and turned 
away from evil.” Job was “the greatest of all the people of the east”: large numbers of 
sheep, camels, oxen, and donkeys belonged to him, and he was the father of seven sons 
and three daughters. His greatness was not only material but also spiritual: he was a pious 
man, offering burnt sacrifices on behalf of his children, in case they had sinned and not 
repented.  
                                                 
4
 Carol A. Newsom, The Book of Job: A Contest of Moral Imaginations (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 3–31. 
5
 All scriptural quotations are from the New Revised Standard Version unless otherwise noted. 
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Maintaining the tone of a fable, the narrator continues, “One day the heavenly 
beings came to present themselves before the Lord [translating YHWH], and Satan 
[translating ha-satan, not a proper name] also came among them” (1:6). When the Lord 
mentions the “blameless and upright” Job, Satan expresses doubt as to whether Job is 
pious out of a faithfulness intrinsic to his character, or if he is pious only because he has 
been blessed with such material riches. The Lord grants Satan leave to afflict Job terribly 
in order to test Job, and Satan does, with the result that Job’s oxen and donkeys were 
stolen, and his sheep, servants, camels, and even children are killed. Still, however, Job 
remains faithful: “Then Job arose, tore his robe, shaved his head, and fell on the ground 
and worshiped. He said, ‘Naked I came from my mother’s womb, and naked shall I return 
there; the Lord gave, and the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord’” 
(1:20-21). Again in the heavenly court the Lord boasts of Job; again Satan expresses 
doubt about Job’s righteousness; and again the Lord grants Satan leave to afflict Job, this 
time even to the point of harming his person. “So Satan went out from the presence of the 
Lord, and inflicted loathsome sores on Job from the sole of his foot to the crown of his 
head” (2:7). The second chapter, and with it the prose prologue, ends with the arrival of 
Job’s friends—Eliphaz the Temanite, Bildad the Shuhite, and Zophar the Naamathite—
who weep with him, tear their robes, and sit in the dust with him in silence: “They sat 
with him on the ground seven days and seven nights, and no one spoke a word to him, for 
they saw that his suffering was great” (2:13).  
The poetic dialogue begins, though “dialogue” is an inaccurate description of 
what follows. In the speeches of Job and the three friends, rarely do the four engage in a 
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reciprocal and responsive exchange of ideas. The three friends, in their own ways, hold to 
the traditional view of divine retribution and reward. Eliphaz, in chapters 4–5 and 15, 
recognizes Job’s essential innocence. Given Job’s innocence, Eliphaz feels the need to 
justify God’s actions by minimizing the severity of Job’s sufferings, depicting them as 
temporary aberrations, and encouraging Job’s fortitude. In his third speech in chapter 22, 
an increasingly frustrated Eliphaz hurls accusations at Job, pleading with him to repent 
and admit at least some fault and predicting that riches will accrue to Job should he do so. 
Bildad, in chapters 8, 18, and 25 (and perhaps chapter 266) similarly evinces an 
awareness of a clear distinction between the “blameless” and the “evildoers” (8:20); the 
former will be rewarded, and the latter annihilated (18:5-21). Job’s children must have 
been sinners, hence their death; the fact that Job is still alive is proof that his sin was not 
as bad as theirs (8:4). Bildad hopes that Job will take heed of Bildad’s warning, 
describing the plight of the wicked in detail and promising Job’s restoration if Job will 
“seek God and make supplication to the Almighty” (8:5). For his part, Zophar, in 
chapters 11 and 20, does not see God’s awareness of Job’s excellence reflected in Job’s 
suffering. This, for Zophar, is proof positive that Job must be a secret sinner (11:5-6). 
Zophar is the harshest of Job’s friends, the one most offended by Job’s protestations, and 
he also promises lavish rewards for Job’s repentance.  
A fourth speaker appears after the first three have finished. Elihu the Buzite 
tempers the retribution theology of the preceding speakers, though he does not disregard 
                                                 
6
 David J. A. Clines, Job 21–37, Word Biblical Commentary 18A (Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 
2006), 626–641. 
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it completely, and he goes significantly beyond them in developing his ideas. For Elihu, 
suffering is not only a matter of God dispensing divine justice. Suffering can also serve as 
revelation, a way that God communicates with human beings. The purpose of this 
revelatory suffering is not requital, but to chastise sinners, make them aware of their 
transgressions, and encourage them to repent. God is a “teacher” (36:22), but Job is 
proving a poor student, as he is wasting the opportunity he has been given to restore a 
right relationship with God. Elihu ends his long speech with an encomium to God’s 
goodness, justice, and majesty.  
In the course of his own eleven speeches, and in spite of the other speeches he has 
heard, Job rejects any implication that he bears responsibility for the woes that have 
befallen him, and thus rejects the idea that the principle of retribution is at work in his 
affliction. Against the repeated assertions of his friends, he continues to assail the idea 
that just people prosper and the wicked suffer, both in his own case and more generally. 
He maintains his innocence and places the responsibility for his suffering, as well as the 
injustice of the world, on God, who “destroys both the blameless and the wicked.… The 
earth is given into the hand of the wicked; he covers the eyes of its judges—if it is not he, 
who then is it?” (9:22, 24). If God is truly omnipotent, then the injustices of life can be 
truly attributed to him. At other points in the speeches, Job addresses God directly, 
pleading for mercy: “Let me alone, that I may find a little comfort before I go, never to 
return, to the land of gloom and deep darkness” (10:20b-21).  
Job’s speeches vary widely in substance and tone, from the initial “The Lord 
gave, and the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord” (1:21b), to the 
7 
 
angry “I loathe my life” (10:1b), to the pleading “withdraw your hand far from me” 
(13:21), to the insistent “I hold fast my righteousness and will not let it go” (27:6). Clines 
writes that, “By contrast with his friends’ single-minded and static positions, Job’s mind 
is confused, flexible, and experimental.”7 Job’s early trust in God’s justice has been 
battered, and he searches for a way to reconcile his present experiences with his previous 
beliefs about God and faith in the right order of the universe. Rather than rewarding the 
good, Job sees a God of “divine hostility,”8 unresponsive to human complaint, 
unaccountable for the divine actions, who “mocks at the calamity of the innocent” 
(9:23b) and continually engages in acts of aggression against his creation, from primitive 
times to the present (9:5-9).  
Still, and perhaps unexpectedly, Job desires to litigate his case against God. In 
chapters 13 and 14, Job presents his case to and against God, though even then he 
recognizes the futility of the gesture (14:18-22). He symbolically enters into a law court, 
one with no judge and no defendant present, addressing God directly: “Listen carefully to 
my words, and let my declaration be in your ears. I have indeed prepared my case; I 
know that I shall be vindicated” (13:17-18). He asserts his innocence, asking, “How 
many are my iniquities and my sins? Make me know my transgression and my sin” 
(13:25). Job never recants this central claim, and further notes of confidence will be 
sounded subsequently. In spite of the fact that Job has been abandoned by friends and 
family, in spite of the fact that God has not deigned to speak, in spite of the fact that there 
                                                 
7
 Clines, Job 1–20, xlii. 
8
 Ibid., 252. 
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is no one who can adjudicate his case, even so, “I know that my advocate lives” (19:25, 
Clines translation). In this context, his own speech is his “advocate”; even if God’s 
hostility should remain unremitting and Job himself should die, the accusations Job has 
made, along with the manner of his life, will speak for themselves, forever. His final and 
longest speech, in chapters 29–31, continues this as a blustering recounting of the life he 
has lived, a climactic and confident proclamation of the rightness of his cause. With this 
bold declaration, he rests his case.  
Following the (possibly interpolated9) Elihu speeches, God enters the dialogue at 
chapter 38: “Then the Lord [YHWH] answered Job out of the whirlwind: ‘Who is this that 
darkens counsel by words without knowledge? Gird up your loins like a man, I will 
question you, and you shall declare to me’” (38:1-3). The defense attorney has arrived, 
and the cross-examination begins: “Where were you when I laid the foundation of the 
earth? Tell me, if you have understanding” (38:4). Job demanded answers from God, but 
God responds with questions instead, and aggressive, pointed questions at that. Though 
Job had been pressing the issue of justice, God’s reply does not address justice at all. 
Rather, in lyrical, impressionistic poetry, God speaks first of the majesty of the created 
universe (38:4-38), and second of the wild kingdom of animals (38:39–39:30). God 
describes a complex world that is organized with precision and forethought. The structure 
of creation evidences not only power but wisdom, and creation’s diversity evidences 
immense creativity and imagination. Indeed, God’s speech implies that creation is as it 
                                                 
9
 See Marvin H. Pope, Job: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, Anchor Bible 15 (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007), xxvii–xxviii; Clines, Job 21–37, 708–742; David J. A. Clines, 
Job 38–42, Word Biblical Commentary 18B (Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 2011), 1052. 
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should be; it remains as it was designed, even in its more brutal aspects (e.g., 39:16-17). 
Not once in the speech, however, is the structure and diversity of the human race itself 
mentioned as God’s crowning achievement. Instead, the “Behemoth” is presented as “the 
first of the great acts of God” (40:15, 19). It becomes clear from God’s speech that the 
world is not designed with Job’s comfort or safety in mind, and this description of the 
wonders of creation simply is God’s response to Job’s complaints about unjustifiable 
suffering. Like the Behemoth, Job’s condition of innocent suffering is part of the order of 
the world, and he has no vantage point from which to criticize that order. This is as much 
“explanation” as Job gets. God never addresses the doctrine of retribution, nor does he 
accept or deny Job’s assertions of innocence. Justice is simply not an issue with which 
God is concerned in these speeches. What Job, his friends, and the reader have taken to 
be the most salient facts of the narrative thus far are ignored in God’s response. The 
moral order of the world is as wild and unfathomable as the wild animals God has 
created. In both the natural and moral orders, Clines writes, “there is much that is 
incomprehensible to humans, even threatening their existence, but all of it is the work of 
a wise God who has made the world for his own inscrutable purposes. Innocent suffering 
is a hippopotamus. The only sense it makes, it makes to God, for it is not amenable to 
human rationality.”10 Job can have trust, or he will have nothing at all. 
It is unclear which Job chooses. He answers the Lord but without an apology: 
“Therefore I have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful for me, which I 
                                                 
10
 Clines, Job 1–20, xlvi. 
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did not know” (42:3b-c). He seems well-aware that God has trumped his charges, not 
answered them. In Job’s critical response in chapter 42, his final lines are a thicket of 
textual and exegetical complexities: the NRSV translates 42:6 as, “therefore I despise 
myself, and repent in dust and ashes”; Clines translates it as, “So I submit, and I accept 
consolation for my dust and ashes”; Pope’s version is, “So I recant and repent in dust and 
ashes.” At stake in these differing translations of Job’s passage is his attitude toward God 
following the divine speeches. Is he sincerely regretful for bringing such a case against 
God, as he seems to be in the New Revised Standard Version? Does the fact that he says 
very little—primarily quoting God’s words back to him—show that he is cowed? Or is he 
being ironic, sharply aware that his desire for explanation remains unfulfilled, and will 
remain so? Is he merely feigning submission? Is he, in fact, contemptuous of God, “more 
insolent than repentant,” as John Curtis posits?11 Job’s response is ambiguous in the 
extreme. 
God’s response to Job’s response is ambiguous as well as God addresses Job’s 
friends. To Eliphaz the Lord says, “My wrath is kindled against you and against your two 
friends; for you have not spoken of me what is right, as my servant Job has,” and, “you 
have not spoken of me what is right, as my servant Job has done” (42:7b, 8b). God then 
instructs the friends to offer a burnt offering and to ask Job for his intercessions. (Does it 
pass Job’s notice that he had offered burnt offerings and made intercessions for his 
children, to no effect?) While, on the one hand, God’s condemnation of the friends may 
                                                 
11
 John Briggs Curtis, “On Job’s Response to Yahweh,” Journal of Biblical Literature 98, no. 4 (December 
1979): 499. 
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be understandable—their invocation of an iron law of retribution is undermined by the 
divine speeches—it seems inconsistent for God to speak kindly of Job’s accusations 
when God’s response has undermined those as well. One answer could be that God 
perceives that Job’s suit against him shows Job’s faith in God’s justice, even when the 
reality seemed unjust. Yet Job’s friends also had faith in God’s justice, so much so that 
they could not believe that Job was truly innocent. God’s reply does not clarify Job’s 
situation or the arguments between Job and his friends.  
The epilogue, a prose section that forms the end frame of the poetic dialogue, 
similarly does not provide clarity.12 Consistent with the tone of the prologue, Job’s 
fortunes are restored twofold “when he had prayed for his friends” (42:10); he was 
reconciled with his sisters and brothers, who provided him with “sympathy and 
comforted him,” as well as giving him money and a gold ring; the number of his 
livestock was doubled from what it was before; ten new children were born to him; he 
lived another 140 years. Yet it remains difficult to find in this epilogue a clear resolution 
of the book’s difficulties. In providing for Job in this way, is God atoning for the 
affliction of Job? Is this Job’s reward for passing the test God allowed Satan to subject 
him to? But did Job in fact pass the test, given that he loathed his life and rued the day of 
his birth? The text gives the reader something like the consolation of a happy ending—
though not, of course, happy for Job’s first ten children, now dead—but one is left 
uneasy. The restoration of the fortune of Job seems to be a counter-narrative that 
                                                 
12
 There is a theory that the prologue and epilogue were written separately, with the epilogue in particular 
being used by a later author to mitigate the more hostile image of God presented in the dialogues. This is 
not the majority view among scholars of Job; see Clines, Job 1–20, lvii–lviii; Pope, Job, xxiii–xxx. 
12 
 
reinforces the doctrine of retribution: if Job’s final speech is sincerely repentant, then 
Job’s new prosperity shows that his friends were right, and the faithful are indeed 
rewarded. On the other hand, the alternative possibility is just as unnerving: rather than 
being rewarded, perhaps God’s acceptance of Job at the end of the book (“the Lord also 
accepted Job” [42:9]) is just as arbitrary as God’s permission that Job be afflicted in the 
first place. Job gets “happily ever after,” perhaps, but it is not a reassertion of some kind 
of discernible order in the world. Job is destroyed; Job is restored. The destruction is 
total; the restoration is total. The reader understandably looks for some kind of clear 
moral lesson in this, but the book of Job does not allow that. Like Job’s friends, the 
reader seeks order, but there is no clear order to be discerned in the book of Job. Taken as 
a whole, Job may disrupt an understanding of an automatic scheme of reward and 
punishment, but it does not univocally dismiss it altogether.  
Indeed, the book of Job does not seem to do anything univocally. It is an odd, 
fragmentary, and unique book that fails to fit into any customary genre. Job is sui generis. 
Attempts to classify it in a category shared with other literary works (including Greek 
tragedy13) have proven unsuccessful, and it sticks out from other Biblical literature like a 
sore thumb. David Raphael asserts that in Job, unlike in any other text in the Bible, “the 
problem of evil raises doubts and no solution is provided.”14 If the Deuterocanonical texts 
may be interpreted to suggest the presence of a transactional relationship between God 
                                                 
13
 Horace Meyer Kallen, The Book of Job as a Greek Tragedy (New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 
1918). 
14
 David Daiches Raphael, The Paradox of Tragedy (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1960), 
47. 
13 
 
and Israel, then the book of Job undermines such a view—though this undermining is 
itself put into question by the fact that Job is not an Israelite and thus not a part of the 
covenant relationship. The book of Job remains a thorn in the side of seekers of 
resolution, as the ambiguities, protests, silences, accusations, and defenses in the book 
frustrate any attempt to arrive at a clear conclusion regarding the problem of suffering. 
Terrence Tilley is correct in asserting that, “Job is not a book of answers, but a text of 
warning, perhaps even a text of terror.”15 This may, however, serve as its own suggestion 
regarding proper considerations of suffering, if Job is taken as an indication of what is 
proper: no single answer will suffice; any faithful consideration will be dialectical; 
straightforward schemas will chafe against real-life experiences.  
In this way, however, Job may serve as a useful corrective to contemporary 
accounts of theodicy. It is significant that the book of Job is not about suffering, 
considered generically. The text is about the plight of a single sufferer—Job, the 
blameless man from Uz—in his specific context. This specificity makes Job a useful 
contrast to much contemporary work in theodicy, in which particular experiences are 
often deemphasized. It is instructive to see that in this primary (though not exclusive16) 
Scriptural discussion of innocent suffering the author avoids this. The book of Job 
suggests that a concern with specifics should be a mark of considerations of suffering. 
Clines identifies this principle as an implication of God’s first speech: the omission of 
                                                 
15
 Terrence W. Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1991), 109. 
16
 See the essays in Antti Laato and Johannes C. de Moor, eds., Theodicy in the World of the Bible (Leiden: 
Brill, 2003), which discuss theodicy in the books of the Hebrew Bible and New Testament, as well as in the 
literature of the Ancient Near East, early Jewish writings, and rabbinic Judaism. 
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human beings in the roster of the created order “is not to teach Job that the universe can 
survive without him … but to show that the principles on which it is founded should be 
discerned from the realities of the natural world rather than from some artificial 
theology.”17 The requirement that theology should be accountable to the observable 
principles of the natural world (including individual experiences) is one supported by the 
book of Job and a component of the method of this dissertation. 
In fact, this may be why, as Tilley notes, the story of Job appears in popular 
commentaries but less frequently in the writings of Christian philosophical theologians.18 
At first blush, this may be surprising: if Job is the ur-text of innocent suffering in the 
biblical canon, then surely it should be an important text for contemporary theological 
reflection. However, the “lessons” of Job (such as they are) are no lessons at all, and 
unhelpful in resolving the tension that exists in the twin assertions of a good God and a 
suffering creation; if anything, the text aggravates that tension. In the work reviewed 
going forward in this dissertation, some of the complications raised by the book of Job 
are omitted. In many ways, Job stands alone.  
Augustine of Hippo: Against “silly complaints” 
The work of Augustine of Hippo (354–430) has profoundly shaped the debate on 
Christian considerations of evil. Contemporary theologian John Hick, for example, refers 
to Augustine as the “fountainhead” of Christian belief about the problem of evil in 
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Western Christianity.19 More recently, Charles Mathewes has argued for a recovery of an 
Augustinian theodicy in a modern world that is decidedly suspicious of the fifth-century 
African bishop.20 (Mathewes cites Goulven Madec’s description of Augustine as the “evil 
genius” of the tradition.21) While evaluations of Augustine’s work may differ, all 
recognize the central role Augustine plays even in contemporary theological 
conversations about evil. While this dissertation cannot do justice to the full scope and 
subtlety of Augustine’s thought—throughout which a concern with the problem of evil is 
visible, perhaps even as an “obsess[ion]”22—even in summary it is possible to see the 
foundation that Augustine laid for later theologians. 
Augustine’s mature thoughts on evil were formed against the backdrop of the 
Manichean controversy. While Augustine eventually became one of the fiercest critics of 
the Manicheans, who were followers of the Persian teacher Mani (216–277), he did so as 
a former adherent, having himself been a part of the Manichean sect for nine years, 
beginning around 373. One of the attractions of Manichean philosophy for Augustine was 
its wrestling with the problem of evil in a serious and sustained manner. Indeed, the 
Manicheans made it a centerpiece of their dualist philosophy: a primeval struggle 
between good and evil, between light and darkness, was a fundamental feature of reality. 
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The world itself is the result of this conflict, as the Darkness attempts to overcome the 
Light, with partial success. The Manicheans held that Satan had stolen particles of light 
from the world of Light and imprisoned those particles in the minds of human beings. 
The goal of religious practice, therefore, was to release those particles of light. The result 
of such a metaphysics is the belief that evil is a substance in the world, a primordial, 
constituent member of reality, having its own ontological status on par with God.  
It was the preaching and teachings of Ambrose (330–397), then Bishop of Milan, 
that led Augustine to catholic Christianity, though his interest in Manichean philosophy 
was already on the wane. Even after his conversion, however, the notion of evil, and its 
cause, remained a problem with which Augustine grappled.23 Prior exposure to “some 
books of the Platonists, translated from Greek into Latin,”24 specifically the writings of 
Plotinus (204–270) and Plotinus’ student Porphyry (234–305), gave him a metaphysics of 
the sovereignty and immutability of God that would prepare him for his conversion to 
Christianity. Plotinus could not effect Augustine’s conversion, however: Greek 
philosophy could teach that “In the beginning was the Word,” but not that “the word was 
made flesh.”25 Nonetheless, Plotinus’ work helped Augustine with his own thinking on 
the problem of evil, since Plotinus supported the notion that the One is absolute and 
transcendent, beyond any conception of being or intellect. A result of this is that evil is 
no-thing:  
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If such be the Nature of Beings and of That which transcends all the realm of 
Being, Evil cannot have place among Beings or in the Beyond-Being; these are 
good. There remains, only, if Evil exist at all, that it be situate in the realm of 
Non-Being, that it be some mode, as it were, of the Non-Being.… By this Non-
Being, of course, we are not to understand something that simply does not exist, 
but only something of an utterly different order from Authentic-Being.26  
This principle would be influential for Augustine’s continuing understanding.  
If evil is not a thing in the world, however, then how can one account for it? Like 
Plotinus, and against the Manicheans, Augustine came to believe that every substance—
everything that exists—is good, solely on the basis of its existence, because existence 
itself is good.27 Things that are good can be corrupted, and thereby lose some of their 
goodness, but their ability to be corrupted is proof of their prior goodness. Something that 
is entirely evil cannot be corrupted because it is entirely evil; therefore, “only something 
good can be evil.”28 Since existence itself is a good, then simply by existing, anything that 
exists maintains some level of goodness, even if that goodness is significantly 
diminished. Should something lose all of its goodness, it would cease to exist.29 If evil is 
a thing, then it would be a thing that lacked all goodness. Things that lack all goodness, 
however, do not exist. Therefore, evil does not exist. Whatever evil is, then, it cannot be a 
thing in the world.  
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Importantly, Augustine differentiated evil that is committed (malum culpae) and 
evil that is suffered (malum poenae).30 For Augustine, all suffering is a result of sin, and 
therefore, there is no genetic difference between natural and moral evil: “A wanton will is 
the cause of all evils.”31 Even in children, the taint of original sin is evident. He writes in 
the Confessions of observing a “jealous baby,” and of himself he writes of his knowledge 
of when he acted “reprehensibly,” even as an infant.32 “So tiny a child,” he writes, “and 
so great a sinner.”33 Without the filter of custom, which they come to learn later, children 
reveal the true human nature, and it is marked by sin. This is epitomized in the theft of 
pears that he and his friends engaged in as adolescents; it was done for no reason other 
than to be wicked. “Though attractive in neither color nor taste,” the friends stole the fruit 
from a neighbor’s vineyard, and their “pleasure lay in doing what was not allowed.”34  
It is original sin that results in the “punishment of suffering,” which includes 
natural evil. If humanity was not marked by sin, humanity would not suffer from the state 
of the world being as it is. In this way, sin becomes the base cause of all suffering. As G. 
R. Evans puts it, “Is the existence of sin the real problem of evil? This is the view to 
which Augustine came gradually after his conversion. Everything else—animal pain, 
disruptions to the natural order such as earthquakes, traffic accidents—can be referred to 
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one or the other of these.”35 Sin is what changes what is “very good” (Genesis 1:31) into 
what is experienced as evil: “Evil things are not part of nature, but everything that is 
called evil is either sin or the punishment of sin, and sin is nothing but the twisted consent 
of the free will.”36 This is as true in the natural world as it is in the moral realm: “There is 
nothing evil about fire, since it is a creature of God; but all the same we in our frailty get 
burned by it as our sins justly deserve.”37 As a result, the primary thrust of Augustine’s 
writings on evil and the suffering that follows as a consequence has to do with human sin 
and the disordered will, and the human psyche is his frequent object of concern.  
But how does human sin result in natural evil? Further, even if one grants that 
human beings have brought great suffering upon themselves through original sin, how 
can one account for the presence of suffering in the nonhuman world, among beings 
whose mental capacities do not allow them to participate in the primordial Fall? 
Augustine predicts just this question in his Literal Meaning of Genesis, published in 416. 
“Someone is going to say: ‘Then why do beasts injure one another, though they neither 
have any sins, so that this kind of thing could be called punishment, nor by such trials do 
they gain at all in virtue?” The answer is easy: “For the simple reason, of course, that 
some are the proper diet of others.”38 The order as a whole is harmonious, and 
questioning the means by which this harmony is achieved is not the prerogative of the 
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human being: “Nor can we have any right to say, ‘There shouldn’t be some on which 
others feed.’”39  
Augustine had also addressed a similar issue in the earlier work On the Free 
Choice of the Will, completed in 395. There he acknowledges the rhetorical power of the 
suffering of animals, which is sometimes employed by “slanderous critics”: “They often 
shake up the faith of the less educated with even the sufferings and travails of animals: 
‘What evil have animals done to deserve to suffer such great distress? What good do they 
hope for, since they are vexed with such great distress?’” The desire of these critics is 
misplaced, however: “Well, those who speak or think this way have an unbalanced 
assessment of things. Since they cannot recognize what the highest good is, nor how great 
it is, they want everything to be the way they think the highest good is.”40 Contrary to 
their opinions, however, the “pain of beasts” has an edifying function: the animals’ 
aversion to it displays to humans that the desire for personal unity and bodily integrity 
extends throughout the created order and therefore illustrates that all of creation was 
“fashioned by the supreme and sublime and inexpressible unity of their Creator.”41 
For Augustine, it is only a limited view that sees natural evil as an aberration to be 
explained. At the deepest level, all created things are in harmony. Following his 
conversion, Augustine “saw that each thing is harmonious not only with its place but with 
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its time.”42 Those things that seem to be evil in the natural world, such as the effects of 
natural disasters, are in actuality the result of a “conflict of interest” between things that 
are, fundamentally, good.43 “There is beauty in the composition of the world’s history 
arising from the antithesis of contraries—a kind of eloquence in events, instead of in 
words.”44 Certainly, considered by themselves, some of these things or events could be 
considered contrary to the goodness of creation: “If I were to regard them in isolation, I 
would indeed wish for something better.”45 But one should not consider things in 
isolation. Once he became a Christian Augustine wrote that, “I no longer wished 
individual things to be better, because I considered the totality. Superior things are self-
evidently better than inferior. Yet with a sounder judgment I held that all things taken 
together are better than superior things by themselves.”46 In Augustine’s aesthetic 
judgment, the world manifests its goodness, even if the view from a more limited 
perspective is not able to see that. Far from being ingrained in the fabric of creation, “Evil 
is contrary to nature.”47 
After all, the beauty of creation would not be possible “unless there were some 
beasts that prey on the bodies of others for the sustenance of their own bodies, while the 
others look after themselves either by their ability to fight back or by their speed in taking 
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flight, or by taking refuge in their hiding holes.”48 Even physical suffering, therefore, is a 
necessary part of the beauty of creation, though it may be unpleasant in itself—just as the 
blackness in a picture, though useless considered in isolation, may nonetheless contribute 
to the overall goodness of the picture.49 In a passage that resonates with later scientific 
developments, Augustine writes, “In those areas of the universe where such creatures 
have their proper being, we see a constant succession, as some things pass away and 
others arise, as the weaker succumb to the stronger, and those that are overwhelmed 
change into the qualities of their conquerors; and thus we have a pattern of a world of 
continual transience.”50 This may be painful to see: “We, for our part, can see no beauty 
in this pattern to give us delight; and the reason is that we are involved in a section of it, 
under our condition of mortality, and so we cannot observe the whole design, in which 
these small parts, which are to us so disagreeable, fit together to make a scheme of 
ordered beauty.”51 Further, not only does physical suffering contribute to the beauty of 
creation, but it also has the potential to be edifying for the individual:  
And after all, even bodily pain in any animate creature is itself a great and 
wonderful power of the soul, which is quickening the entire organism and holding 
it together by being mixed in with it in a manner beyond words, and giving it a 
certain unity in its own small measure; the pain it feels means, if I may so put it, 
that it is not indifferent to the organism being spoiled or broken up, but reacts to 
this with indignation.52  
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One sees here an emphasis on the benefits of the pain that exists in the natural 
world: pain is necessary to prevent the destruction of an organism, as well as to benefit it 
by improving its moral character. Speaking of poisonous animals, he writes, “So it would 
have been quite possible for these creatures to do no harm when they were created, if no 
occasion had arisen for punishing vices and frightening people off them, or for testing 
virtue and making people perfect.… And it is only just that the eternal salvation which 
had been disgracefully lost through willfulness, should be courageously won back again 
through pain.”53 Augustine is positive that these apparent evils have a latent edifying 
quality, even when that cannot be seen. It was for the edification of the human race that 
God allows evil: “He judged it better to bring good out of evil than to allow nothing evil 
to exist.”54 
For some “heretics,” this may be difficult to see, because  
there are so many things which do not suit the inadequacy and frailty of our moral 
flesh, which has already come under deserved punishment, many things which 
cause distress, like fire, cold, wild animals, and so on. They do not observe the 
value of those things in their own sphere and in their own nature, their position in 
the splendor of the providential order and the contribution they make by their own 
special beauty to the whole material scheme, as to a universal commonwealth.55  
After all, even those things “which cause distress” can have a purpose that furthers the 
good: “Even poisons, which are disastrous when improperly used, are turned into 
wholesome medicines by their proper application.”56 Besides, these things are 
intrinsically good in themselves; the perception of malum only arises when they are 
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considered in relation to other creatures. But this notion of creatures considered ad 
nostrum is misguided; each creature must be considered per se ipsas, in terms of what it 
is itself, not in terms of its utility (or injury) to other creatures. When each creature is 
considered in itself, the goodness of creation is self-evident.  
For this reason, to focus on the negative qualities is to miss the grander picture of 
the splendor of creation and to ignore the positive attributes of what is apparently 
negative: “Divine providence thus warns us not to indulge in silly complaints about the 
state of affairs, but to take pains to inquire what useful purposes are served by things.”57 
Augustine admits that these useful purposes may not be immediately obvious, but this is 
a failure of perception, not a fault in creation: “When we fail to find the answer [i.e., the 
“useful purposes”], either through deficiency of insight or of staying power, we should 
believe that the purpose is hidden from us.”58 Even the “obscurity of … purpose” has a 
purpose, as “it may serve to exercise our humility or to undermine our pride.”59 So “Let 
not man say ‘What is this? Why is that?’ Let him not say it, let him not say it; for he is 
man.”60 
Commenting on Augustine’s discussions of evil, Rowan Williams writes that, for 
Augustine, it is this difference in perception that determines one’s relationship to 
understanding evil. Rather than a philosophical problem that will have a philosophical 
answer, “Evil presents itself to the Christian philosopher as an epistemological 
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problem.… This is why the solution of the problem (as Confessions VII makes plain) is 
conversion rather than metaphysical ingenuity: God must solve the problem for us by 
transforming our thinking and willing.”61 Without this conversion of the heart, the 
problem of evil remains intractable; with this conversion, it can be seen as an aberration, 
a lack, something minimal and external to the world, which was created as good.  
Coming to the conclusion that evil is a result of human sin and not a Manichean 
substance of similar status with God also has the consequence of reducing evil’s scale. As 
Evans represents Augustine’s position, evil is “no more than a gnat-bite—certainly not a 
hideous disease deforming the universe.”62 The true “problem of evil” is actually the 
presence of sin in the world, and not something intrinsic to the natural order separate 
from human beings. The created world, including the human body, is, in itself, good and 
devoid of evil. It is only sin that has resulted in the natural order being experienced as 
destructive to human beings. The converted soul will realize the anthropological 
provenance of evil, and thus the idea of a conflict between God and evil will come to be 
seen as fallacious. The problem of evil is really the problem of sin. 
However, there is a nuance that arises in Augustine’s thought in his later years.63 
If his emphasis contra the Manicheans was on evil as mere appearance, and the 
perception of evil the result of a lack of correct perspective, Augustine recognizes in 
Books XIX and XXII of City of God that even among human beings there exists suffering 
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that does not have to do with one’s own misguided desires or even the misguided desires 
of others. On the contrary, Augustine shows an awareness of the extent of physical 
suffering that is incurred not as a result of any sin in particular but simply as part of the 
natural order of the course of a human life. He writes in detail of the “wise man” in his 
advanced years having “limbs [that] shake and tremble” or a spine “so curved as to bring 
his hands to the ground, turning the man into a virtual quadruped,”64 and he writes at 
length about other physical sufferings. The observation of various other natural 
deficiencies are enough that we “can scarcely—or possibly we cannot at all—restrain our 
tears, if we consider their situation as it deserves to be considered.”65 He mocks the 
Stoics, who claim that a person living such an enfeeble life, the pain of which can be 
intense enough to cause the individual to commit suicide, is or can be nonetheless happy, 
and who claim that “those ills are not ills at all.”66 Incredulous, he writes, “This shows 
that those who acknowledged such things to be evils are talking in a more tolerable 
fashion.”67  
One even gets a glimpse of a more pessimistic Augustine in Book XXII, for 
whom suffering is more than a “gnat-bite.” He writes, “This present life of ours (if a state 
full of so much grievous misery can be called a life) is evidence that all the mortal 
descendants of the first man came under condemnation.” These are not only the results of 
a personal moral evil that has been committed, but “the pains which trouble all mankind. 
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How many of those there are, and how oppressive, which are not directed to the 
punishment of the wickedness and lawlessness of evil man, but are part of our common 
condition of wretchedness! Who can discuss them all in a discourse? Who can grasp them 
all in his thought?”68 He is aware that this is found in the natural world taken on its own 
terms: “Then there are the fears of the dreaded calamities from nonhuman sources; and 
they are past counting: the dread of extremes of heat and cold; of storm tempest, and 
flood; of thunder and lightning, hail and thunderbolt; of earthquakes and upheavals; the 
terror of being crushed by falling buildings, of attacks by animals, in panic or in malice; 
of the bites of wild beasts” and so on.69 This is no way to live. It is a “life of misery, a 
kind of hell on earth,” from which there is no escape, except eschatologically through the 
mediation by grace of Christ.70 In the face of such experiences, it cannot be denied that 
even genuine virtues “do not profess to have the power to ensure that the people in whom 
they exist will not suffer any miseries.”71 The rain falls both on the just and on the unjust. 
Nonetheless, it is in the response to suffering that the difference between the virtuous and 
the wicked person is found: “Thus the wicked, under pressure of affliction, execrate God 
and blaspheme; the good, in the same affliction, offer up prayers and praises. This shows 
what matters is the nature of the sufferer, not the nature of the sufferings.”72 
Augustine is able to see, however, that, “though human life is compelled to be 
wretched by all the grievous evils of this world, it is happy in the expectation of the world 
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to come.”73 It is this forward-looking hope that makes happiness possible, even over 
against the physical pains that are incurred in the current physical life: “We do not enjoy 
a present happiness, but look forward to happiness in the future, and we look forward 
‘with steadfast endurance.’ We are beset by evils, and we have to endure them steadfastly 
until we reach those goods where there will be everything to supply us with delight 
beyond the telling, and there will be nothing any longer that we are bound to endure.”74  
Is Augustine’s position tenable today? It certainly faces several challenges. First, 
Augustine’s understanding of the inherent goodness of the human body, even in its 
fragility and vulnerability to natural ills, is facilitated for him by his understanding of 
Scripture. Notwithstanding his fondness for allegorical interpretations,75 Augustine, like 
his contemporaries, believed in an historic Adam and Eve who had been completely 
without any type of pain;76 they were also immortal, free from “inevitable death.”77 As a 
result, Augustine is able to contrast the human body free from the effects of original sin 
with the human body that bears the marks of original sin. “Those first human beings did 
indeed have merely ‘ensouled’ bodies, but ones that were not going to die unless they 
sinned … but as soon as they transgressed the commandment, they contracted death itself 
in their members, like some lethal illness.”78 Death was a kind of foreign force for the 
first couple, and certainly not something intrinsic to the world as it was created. That 
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organic bodies suffer death, therefore, was considered an accident, not something that 
was part of their inherent nature. Biological evolution, however, shows that, on the 
contrary, death and reproduction is a requisite part of the process of species 
differentiation; it is, at least on Earth, an inherent part of the nature of every creature. The 
harmony in creation that Augustine so admired requires it. A world without death is no 
recognizable world at all. 
Second, the prior assumptions that Augustine makes determine his conclusions. It 
is axiomatic for him that creation, as it currently exists and considered as a whole, is 
good, in a recognizable way, because it was created by God ex nihilo, and God is wholly 
good and judged creation as wholly good. The realization of this inherent and complete 
goodness was part and parcel of his conversion to catholic Christianity. If creation is 
wholly good in this way, then the evils, including suffering, that are undergone by 
creatures are only deceptive appearances of evil, misconstrued by the unconverted mind. 
That suffering may be authentic, to be sure, such as when one animal is the “proper diet” 
of another. But even that suffering itself is part of the overall harmony and beauty of 
nature, the “eloquence of events.” It will be the position of this dissertation that “overall 
harmony” does not morally account for the pivotal role of pain and death in the 
development of organic life. 
However, the development over time that can be observed in Augustine’s thought 
suggests that he recognized, at least as regards human beings, the occasionally adversarial 
relationships that creatures may have with one another, relationships that are the results 
of natural drives. If his earlier views maximized the goodness of creation and minimized 
30 
 
the problem of suffering, later writings restored some of the balance. The “solution” 
becomes eschatological, to be found only in the heavenly realm. An invocation of the 
eschaton, however, obviously raises its own questions for this theology, questions that are 
far from settled and which require their own justification. 
Thomas Aquinas: The allowance of defects 
There is a clear line of continuity between Augustine and Thomas Aquinas 
(1225–1274). Like Augustine, Aquinas holds being itself to be a good, and thus anything 
that exists is at least somewhat good by virtue of existing at all: “Every being, considered 
as such, is good.”79 This has important implications when discussing the nature of evil; 
again like Augustine, the badness of suffering indicates that a thing lacks goodness—not 
that it has badness.  
Nonetheless, one does see in Aquinas a shift in theological understanding of the 
relationship between God and evil. This shift is part and parcel of a larger Thomistic 
metaphysics. When discussing Aquinas on evil, one cannot consider that topic in 
isolation but must take into account other questions that Aquinas asks as well. Brian 
Davies identifies only a few: “‘What is a being?’ ‘What is a cause?’ ‘What kinds of 
beings are there?’ and ‘What kinds of causes are there?’”80 All of these questions bear on 
the question of suffering in nature.  
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Aquinas also adopts Augustine’s separation of types of evil into “evil committed” 
(malum culpae) and “evil suffered” (malum poenae)—that is, evil that is the result of the 
immoral actions of a free creature, versus the evil that is suffered without reference to 
moral fault.81 For Aquinas, God does not cause the evil that is suffered. Instead, evil 
suffered, in contrast to moral evil, can be the result of the consequences of things being 
good. In Davies’ example, a particular virus that afflicts a particular human being is 
doing what viruses do when they are acting as viruses should.82 This is because, for 
Aquinas, what any being is doing is “good” when it is operating with the goal of its own 
perfection.83 
In addition, the person made sick by the virus is still good, in the sense that she is 
still a human being, whose existence is, intrinsically, good. This is true even if her 
sickness makes her less good because she is less fully realizing her human potential than 
she would be without his encounter with the virus. The sickness itself, of course, is not 
good and can even be termed evil, but the sickness is not a thing in itself; it is a reduction 
in a particular good (the person) caused by the interaction of two goods. Davies writes, 
“According to Aquinas, evil suffered occurs only insofar as there is a concomitant good 
in the light of which it can be explained. It is, he thinks, due to something that by being 
good in its way [e.g., the virus], causes something else to be bad in its way [e.g., the 
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human being].”84 Therefore, Aquinas sees evil that is suffered as “nothing but a matter of 
goodness and in no way a matter of badness being caused by God.”85 
Therefore, Aquinas is able to say that God causes goodness, the good of the virus 
and the good of the human being, but never causes badness, which is the result of the 
interaction of two goods. A particular badness may “exist”—sickness does occur, and it 
can be identified as such, and, in this sense, has being—but it does not have esse, or 
independent being; there is no sickness without health, though there can be health without 
sickness.86 While this does not mean that God is wholly unrelated to evil, it does mean 
that God is not directly causally related. In fact, he explicitly rejects the idea that God 
wills physical evils directly, even in order to bring about good. “Some have held that 
although God does not will evils, he wills them to come to be and exist, for though they 
are not good it is well if they enter or are present,” since they lead to what is good. 
Aquinas disagrees: “For evil is not intrinsically ordered to good. It is ordered to good 
indirectly.”87 That goodness may arise from the presence of evils does not make these 
evils non-evil, and thus they are not a direct part of God’s will. “God neither wills evils to 
be nor wills them not to be. He wills to allow them to happen, and this is good.”88 
According to Aquinas, the key to understanding God’s relationship to evil is to see that, 
unlike goodness, evil does not have a formal or final cause but only an efficient cause, 
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such that it is not caused directly but is “incidental” (accidens).89 Rather than being 
directly willed by God, it is an indirect consequence of the goodness that God truly and 
directly causes and wills. Even something “absolutely good” can nonetheless serve as an 
evil for something else, “as, for example, the form of fire is a good absolutely and an evil 
for water.”90 
These indirect physical consequences are the inevitable results of the fact of there 
being a material world such as the one we inhabit, with its particular natural processes. 
Natural processes, of which all organic life takes part, will unavoidably result in 
suffering, even though suffering is not willed directly by God. As Davies puts it, 
“Aquinas’ view is that God cannot make lions and lambs without the lambs having 
something to worry about,” as each creature goes about its business of flourishing, each 
in its own way.91 This is the only motivation among different animals. Aquinas writes, 
“No natural agent intends privation or destruction,” but rather desires what is good. This 
is as true for “natural appetite” or “animal appetite” as “intelligent appetite, which is 
will.”92 The lion’s “intention” (as well as the virus’, and, for that matter, the lamb’s) is to 
advance its flourishing, which requires the constant intake of food. That the lion’s 
flourishing involves the retardation of the flourishing of the lamb is an accidental result. 
In the material world as we know it—which is as God created it—the carnivorous 
consumption of food is how lions thrive. 
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Because this “badness” for the lamb is a per accidens result of the interaction of 
goods in a material world created by God, Aquinas differs from some other theologians 
in his conception of life in Eden. Aquinas responds to theologians who describe the 
supposedly prelapsarian state as one of peace among all creatures and animal suffering as 
a byproduct of the transgression of Adam and Eve. In this view, the prelapsarian paradise 
lacked the violence of the natural world of the present day. This option, however, is not 
available for Aquinas since he sees violence as an intrinsic part of the system of natural 
processes. Further, he affirms that the Edenic world was a material world, as the creation 
narratives attest; at no point has the created world ever been a purely spiritual realm.93 In 
a material world, goods interact in a way that results in physical suffering. Therefore, for 
Aquinas, this must be as true in Eden as in any other place; lions and lambs may lie down 
together in the redeemed, new earth but not at any time before that. “Some say that 
animals which are now savage and kill other animals would have been tame in that state, 
and not only towards man but towards other animals too. But this is altogether 
unreasonable,” he writes. “For man’s sin did not so change the nature of animals, that 
those whose nature it is now to eat other animals, like lions and hawks, would then have 
lived on a vegetable diet.”94 It is the human being who suffers malum poenae as a result 
of moral fault (“whether in the person or at least in human nature”), but one does not 
ascribe moral fault to beings without intellect and, where there is no fault, there is no 
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punishment.95 Whatever the nature of nonhuman animals is now is how it must have 
always been, therefore, even in paradise. Aquinas concludes that “clashes and antipathy 
would have been natural between certain animals even” in Eden.96 Animal suffering, 
then, is not a matter of malum poenae, the way human suffering is, but is simply part of 
life in a physical world.  
Like Augustine, Aquinas holds that the inability to see the goodness of this 
violent order, however, is a result of the lack of perspective some human beings have. 
Quoting the bishop of Hippo, he writes, “Thus some people presume to find fault with 
many things in this world, because they do not see the reason for their existence. For 
there are many things that would have no place in our own home, but are nevertheless 
necessary for the completeness of the universe.”97 He excepts human beings from these 
natural conflicts, however: “Before sin, however, man would have used the things of this 
world properly, and so poisonous animals would not have harmed him,”98 and there 
would not have been conflict between human beings either.  
The present experience of malum poenae is punishment for human beings, even if 
it is not a direct punishment for a specific moral wrong performed by an individual. “For 
three things belong to the nature of punishment,” he writes. “The first is that it should 
have a relation to moral fault.… And the tradition of faith holds that rational creatures 
would be unable to incur any harm, whether regarding the soul or the body or external 
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things, except because of a previous moral fault, whether in the person or at least in 
human nature.”99 He cites ancient authorities for this view: “Augustine says … that such 
ills [as death] derive from the condemnation of sin. Isidore also says … that water would 
not drown human beings, nor fire burn them, nor other like things come about, if a human 
being were not to have sinned. Therefore,” he concludes, “all such ills are punishment of 
original sin.”100  
Unlike some later thinkers, Aquinas does not deny that the universe could be 
different, and even, perhaps, better. If it were, however, then it would not be the universe 
we know but some other, and thus would be inaccessible to human knowledge. 
“Supposing the things that are, the universe cannot be better than it is,” he writes; 
however, “God could make other things, or add them to those he has made, and there 
would then be another and better universe.”101 Given the interconnection between all the 
different parts of the world, however, a single change here or there could not be made and 
the universe still stay, basically, the same. “If one part of [the universe] were improved, 
that would spoil the proportions of the whole design (overstretch one harp string and the 
melody is lost).”102 Instead, there would have to be “another and better universe” 
altogether. Such a world is possible in theory, but it is impossible to speak of; we have 
experiences of different animals, different foods, and different ideas, for example, but we 
have no direct experience of life in different universes with which we can compare our 
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present one. Given the universe that we have, however, the level of suffering in it is not 
only entirely explainable but even to be expected.  
Aquinas addresses the potential protests of those who may accuse God of neglect 
in allowing a world that, even in its paradisiacal state, contains within it suffering and 
violence as part of its organic architecture. One of his responses involves differentiating 
between “limited responsibility” and “universal providence.” The former is something 
that (human) individuals have, in one capacity or another: “Someone with [limited 
responsibility] wards off harm to an individual in their care so far as possible.”103 This is 
the kind of responsibility a parent has for children, or a king has for his subjects. God 
does not only have limited responsibility, however; God (and only God) has providential 
care for all “singulars”104 (as a king does) and also for all of creation taken as a whole. 
Therefore, unlike one with limited responsibility, “one with universal providence might 
allow some defect in one individual in order to preserve the good of a whole.”105 Indeed, 
this appears to be what God does, and this fact is the crux of the solution to the problem 
of natural evil for Aquinas:  
We therefore say that defects and death are contrary to the individual’s nature. 
But they still fall within the aim of nature as a whole—in so far as deficiency in 
something can lead to the good of something else, or to the good of the universe 
as a whole. For the passing away of one thing is the coming to be of something 
else, and this is a way in which species are preserved. So, since God is the 
universal guardian of all that is real, a quality of his providence is to allow 
defects in some particular things so as to safeguard the complete good of the 
universe. For if he prevented all evil, many good things would be lacking in the 
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world. Lions, for instance, would never survive if they had no prey on which to 
feed, and there would be no patience of martyrs were there no persecution by 
tyrants.”106  
In this view, the violence suffered in the natural world nonetheless falls under the 
providence of God; again, it is not that God wills the violence of lions any more than he 
wills the persecution by tyrants, but “he wills to allow them to happen, and this is 
good.”107  
Aquinas’ thought is not inherently contrary to a view of the place of suffering in 
creation that is amenable to Darwinian evolution. Since suffering is the result of the 
interaction of goods, even in a world that is perfectly good (i.e., Eden), we can expect 
there to be suffering. If this is the case, then it seems entirely reasonable to recognize the 
quality of tragedy as being an intrinsic quality of creation. Still, it is important to 
highlight the questions that Aquinas does not address in his system. His explication of 
creation stays at the level of the created world and, consistent with the kind of theological 
agnosticism about God’s nature found in the early articles of the Summa Theologiae, 
Aquinas denies that any human knowledge of creation makes it possible to then make 
conclusions about the character of God, or to speak of God’s “motivations,” for example, 
and whether these motivations are morally justifiable or not. In a Thomistic framework, 
God is not a moral agent of a kind that can be evaluated in the manner of a human moral 
agent. Because God is the creator of all things and cannot, therefore, be an existent on the 
order of created things, there is no way to compare and contrast God with objects of any 
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kind; there is no category of which God is a member. As Aquinas puts it, “Creatures are 
not related to God as to a thing of a different genus, but as to something outside of and 
prior to all genera.”108 Being the creator, God is outside of any moral community; God’s 
goodness, about which Aquinas affirms that one can speak, is not a matter of God being 
“well behaved.”109 This limits the possibility of potential language about God, and indeed 
this delineation of the grammar of possible talk about God is one of Aquinas’ primary 
projects in the Summa Theologiae. This consequence has significant implications for a 
discussion of natural evil and the divine. For this reason, the theology of Aquinas does 
not meet the criteria of a modern-day “theodicy,” understood as a defense of God in the 
face of suffering and evil. Aquinas would reject the logical coherence of a defense of God 
were he presented with the request to do so. 
However, it should be no surprise that a description of this separation of Creator 
and creature can be experienced emotionally by human beings as indifference. John Hick 
describes Aquinas on evil as writing “in an abstract and detached manner that seems well 
suited to the somewhat impersonal aesthetic principle that governs his theodicy.”110 He 
quotes Jacques Maritain on Aquinas’ doctrine: “The order of the universe requires … 
that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail.”111 The question at 
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issue in the present dissertation is not regarding moral failure but the way in which the 
natural world is structured, such that pain and suffering are not only intrinsic but also 
necessary to its continued functioning. The sentiment, however, is the same. 
The metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, and his scholastic version of natural 
theology, became the standard framework for theological reflection for centuries. For a 
number of reasons, however, the accepted notion that creation attested to the glory of 
God came under severe critique with the advent of modernity. Appreciations of an 
orderly design transitioned to a questioning of the premise of an orderly design in a way 
that continues to be common in contemporary philosophy and theology. No two 
philosophers illustrate the tension that arose between these two metaphysical worldviews 
better than Pierre Bayle and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. 
Pierre Bayle: The incompatibility of faith and reason 
By the late seventeenth century, the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on reason 
and independent thinking, was in its nascent stages, and the growth of scientific 
exploration led to an expectation that the world’s operations would continue to become 
more and more transparent. A trust in God’s providence, insofar as it relied on the 
mysterious operations of the world, was being lost among the leading intellectuals of the 
time. Belief in God’s providence being actualized through natural processes—a belief 
held, for example, by Galileo—was increasingly put into doubt. At the hands of Western 
European thinkers, the searing light of reason was casting a critical eye on the view of a 
good, just, and omnipotent God.  
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It was in the context of these shifting pressures that Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) 
wrote his Dictionnaire historique et critique, published in three folio volumes in 1697, 
with an enlarged second edition released in 1702. While Bayle’s exact religious views are 
a matter of immense controversy, for reasons that will become clear below, he was 
ostensibly a Calvinist throughout the period of his life when the bulk of his philosophical 
work was done. Born a Huguenot in France in 1647, he converted to Catholicism while 
attending a Jesuit college in Toulouse but left for the University of Geneva in 1670, 
returning to the Calvinist fold.112 After taking a position as a professor of philosophy at 
the École Illustrein in Rotterdam in 1680, he remained in that city until his death in 1706.  
In spite of—or perhaps because of—it being banned in France, the Dictionary 
was explosively popular. Thomas Lennon refers to it as “the philosophical blockbuster of 
all time,” and reports that, “Shelf counts of private libraries from the eighteenth century 
show the Dictionnaire overwhelming anything from the distant competition of Locke, 
Newton, Voltaire, and Rousseau.”113 Though less well known in recent years, Bayle was 
hailed by such philosophical luminaries as Denis Diderot and Voltaire, and Bayle had a 
significant and direct influence on David Hume as well, reflected in the many quotations 
from Bayle in Hume’s philosophical memoranda.114 Scholars find Bayle’s ideas present 
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even in such central Humean issues as skepticism and criticism of the design argument.115 
Traces of Bayle can also be found in Hume’s writings on Spinoza, time and space, and 
history.116 
The thesis of Bayle that is relevant for this dissertation can be expressed simply: 
“One must necessarily choose between philosophy and the Gospel.”117 By “philosophy,” 
Bayle means specifically the practice of reason as it had been developed by Descartes and 
others. One of the primary ways he explores these issues is in addressing the problem of 
evil. It was a puzzle of abiding concern for Bayle, and he discusses it several times in the 
Dictionary. In the entry “Manicheans,” Bayle imagines a conversation between 
Zoroaster, who is a Zoroastrian, and Melissus, who is an orthodox Christian.118 Zoroaster 
acknowledges that the concept of a unitary principle of good is better than a concept of 
two ultimate principles, “surpassing [it] in the beauty of ideas and in a priori reasons,” 
but holds that “I surpass you in the explanation of phenomena and in a posteriori 
reasons.”119 This is, Bayle interjects, “the main point of the whole affair.” From the 
Zoroastrian’s perspective, centuries of abstract theologizing have resulted in the positing 
of a simple and beautiful metaphysical system that explains the existence of only an 
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“infinitely good and holy principle.”120 However, such a system crumbles in the face of 
“the mixture of happiness and virtue with misery and vice” that is the object of human 
experience.121 Reasoning from the evidence of experience, the philosopher would have to 
reject the idea of a unitary good and conclude that Manichaeism better fits the 
observation of the world. Bayle remarks, however, that, for the faithful Christian, 
Manichaeism is not an option. There are no other principles equal to God, and this belief 
is non-negotiable. Since the exercise of reason leads to the contrary opinion, Bayle 
concludes that a Christian should not engage in such metaphysical speculation; the use of 
reason only ends in tears. It is better and more faithful to cling to the Biblical revelation 
and leave reason to itself. 
This is only one of several examples. In the entry “Paulicians,” Bayle undertakes 
a lengthy and relentless critique of several different methods of solving the problem of 
evil, both historical and contemporary, beginning with Lactantius (240–320 CE), who 
attempted to respond to Epicurus’ famous trilemma. Lactantius’ answer, he finds, “is 
pitiful. It is not only weak, but it is full of errors, and perhaps even heresies,” and then 
Bayle spends several pages showing how it is lacking.122 He does the same thing with 
Basil of Caesarea, concluding after several pages, “It is obvious that St. Basil argues 
badly.”123 He treats with particular disdain what is now known as the “free will defense,” 
the claim that “God permitted sin because he could not have prevented it without 
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destroying the free will”124 with which he had gifted humankind. He compares the picture 
of God that results with the idea of “a mother, who, knowing with certainty that her 
daughter would give up her virginity if, at such a time and in such a place, she were asked 
by a certain person, should then arrange that interview, lead her daughter there, and leave 
her to conduct herself as she sees fit,” a ribald metaphor that he returns to several times 
with different variations.125 (Leibniz sanitizes the story when he discusses it.126) 
Bayle claims to show that reason destroys any of these defenses of God’s 
goodness in light of the evil in the world. It is clear for Bayle that discussions of evil 
limited to the “natural light” (i.e., reason) invariably result in defeat for the monotheist. 
The rationalist theologians of the day, particularly Jean Le Clerc and Isaac Jaquelot, may 
try to reason their way out of the problem, but they fail, and they cannot but do otherwise. 
How should a Christian proceed when faced with such difficulties? Simply this: “Man’s 
understanding must be made a captive of faith and must submit to it.”127 This does not 
require overlong treatises or extended disputations, but a simple and final “Credo.” At the 
end of the lengthy entry on Paulicians, after knocking down one attempt at a theodicy 
after another, he writes, “Yes, [defenders of orthodoxy] will finally say, but ‘Shall the 
thing formed say to him that formed it, “Why hast thou made me thus?”’ (Romans 9:20). 
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This is well put, and there is where the matter should rest.”128 The defenses of God’s 
holiness have been brought to this; the theist has come full circle. Bayle continues,  
We are back at the beginning of the discussion. It would have been better to have 
remained there; for it is useless to enter into a dispute, if, after it has gone on for 
some time, one is forced finally to shut oneself up in one’s own theses. The 
doctrine that the Manicheans oppose ought to be considered by the orthodox as a 
truth of fact, clearly revealed; and since it must finally be admitted that the causes 
and the reasons for it cannot be understood, it would be better to say this from the 
outset, and stop there, and allow the objections of the philosophers to be 
considered as vain quibblings, and to oppose nothing to them but silence along 
with the shield of faith.129  
Bayle has relentlessly dismantled the different arguments and shown that defenses of God 
are philosophically bankrupt. Reason leads to a conviction of God as the author of sin and 
suffering, a view contrary to Scripture and tradition. Therefore, Bayle concludes, there 
must be a problem with reason (“It is only proper for raising doubts”130), particularly 
when it comes to ultimate things. In those important matters, it cannot be trusted. Faith 
and reason are incompatible.  
The Enlightenment philosophes could not have agreed more. When reading such 
sentiments of Bayle’s as “a dispute in which only the natural light will be employed will 
always end to the disadvantage of the theologian,”131 and “the mysteries of the Gospel … 
were not made to stand the test of philosophical disputations,”132 they assumed that Bayle 
was speaking, subversively, for the Enlightenment project. They proclaimed him an early 
vanguard of the Enlightenment and his arguments as thoroughly undermining religion. 
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Voltaire referred to him as “the immortal Bayle, the honor of the human race”133 and is 
often credited with terming him “the Arsenal of the Enlightenment.”134 
In spite of his adoption by the forces arrayed against traditional religion, Bayle’s 
own beliefs remain a matter of intense scholarly dispute.135 After decades of study, 
Popkin writes that he has “found the attempt to define the actual beliefs and the actual 
religion of Bayle quite baffling.”136 Bayle was not only a member of a church but 
regularly a congregant, though in the permissive social milieu of Rotterdam he easily 
could have converted, or simply stopped attending, without social sanction. These 
personal practices seem discordant with a view of his writings that sees them as wholly 
ironic, as they had the result of undermining the reasonableness of the Christian faith at a 
time when reason was itself on the ascendant over against religion.  
Further, the philosophes may have been overly confident in Bayle’s allegiance to 
their overall intellectual project. The skepticism he brought to the Dictionary was not 
only implicitly critical of religious claims; if one takes him at his word, his skepticism 
was also critical of the abilities of reason itself, and not only in matters of faith. In entry 
after entry, he takes apart each and every claim until it dissolves in contradictions. Popkin 
points out that in the entry on “Pyrrho,” after critiquing Cartesians, Bayle “quickly 
generalizes the critiques of the previous sceptics into an attack on the entire rational 
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world and raises the horrendous possibility, which no previous sceptic had entertained, 
that a proposition could be self-evident and yet demonstrably false—that there might be 
no criterion of truth whatsoever.”137 In this reading of Bayle, the searing light of reason 
did not reveal the truth; rather, it showed the impossibility of finding the truth, “the 
helpless abysses to which all human intellectual endeavors lead.”138  
Regardless, whether Bayle was an atheist (Gianluca Mori) or a “bare fideist” 
(Elisabeth Labrousse) or if the matter is simply irresolvable (Thomas Lennon), what is 
important for this study is the reception of the work—even, perhaps especially, when that 
reception was rejection. And rejected it was, for it was not only the philosophes who saw 
Bayle’s project as having negative implications for religion; theologians, both liberal and 
conservative, attacked Bayle. It was the response of Leibniz, however, that has proven 
the most enduring. Seeing the risks that Bayle’s work posed to a reasonable religion, the 
rationalist Leibniz wrote his Théodicée in response.139  
G. W. Leibniz: The invention of theodicy 
Bayle and Leibniz (1646–1716)—only a year apart in age—carried on a 
philosophical conversation in print for many years. Bayle had critiqued Leibniz’s “New 
System” within the text of his entry on Jerome Rorarius in the first edition of his 
Dictionary; Leibniz responded in a journal article; the second edition of the Dictionary 
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contained Bayle’s response, and so on. These exchanges were primarily cordial, though 
one notes a snide comment about Bayle in an appendix to Theodicy when Leibniz writes, 
“But the fifth chapter [of the book Origin of Evil by William King] … is constructed 
upon principles opposed to mine, and often, indeed, to those of M. Bayle; that is, if it 
were possible to credit him with any fixed principles.”140 Given Bayle’s popularity, the 
topics about which he wrote so controversially were a frequent subject of conversation in 
the learned centers of European cultural life, and those learned centers were where 
Leibniz made his home. Most consequentially, he carried on extended conversations with 
Sophie Charlotte, electress of Brandenburg and subsequently the first queen of Prussia, at 
her court in Lützenburg. The Theodicy has its roots in these conversations.141 
The public correspondence between Bayle and Leibniz was a quarrel between two 
leaders of the European intelligentsia coming from very different perspectives. It is 
widely acknowledged that Leibniz was one of the most erudite and learned men of his 
age; Bertrand Russell cited him as “one of the supreme intellects of all time,” though “as 
a human being he was not admirable.”142 A mathematician who invented the calculus 
independently of Newton, Leibniz was also a legal theorist, a diplomat, a scientist, and a 
logician, as well as a rationalist metaphysician who composed a comprehensive 
philosophical system to describe reality as a whole. In doing so, Leibniz sought to correct 
the errors he saw in the systems of Descartes and Spinoza. Leibniz’s ontology posited 
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that the building blocks of reality are “monads.” These monads are spiritual, immaterial 
substances with appetites and perceptions. He held that atomic matter cannot be the 
foundation of reality since anything extended is infinitely divisible and thus cannot be 
ontologically basic. Monads must be indivisible, then, so Leibniz described monads as 
“simple” in that they lack constituent parts and are not extended in space. Lacking parts 
and extension, they cannot be either created or destroyed by other monads or extended 
substances; instead, they are created or annihilated by the miraculous acts of God.143 The 
mechanics of this process remain beyond the realm of human knowledge.144 Extended 
substances—bodies—are aggregates that result from monads, though they are not 
aggregates of monads; he uses the comparison of an army, which is not ontologically 
identical to the soldiers that make it up, nor a flock to its constituent sheep.145  
Being immaterial, lacking extension, and being “without windows,” these monads 
also cannot interact directly with each other or with material objects.146 The interaction of 
the material and immaterial was the problem Leibniz recognized in Descartes’ dualist 
metaphysics. In seeking to overcome the problem of soul-body interaction in Cartesian 
thought, Leibniz explained the presence of causally interacting substances by positing 
that God coordinates these infinite monads, maintaining a pre-established harmony (“the 
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primal regulation”) between them.147 However, Leibniz resisted an occasionalist view of 
each moment being a miraculous event of divine intervention, a metaphysics of deus ex 
machina; this, he felt, led directly to a belief in God as the only substance—the heresy of 
Spinoza.148 Instead, “God originally created the soul (or any other real unity) in such a 
way that everything must arise for it from its own depths, through a perfect spontaneity 
relative to itself, and yet with perfect conformity relative to external things.”149 Even 
though God’s perfect wisdom makes God able to foresee every event, God does not cause 
every event directly, but rather makes events possible, aligning efficient and final causes 
in a process of continuous creation.150 Nicholas Jolley describes this view by comparing 
God to the author of a novel, where it is the novelist “who made the causes cause.”151  
Leibniz invokes the principle of sufficient reason to explain how God coordinates 
the monads in the particular way that God does (even if the mechanics of the 
coordination lie beyond our understanding).152 The principle of sufficient reason holds 
that nothing in the world occurs without a sufficient reason as to why it is that way and 
not otherwise. This principle of sufficient reason, nihil fit sine ratione, appears in 
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Leibniz’s writings as early as 1668.153 It remains key to Leibniz’s thought throughout his 
life and is a cornerstone of not only his metaphysics but also his theology. For Leibniz, 
not only the particular configuration of reality, but also the fact of reality itself—why 
there is something rather than nothing—must have a sufficient reason. Further, the 
sufficient reasons can be moral, not only logical; moral necessity counts as a “sufficient 
reason” for something to happen. God’s choice to maintain the pre-established harmony 
is the reason why God coordinates the monads in the specific way that they are 
coordinated.  
A consequence of this principle is that absolutely nothing is arbitrary. Not even 
God’s actions are done without some justification, at least in principle, even if that 
justification is not known by the human intellect. Given God’s perfection of holiness, 
which Leibniz considered a fact able to be proven exclusive of revelation, the reason for 
the coordination of monads in the specific way that they are coordinated has a morally 
sufficient reason too: that is, to enable and maintain the goodness of a creation that was 
created good by a good God. A perfect God, having through perfect wisdom weighed all 
the considerations and the infinity of choices, would only choose to create the most 
perfect world possible.154 As a result, the world as it is, as it is experienced moment by 
moment, is configured and coordinated the best way that it can be, given the infinite 
aspects that go into its functioning. God would not have chosen it otherwise because “this 
supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite, cannot but have chosen the 
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best.”155 The reasoning philosopher can then come to a clear conclusion: this is the best of 
all possible worlds.  
Leibniz was not interested in propagating a dogma of the best of all possible 
worlds as a simple statement of faith. He wanted it to be the case that “we should see, and 
should not believe only, that what God has done is the best.”156 As a result, the conclusion 
of this as the best of all possible worlds is reached in Leibniz’s work by a steady process 
of philosophical investigation. This methodology is intentional and serves a larger 
purpose. Leibniz set as one of his goals for the Theodicy to demonstrate the reconciliation 
of faith and reason that Bayle had attempted to divorce. He says this explicitly, 
referencing Bayle continuously throughout the text. He refutes Bayle point by point, even 
as he acknowledges how tedious such a style of argumentation is.157  
Leibniz begins Theodicy with a “Preliminary Dissertation on the Conformity of 
Faith with Reason.” For Leibniz, reason is “the linking together of truths,” a method of 
investigation of an orderly world.158 Where Bayle emphasized the incomprehensibility of 
the world, Leibniz insists on the world’s rationality. Reason was given to humankind by 
God, as faith was given as well; since that is true for both of them, “contention between 
them would cause God to contend against God,” an obvious impossibility.159 No truth can 
contradict another truth; the truths of science, for example, cannot be at odds with the 
truths of faith without one of them being false. Axioms of reasoning, such as the principle 
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of non-contradiction, remain valid for both earthly and divine matters, such that there can 
be no valid truths that are against the conclusions of reason.  
Bayle’s religion of fideism and extreme skepticism, then, was the polar opposite 
of Leibniz’s insistence on a rational religion, and therefore Leibniz sets up his theological 
method as a refutation of Bayle’s religion of revelation alone. Leibniz will make his 
theological case without appealing to truths available only through revelation but will 
instead use the common tools of philosophical investigation that are, in principle, 
available to any human being. The consequence of this is that neither revelation, nor even 
religion, is required for this pursuit: “Now we have no need of revealed faith to know that 
there is such a sole Principle of all things, entirely good and wise. Reason teaches us this 
by infallible proofs.”160 Christia Mercer refers to this as Leibniz’s “radical rationalism,” a 
rationalism that by itself can reach even up into the heights of knowledge of the divine, 
“severed from any religion or set of religious beliefs.”161 Leibniz still honors the 
ecclesiastical theological tradition, writing that he does not “favour contempt toward 
antiquity in religious matters,” but this does not mean blind acceptance of tradition over 
reason.162 Knowledge of God’s existence itself does not require revelation, and Leibniz’s 
spokesman Theophilus reports almost casually in New Essays on Human Understanding 
that, “I believe indeed that almost all the methods which have been used to prove the 
existence of God are sound, and could serve the purpose if they were rendered 
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complete.”163 Therefore, to separate faith from reason, even when done from a sense of 
piety, is not good and is even detrimental to the task of discerning theological truths. He 
goes so far as to criticize his patroness: “It is true that in our own day a person of the 
most exalted rank [Christina] has said that in questions of faith we have to put out our 
eyes in order to see clearly, and Tertullian said somewhere: ‘This is true because it is 
impossible; we must believe it because it is absurd.’ But even if people who express 
themselves like this have good intentions, what they say is still extravagant and apt to do 
harm.
“164  
Leibniz acknowledges that there are “mysteries” of the faith that are above 
reason, such as the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. However, something 
being above reason is not the same as it being against reason. The former is permissible, 
the latter is not. “The Mysteries transcend our reason … but they are not contrary to our 
reason, and they do not contradict any of the truths whereto this sequence can lead us.”165 
The principle of non-contradiction holds, and “all that which can be refuted in a sound 
and conclusive manner cannot but be false.”166 There is no exception for religious 
mysteries, which must also be in accord with reason: “But a truth can never be contrary 
to reason, and once a dogma has been disputed and refuted by reason, instead of its being 
incomprehensible, one may say that nothing is easier to understand, nor more obvious, 
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than its absurdity.”167 Things that are contrary to reason are simply false, but things that 
are above reason are just difficult to discern from a human perspective: “For what is 
contrary to reason is contrary to the absolutely certain and inevitable truths; and what is 
above reason is in opposition only to what one is wont to experience or to understand.”168 
Leibniz’s concern is not only with faith and reason in the abstract, however. He, 
like Bayle, recognizes that the problem of evil is the sticking point. Donald Rutherford 
holds that the problem of evil was the central issue for Leibniz throughout his intellectual 
life, informing and being informed by his metaphysics in an intricate and comprehensive 
system that is grounded in the power of reason.169 Leibniz writes that the “great question” 
of the origin of evil is one of the “two famous labyrinths where our reason very often 
goes astray” (the other being the question of infinity); evil “perplexes almost all the 
human race.”170 Bayle’s Dictionary and Leibniz’s conversations with Christina may have 
precipitated the writing of Theodicy, but Leibniz’s concern with the issue goes back to his 
formative years in philosophy.171 When discussing an earlier work, Leibniz describes its 
thesis as having been, “that God, having chosen the most perfect of all possible worlds, 
had been prompted by his wisdom to permit the evil which was bound up with it, but 
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which still did not prevent this world from being, all things considered, the best that 
could be chosen.”172 Showing this to be true remained his project throughout his life. 
Bayle had held that, given the evidence of the world only, apart from revelation, 
God could be convicted of being the origin of evil. Like a defense attorney, Leibniz set 
himself to the task of defending God from this charge.173 He desired to “offer a 
vindication of his perfections that shall extol not less his holiness, his justice and his 
goodness than his greatness, his power and his independence.”174 If God’s holiness and 
greatness are considered absolute, however, then one is left with the classic problem: 
“how a sole Principle, all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful, has been able to admit evil, 
and especially to permit sin, and how it could resolve to make the wicked often happy 
and the good unhappy?”175 
In response, Leibniz wanted to demonstrate that, “all things considered”176 (an 
important condition) this world is optimal, the most morally perfect of all possible. 
However, Leibniz held that this requires looking at the world in a holistic way, in its 
fullness. The failure to do this was one of the mistakes that Bayle had made. Leibniz set 
out to show that, beyond the hue and cry of any local occurrence, the world is structured 
in a rational, even beautiful, way, and, from the proper perspective, that rationality can be 
discerned through observation. Protests about the destructiveness of sicknesses or the 
brutality that humanity displays lack that proper perspective. On the contrary, the world 
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is orderly, and the occasional disorder contained in it only serves to highlight its 
generally orderly character. A proper recognition of the world’s orderliness testifies to 
the one who created it, who himself is the principle of order, “Supreme Reason” itself.177 
To see this, however, one must have the right perspective: what looks like indefensible 
evils in the world may be similar to a situation “where certain beautiful designs look like 
mere confusion until one restores them to the right angle of vision or one views them by 
means of a certain glass or mirror.”178 Further, questioning the very basis of the 
prosecution’s claims, Leibniz points out that the fact that a “mere confusion” (or worse) 
can be part of a divine holy plan should “increase our wonder at the wisdom of him who 
makes evil serve the greater good.”179 
But how can we find such reasonable arguments persuasive when experience tells 
us otherwise, when we regularly see “the wicked often happy and the good unhappy?”180 
The un-persuaded observer is simply confused, Leibniz says: “What appears injustice on 
the part of God, and foolishness in our faith, only appears so.”181 Experience is not, in 
fact, evidence, or at least not conclusive evidence. The problem is that “men judge things 
only in accordance with their experience, which is extremely limited, and whatever does 
not conform with it appears to them absurd.”182 A limited perspective is the critical flaw 
in the criticisms of God for the entrance of evil into the world; Leibniz writes, “one of the 
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greatest sources of fallacy in the objections is the confusion of the apparent with the 
real.”183 The universe is so large, and we are so small, that we wrongly make conclusions 
from “that which has been derived from the small extent of our experiences.”184 This is 
Leibniz’s critique of King Alfonso, who (in)famously said in the thirteenth century that 
he could have designed the creation better than God did. Leibniz responds to Alfonso: 
“You have known the world only since the day before yesterday, you see scarce farther 
than your nose, and you carp at the world. Wait until you know more of the world and 
consider therein especially the parts which present a complete whole (as do organic 
bodies); and you will find there a contrivance and a beauty transcending all 
imagination.”185 Like any accused person, Leibniz holds, God should not be convicted on 
only partial evidence. 
Instead, Leibniz seeks to show that God permits—but does not cause—evils when 
they are required for the accomplishment of the greatest good: “the evil that occurs is an 
inevitable result of the best”; as a result, “to permit the evil, as God permits it, is the 
greatest goodness.”186 Allowing for the presence of evil in some situations in the world is 
actually part of God’s plan for the best world: “an imperfection in the part may be 
required for a greater perfection in the whole.”187 While some people may be repulsed by 
seeing any evils at all and wish that only the good was ever in sight, they are reminded 
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that “the best course is not always that one which tends towards avoiding evil, since it is 
possible that the evil may be accompanied by a greater good.”188 And this is Leibniz’s 
conclusion in his defense of God: “he has permitted evil because it is involved in the best 
plan existing in the region of possibles, a plan which supreme wisdom could not fail to 
choose. This notion satisfied at once the wisdom, the power and the goodness of God, 
and yet leaves a way open for the entrance of evil.”189 Whether God is innocent or not, 
God at least cannot be found guilty. 
Since Leibniz is acting the part of a defense attorney, he only has to defend these 
beliefs as reasonable; he does not have to prove the contrary case. As in the European law 
courts with which Leibniz was so familiar, so in philosophy “it is not for the defender to 
adduce reasons; it is enough for him to answer those of his opponent.”190 Bayle, however, 
wanted a complete and detailed explanation of how evils can be permitted without 
maligning God’s holiness. Bayle wanted to know how specific evils could be reconciled 
with the perfections of God. Leibniz rejects the notion that he must provide this: “[Bayle] 
asks a little too much: he wishes for a detailed exposition of how evil is connected with 
the best possible scheme for the universe. That would be a complete explanation of the 
phenomena: but I do not undertake to give it; nor am I bound to do so, for there is no 
obligation to do that which is impossible for us in our existing state.”191 Since a human 
being can never know the extent of the factors that go into determining what results in the 
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best—a human being can never know the past, present and future in their fullness—a 
complete explanation is impossible to provide, and unnecessary. “It is sufficient for me to 
point out that there is nothing to prevent the connexion of a certain individual evil with 
what is best on the whole. This incomplete explanation, leaving something to be 
discovered in the life to come, is sufficient for answering the objections, though not for a 
comprehension of the matter.”192 How would such a comprehension even be possible? 
“For can I know and can I present infinities to you and compare them together?”193 Such a 
thing is beyond the realm of human ability. 
Leibniz acknowledges that it is possible to conceive of a world that lacks all sin 
and suffering, but, precisely because of the complexity of the world, he denies that such a 
world would be better than the present one. The intricate interconnection of all the 
different aspects of the world must be taken into account: “For it must be known that all 
things are connected in each one of the possible worlds: the universe, whatever it may be, 
is all of one piece, like an ocean: the least movement extends its effects there to any 
distance whatsoever.”194 Any particular change, however minute, in the way the world is 
would have far-reaching effects, and predicting these effects is far beyond the ability of 
any human observer—though not beyond the ability of God, the “Author of all things, 
infinitely powerful and infinitely wise.”195 Since God is able to foresee the results of all 
events, large and small, he has thereby designed creation from the beginning in such a 
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way that the world as it exists will be the best possible one: “God has ordered all things 
beforehand once for all, having foreseen prayers, good and bad actions, and all the 
rest.”196 God has “pre-established” all things so that they will reflect the greatest order and 
harmony. Even when it appears that disorder reigns, it may be that God has allowed local 
disorder in the interests of the greater good, “a superior order.”197 One can conclude, 
based on an understanding of God’s perfections, that when evils occur in the world, it 
must be that they occur because “otherwise a still greater evil would have been 
altogether inevitable.”198 
Besides, Leibniz questions whether the world is truly as horrible as his opponents 
assert. Bayle, Leibniz writes, exaggerates: “But it will be said that evils are great and 
many in number in comparison with the good: that is erroneous.”199 In actuality, “There is 
incomparably more good than evil in the life of men, as there are incomparably more 
houses than prisons. With regard to virtue and vice, a certain mediocrity prevails.”200 It is 
true that one can be struck by the evils one sees in the world, but the shocking nature of 
their presence actually illustrates how good the world is: “evil arouses our attention rather 
than the good: but this same reason proves that evil is more rare.”201 It is not that people 
become sick that is so astonishing; it is that they are so often well that is surprising.202 
Further, without the occasional sickness, one would not realize what a gift being healthy 
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is; a touch of sickness now and again has the effect of making one appreciate and enjoy 
the times of health. It’s similar to how “shadows enhance colors; and even a dissonance 
in the right place gives relief to harmony.”203 So it is with physical suffering; he asks, 
“And is it not most often necessary that a little evil render the good more discernible, that 
is to say, greater?”204 Look more closely at the world, and you will see “a beauty 
transcending all imagination.”205 One can choose to focus only on the ills of the world, 
but these need not be determinative of one’s experience: “we shall be happy [in the 
world] if we wish to be.”206 
Leibniz has another criticism of those seeking to convict God: they seem not to 
realize that God’s providence, the “Pre-established Harmony” that was established, is not 
limited to human beings but is comprehensive of creation as a whole. Animal 
development, for example, arises from the same plan of God’s that results in human 
beings: “Moreover, as the formation of organic animate appears explicable in the order of 
nature only when one assumes a preformation already organic, I have then inferred that 
what we call generation of an animal is only a transformation and augmentation.”207 The 
unfolding of organic life—all organic life, not only humans—was ordained from the 
beginning: “It is thus my belief that those souls which one day shall be human souls, like 
those of other species, have been in the seed, and in the progenitors as far back as Adam, 
and have consequently existed since the beginning of things, always in a kind of organic 
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body.”208 This vast aggregation of everything material is marked by harmony, such that 
“nature should be parallel with grace.”209 But this harmony is not anthropocentric; when 
Leibniz refers to the good of the whole, he truly means the whole. While “it is certain that 
God sets greater store by a man than a lion; nevertheless it can hardly be said with 
certainty that God prefers a single man in all respects to the whole of lion-kind.”210 
Leibniz doubts that God values “a certain number of men” more highly than “an infinite 
number of creatures,” if that is the trade-off that must be made; such an anthropocentric 
view is a “remnant of the old and somewhat discredited maxim, that all is made solely for 
man.”211 Rather, as in the permitting of evil in order to maximize the goodness of the 
world, this extends to the place of humans in the cosmic ecosystem: “Thus God has more 
than one purpose in his projects. The felicity of all rational creatures [i.e., human beings] 
is one of the aims he has in view; but it is not his whole aim, nor even his final aim. 
Therefore it happens that the unhappiness of some of those creatures may come about by 
concomitance, and as a result of other greater goods.”212 In fact, God’s providence 
extends even beyond animals, both human and nonhuman, to all aspects of the created 
world: “God does not neglect inanimate things: they do not feel, but God feels for them. 
He does not neglect animals: they have not intelligence, but God has it for them.”213 The 
critic who judges the evil in the world as evidence to convict God, based only on 
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evaluating human suffering, does not realize the completeness of God’s authorship of 
creation.  
This expansion of the scope of concern beyond human beings, to include animals 
as well, makes Leibniz’s theodicy a development in the writing on the topic. Leibniz 
takes the suffering of nonhuman animals with philosophical seriousness, and he 
recognizes that their suffering (which is suffering without sinfulness) complicates an easy 
view of suffering as punishment: “It is on account of the injustice there would be in the 
sufferings of beasts that divers Cartesians wished to prove that they are only machines … 
it is impossible that an innocent creature should be unhappy under such a master as 
God.”214 Against this problematic aspect of Cartesian thought, Leibniz affirms that “one 
cannot reasonably doubt the existence of pain among animals,” though he denies that 
experiences of pain are quite as intense as they are in human beings, since nonhuman 
animals lack the capacity to reflect on their experiences.215 For Leibniz, of course, animal 
suffering does not have to be punishment to still be a good for the best possible world; it 
is merely better than some alternative situation, which would have unknown 
consequences that would reduce the optimal nature of the world. Because of this 
expansion of scope, Leibniz’s theodicy is well suited to be adapted by philosophers and 
theologians in light of evolutionary theory. For example, a Leibnizian could say that, 
through the great divine wisdom, God had foreseen the process of natural selection, and 
how it maximizes the goodness of the world. When an observer sees nastiness in the 
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natural world, and is repulsed by what she sees, she is being fooled by her limited 
perspective; she is not recognizing how, even in those processes, the overarching purpose 
of God is being fulfilled, which is the creation and preservation of the best possible 
world: instead, “one must believe that even sufferings and monstrosities are part of 
order.”216  
This same philosophical approach to suffering, however (without the kind of 
mitigation found, for example, in Book XIX of Augustine’s City of God), made Leibniz’s 
view dubious for his philosophical successors, some of whom were morally repulsed at 
the defense of suffering in the name of a greater good. Quite apart from philosophical 
considerations, such a perspective seemed morally objectionable, entirely too easily 
justifying the pain of others. This was Voltaire’s critique, particularly following the 
Lisbon earthquake of Saturday, November 1, 1755. It is difficult to overstate the 
importance of the Lisbon quake for European intellectual life. This natural disaster, 
coming at a time when, as the controversy between Bayle and Leibniz shows, the 
benevolence of God’s design, if not God’s authorship of it, was already being questioned, 
further undermined a blandly optimistic theological speculation. Estimates vary widely as 
to the total number of fatalities from the earthquake and its resultant tsunamis, fires, and 
civil unrest: careful recent scholarship estimates between 10,000 to 17,400 dead,217 while 
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other researchers estimate that as many as 100,000 people died in all.218 That the quake 
occurred on All Saints’ Day pressed the theological issues: the result of the quake’s 
timing was that many of the faithful were buried under the stone arches of the churches in 
which they were worshiping. The religious implications of the earthquake became the 
subject matter of the writings of not only Voltaire, but also Rousseau, Kant, and even 
John Wesley. Susan Neiman holds that the philosophical reactions to the Lisbon 
earthquake marked the beginning of modern philosophy,219 and Charles Taylor also 
recognizes the event’s devastating significance for a traditional “providential deism.”220 
The destruction wrought by these natural forces, combined with an already-turbulent 
intellectual milieu, changed the context of the theological discussion of evil, with effects 
that lasted almost two centuries.221   
Prior to the earthquake, Alexander Pope’s widely-read Essay on Man, published 
in 1734, sought to “vindicate the ways of God to man.”222 Inspired by Leibniz, Pope had 
composed his own poetic version of “the best of all possible worlds.” He wrote,  
All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee; 
All chance, direction, which thou canst not see 
All discord, harmony not understood, 
All partial evil, universal good: 
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And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite, 
One truth is clear, whatever is, is right.223 
For many, such a view became difficult to stomach after Lisbon. Voltaire, in particular, 
already suspicious of orthodox Christianity, wrote in the preface to his poem “The Lisbon 
Earthquake” (written a month after the disaster), “The maxim, ‘whatever is, is right,’ 
appears somewhat extraordinary to those who have been eye-witnesses of such 
calamities” as plagues and earthquakes.224 The objection to the Leibnizians was a moral 
objection: 
If, when Lisbon, Moquinxa, Tetuan, and other cities were swallowed up with a 
great number of their inhabitants in the month of November, 1759, philosophers 
had cried out to the wretches, who with difficulty escaped from the ruins, ‘all this 
is productive of general good … it is the necessary effect of necessary causes; 
your particular misfortune is nothing, it contributes to universal good,’ such a 
harangue would doubtless have been as cruel as the earthquake was fatal, and all 
that the author of the poem upon the destruction of Lisbon has said amounts only 
to this.225 
It is worthy of note that this marks a change in Voltaire’s thinking. A prior work, titled 
Zadig and written in 1747,226 is remarkably more optimistic and less cynical than the later 
and more famous Candide. The character of Zadig is given by angels the explanations for 
suffering that Bayle had sought: the house burned down so that the owner could find the 
treasure underneath; the boy’s drowning prevented his becoming a murderer. Zadig is 
allowed to see the order that underlies the apparent chaos. The post-Lisbon Candide, 
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however, displays no such recognition of order. Written in 1759, it is a reductio ad 
absurdum of the view of this as the best of all possible worlds, satirizing the sunny 
optimism of Candide and his tutor, Dr. Pangloss. “If this is the best of all possible worlds, 
what are the others?”227 Candide asks this after undergoing a flogging, administered by 
the Portuguese, who were attempting, through auto-da-fé, to prevent another earthquake. 
By the time Candide and his friends come to the end of their adventure, the outrageous 
tribulations that had gotten them to that point and the sufferings of others that they had 
witnessed (most of them based on actual events) make a mockery of their beliefs. Bayle’s 
Zoroaster returns: the Leibnizian theory is refuted by the a posteriori evidence of living 
in the world. Observation must precede philosophical speculation. 
To be fair, Leibniz’s view in the Theodicy is not, in fact, the one that Voltaire 
mocks in Candide. Leibniz does not hold that everything turns out for the best in regards 
to any one person in particular; in fact, it is actually the failures of reasoning from limited 
experience that he critiques. For Leibniz, this world is better overall than any other, but 
that does not mean that it is necessarily better for any one person. It is entirely consistent 
with Leibniz’s theory both that this is the best of all possible worlds and that a particular 
person—even many persons—may live entire lives in excruciating agony. Voltaire has 
fallen victim to something Leibniz identifies in the Theodicy: “What is deceptive in this 
subject, as I have already observed, is that one feels an inclination to believe that that 
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which is the best in the whole is also the best possible in each part.”228 But that is not the 
case with the world, as one can see by using an analogy with art: “the part of the best 
Whole is not of necessity the best that one could have made of this part. For the part of a 
beautiful thing is not always beautiful, since it can be extracted from the whole, or 
marked out within the whole, in an irregular manner.”229 That this is the best of all 
possible worlds does not mean that all evil eventually has good results for an individual, 
only that it is allowable by God because in a complexly and intricately interconnected 
world, that instance of evil somehow contributes to the world’s overall goodness. To 
know how such a thing is possible is beyond our reach; to know that it is possible is a 
matter of reasoning, the “linking together of truths.” Philosophical speculation inevitably 
influences the results of observation. 
One can see, then, beginning with Bayle (“the immortal Bayle”), and perhaps for 
the first time within Western European Christian theology, a serious cultural 
consideration of the possibility that there was no providential order to the world. Bayle, 
Voltaire, and others were affirming (or at least coming very close to affirming) that what 
appeared to be disorder in the world was, in fact, just that; appearances, in this case, were 
not deceiving. Something new happened to the religious sensibilities of Europe during 
the Enlightenment, particularly in France. Hegel would comment on this shift later, in his 
own history of philosophy: “We ought not, however, to attach the label of ‘atheism’ to 
anyone lightly. It is easy to accuse a philosophy or an individual of atheism because of 
                                                 
228
 Leibniz, Theodicy, 260. 
229
 Ibid., 261. 
70 
 
views concerning God that deviate from those that others hold. But, all the same, many of 
the argumentative philosophers [of that time] did move on to atheism in the most definite 
way.”230 As with Bayle, opinions about Voltaire’s true beliefs about religion differ; 
perhaps he was an atheist, perhaps not. And the changes that occurred during the 
Enlightenment were not exclusively, or even primarily, in regards to the design of the 
world or the problems regarding creation and suffering as taken up in this dissertation. 
Nonetheless, as Taylor notes, “We can notice, running through much of the 
Enlightenment a motif of anger at, even hatred of orthodox Christianity,” 231 and no small 
part of that anger had to do with issues of suffering. The cultural tides were turning in 
ways that would have significant effects on Christian theology.  
David Hume: Nature’s abortive children 
More than in the work of Voltaire or the other French philosophes, however, the 
skeptical impulses of Bayle can be seen in the philosophy of Scottish empiricist David 
Hume (1711–1776). In the legacy of Hume’s philosophical corpus, one sees a definitive 
disruption of the tradition of natural theology within the mainstream of the Western 
philosophical world, even if it took time for the implications of his work to be 
recognized. The design argument had long been part of the theological and philosophical 
tradition, seeing the fit between the human being and the natural world as evidence of 
God’s existence and attributes. There is no mistaking the fact that Hume’s work 
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permanently damaged this design argument among philosophers of religion. As J. C. A. 
Gaskin writes, “Almost all of what [Hume] wrote [about religion] was critical; some of it 
has since been recognized as terminally destructive.”232  
The design argument is typically divided into two different aspects: the regularity 
argument and the teleological argument. The former refers to the fact that laws of nature 
are uniform across the universe; this is taken as evidence of a creator, a single divine 
designer. The latter is an observation of the synchronicity between organisms and their 
environment in a way that seems to display a designer’s intention for the flourishing of 
life, for the individuals involved or for the world as a whole. Sometimes these aspects 
overlap, and sometimes they do not; many design arguments, including Newton’s, for 
example, drew on both. Many of Hume’s objections apply to both.  
Hume’s arguments were, and are, a philosophical challenge to that strain of 
natural theology that finds design and its theistic implications self-evident. The design 
argument is important for a consideration of suffering in the natural world because of the 
tendency of thinkers from Plato, through Aquinas and Newton, to present-day 
theologians and even scientists, to interpret the order in the natural world as evidence of 
an intelligent designer, and the harmonious functioning of the natural world as displaying 
the benevolence of this designer. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century versions of this 
“natural theology,” drawing from science and reason, reflected a view holding that 
increased knowledge about the world is increased knowledge about the work of God.  
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Of course, the earlier discussion of Bayle shows that challenges to the assumption 
of the efficacy of natural theology in developing ideas about God or supporting religious 
doctrines were not unknown in Hume’s day. The shift that began in the eighteenth 
century, however, was an emerging opinion among some intellectuals that empirical 
observation was sufficient for establishing all religious belief; neither Locke, Leibniz, 
Newton, nor their predecessors would have written, as Matthew Tindal did in 1730, that 
revelation was completely unnecessary: “And if God designed all Mankind should at all 
times know, what he wills them to know, what he wills them to know, believe, profess, 
and practice; and has given them no other Means for this, but the Use of Reason; Reason, 
human Reason, must then be that Means.”233 An important component of this 
scientific/religious worldview, however, remained the design argument. Neiman writes 
that “for the eighteenth century the argument from design was less an argument than a 
piece of hard data. Its central claim was just this: the evidence for God’s existence is 
nothing less than the whole of Creation.”234 It was this assumption, this piece of “hard 
data,” that Hume attacked at the root in a way that had not been done before.  
Gaskin holds that, taking Hume’s corpus as a whole, Hume wrote more about 
religion than about any other subject.235 Hume was not content merely with theological 
questions, however; he also discusses religion as a human phenomenon, and as a social 
occurrence. The social and psychological aspects of the human being that result in the 
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rise of religion are discussed in The Natural History of Religion (1757), and the 
consequences of religious belief throughout history are discussed in An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) and History of England (1754–1762). 
However, Hume’s incisive—some would say devastating—critique of the assumptions of 
natural theology, including the design argument, is found especially in book XI of the 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) and throughout Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion, posthumously published in 1779. Gaskin identifies four 
categories of objections that Hume raised to the design argument’s claim that the 
uniformity of the laws of the universe (the regularity component), and the fit found 
between organisms and their environments (the teleological component), testify to the 
existence and characteristics of a benevolent and divine creator.  
The first of Hume’s objections Gaskin terms “restrictions on the conclusion.” 
Even if the design argument is true, and the universe was created and designed by a god, 
Hume questions whether this alone can establish the facts about that god that its 
supporters believe. If an observer is drawing solely from the evidence found in the 
natural world, then only those characteristics that are found in the natural world can be 
used to posit that god’s attributes. “If the cause be known only by the effect, we never 
ought to ascribe to it any qualities, beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the 
effect,” he writes. “Nor can we, by any rules of just reasoning, return back from the 
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cause, and infer other effects from it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us.”236 
Hume the empiricist insists on beginning from the empirically observable—in this case 
the qualities and processes of the created world—and no conclusions must go beyond 
what is testified to by those observations. Do those qualities and processes support the 
Christian religious community’s conclusions of omnipotence, omniscience, and complete 
benevolence? Philo, the skeptic in the dialogue, holds that they do not, thereby raising the 
classic problem of reconciling evil in the world with the (absolute) goodness of God and 
invoking Epicurus’ trilemma.237 For Philo, that evil exists in the world in such a measure 
as it does blocks the inference from the world to the traditional description of God’s 
attributes, even if there is a divine designer. In fact, significant evidence, drawn from the 
observation of the suffering in the world, supports entirely different conclusions about 
God’s characteristics, the most obvious being “that the original source of all things is 
entirely indifferent to all these principles, and has no more regard to good above ill than 
to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy.”238 Observation 
of the natural world could just as easily support the inference that the world is the product 
of a committee of designers, or the first, failed draft of a world, the following versions of 
which perhaps were more successful. Other inferences are at least as equally plausible, 
and perhaps more plausible, than the traditional position. 
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Given this range of options, can the Christian believer still maintain the traditional 
notion? Perhaps. But, Hume asks in the Enquiry, “Why torture your brain to justify the 
course of nature upon suppositions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely 
imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature?”239 Why 
engage in such mental acrobatics, instead of drawing the most probable conclusion from 
an empirical study of the world: that the divine designer, if it is granted that there is one, 
is utterly indifferent to the plight of the designed creatures? Philo does not argue that the 
existence of a god with the traditional attributes is impossible or logically incompatible; 
perhaps there is a way that the traditional attributes can be shown to be consistent with 
the evil in the world in a way that simply has not yet been discovered. “The consistency 
is not absolutely denied,” Philo says, “only the inference.”240 The conclusions that the 
natural theologians were coming to, however, and were presenting as the only possible 
conclusions were unsupported by the evidence.  
The second criticism has its roots in Hume’s ideas about causation. In the 
Treatise, Hume had presented a novel analysis of causal processes, namely that 
inferences about causes, based on observable effects, are really matters of habit and 
custom. What people, including philosophers, identify as causes are objects that have 
contiguity, priority, and a necessary connection with their purported effects; they do not 
have some inherent quality that translates to “cause.” The identification of a cause, 
therefore, requires experience, and not a singular experience: “The nature of experience is 
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this. We remember to have had frequent instances of the existence of one species of 
objects; and also remember, that the individuals of another species of objects have always 
attended them, and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and succession with 
regard to them.”241 It is only once there have been “frequent instances” that one is able to 
infer causation, with varying degrees of certainty: “We suppose, but are never able to 
prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had 
experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery.”242  
It is this kind of inference that the design argument is trying to make: things in the 
world (human artifacts such as watches, machines, and furniture) that evidence 
sophistication and appear to be designed have indeed had an intelligent designer as their 
cause. There have been repeated observations of the design of human artifacts, such that 
it can be reasonably inferred that a human designer is a necessary cause of any observed 
sophisticated objects. Similarly, the universe evidences sophistication and it appears to be 
designed. Therefore it is reasonable to believe that an intelligent designer was the cause 
of the universe. This is an analogical inference, of course, but such inferences are not 
completely invalid; even if there is only one experiment that makes causation appear 
present between two objects, causation can be inferred if the objects involved are similar 
to objects that have been observed previously.243 The analogical inference, however, 
depends on that similarity. Hume writes, “If you weaken either the union or resemblance, 
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you weaken the principle of transition, and of consequence that belief, which arises from 
it.… Without some degree of resemblance, as well as union, ‘tis impossible there can be 
any reasoning: But as this resemblance admits of many different degrees, the reasoning 
becomes proportionally more or less firm or certain.”244 Assuming that one is playing 
billiards for the nth time, the player can expect the first ball to cause the second ball to 
move when it is hit, based on previous experience with objects that are very nearly 
identical. The degree of similarity determines the probability of the validity of the 
inference. The universe, however, is unique; there are no objects that bear any degree of 
resemblance to the universe as such. Therefore we cannot have a reasonable expectation 
about its cause. The analogy between divine creation and human creation does not hold.  
Hume’s third criticism, from the other direction, is to question whether the 
analogy between the human creator and the divine Creator holds. The problem is this: 
“Being” on the one hand, and a “being” such as we know, on the other hand, do not have 
enough in common to hold the analogy together. While human creators are readily 
accessible for study, when we use them as the pattern of the divine creator, then we are 
stretching the bounds of analogy: “it must evidently appear contrary to all rules of 
analogy to reason, from the intentions and projects of men, to those of a Being so 
different, and so much superior.”245 The analogical reasoning can be used to infer the 
existence of behavior of beings, but “this method of reasoning can never have place with 
regard to a Being, so remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less analogy to any 
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other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper.”246 As Cleanthes, a 
representation of the eighteenth century’s empirical theists, asks Demea, a traditional 
orthodox fideist, in the Dialogues, “How do you mystics, who maintain the absolute 
incomprehensibility of the deity, differ from sceptics or atheists, who assert, that the first 
cause of all is unknown and unintelligible?”247 It is nearly impossible to use analogical 
reason regarding what is “unknown and unintelligible.” Therefore, if God is “remote and 
incomprehensible,” then it is difficult to establish a reasonable comparison between 
human and divine creators, and the analogy does not hold. The distance between the two 
is simply too great.  
The theist might, however, temper this notion of God’s utter transcendence in 
order to keep the analogy relevant. To make God more immanent, however, is to fall into 
an unacceptable anthropomorphism that results in the ascription of limitations to God’s 
perfections—something that Philo demonstrates to Cleanthes in Part 5 of the Dialogues. 
If the characteristics of infinite and perfect are not appropriate, then perhaps the deity is 
mortal, or corporeal, or an “infant,” or in his “old age and dotage.”248 Philo says, “From 
the moment the attributes of the deity are supposed finite, all these have a place.”249 The 
price of analogical accuracy, which is necessary for the design argument to succeed, is 
the diminution of the divine creator.  
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Hume’s fourth set of objections comes from the fact that there are other ways that 
order could have come about in the cosmos, not only the initiating act of a divine being. 
One of them bears particular note. Philo asks, “Is there a system, an order, an economy of 
things, by which matter can preserve that perpetual agitation, which seems essential to it, 
and yet maintain a constancy in the forms, which it produces?”250 There is a system like 
that; it is the universe in which we now live. “Perpetual agitation” is a hallmark of matter; 
nonetheless, there remains a regularity of order in the structure overall that is maintained 
perpetually in a way that gives the appearance of “art and contrivance.”251 This 
appearance does not require the intervention of an artist, however; the perpetual motion 
of matter alone resulted in this order. Such a conception is also relevant to the way that 
animals seem fitted to their environment. In language that presages Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection, Hume writes that “It is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the 
parts in animals or vegetables, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would fain 
know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? Do we not find, 
that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its matter 
corrupting tries some new form?”252 That is to say, if the parts of the creature were not 
adjusted to the creature’s environment, the creature itself would not exist for long, and 
thereafter would not be available for observation. The creatures that are visible are the 
ones that have been adaptable, and these adaptations do not and did not necessarily entail 
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the work of a divine artisan; it may just be, Hume suggests, that the non-adaptive 
creatures have been lost to history.  
There is a fifth objection, which Gaskin includes with the above, but which 
deserves its own category. That is the fact that such matters as the origination of the 
universe as a whole are simply beyond human knowledge, and thus agnosticism on the 
matter is the only philosophically justifiable position. Of philosophers who hold forth on 
divine matters, Hume asks, “who carried them into the celestial regions, who admitted 
them into the councils of the gods, who opened to them the book of fate, that they thus 
rashly affirm, that their deities have executed, or will execute, any purpose beyond what 
has actually appeared?”253 There is no experience to be had of these matters and, as he 
wrote in the Treatise, “we cannot go beyond experience.”254 When we do,  
We are got into fairy land, long ere we have reached the last steps of our theory; 
and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument, or to 
think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority. Our line is too 
short to fathom such immense abysses. And however we may flatter ourselves 
that we are guided, in every step which we take, by a kind of verisimilitude and 
experience, we may be assured that this fancied experience has no authority when 
we thus apply it to subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience.255 
This is the thrust of the dramatic closing words of the Enquiry: “When we run over 
libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our 
hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it 
contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any 
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experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to 
the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.”256 
Hume’s work illustrates a shift in the Western Christian theological consideration 
of theodicy that is important for the thesis of this dissertation. First, one notes the 
movement of theological focus from large-scale to small-scale study, from group 
considerations to the consideration of individuals. Hume marks this shift explicitly. 
Beginning by describing the view from the general, he writes, “Look round this universe. 
What an immense profusion of beings, animated and organized, sensible and active! You 
admire this prodigious variety and fecundity.”257 Such admiration, however, does not 
stand the more specialized inspection of the specific: “But inspect a little more narrowly 
these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to 
each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How contemptible or 
odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature, 
impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without 
discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children.”258 As was seen 
previously, one of Leibniz’s strategies was to minimize the amount of suffering in the 
world by avoiding that kind of detailed scrutiny, as Philo points out to Demea when the 
latter remarks that “No one author has ever, so far as I can recollect, been so extravagant 
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as to deny” the surfeit of human misery.259 Philo corrects him, saying, “Leibniz has 
denied it; and is perhaps the first who ventured upon so bold and paradoxical an opinion; 
at least, the first, whom made it essential to his philosophical system.”260 This move from 
general to specific, and the consequent difficulties for the exercise of theodicy, is 
similarly illustrated in the Enquiry:  
There are many philosophers who, after an exact scrutiny of all the phenomena of 
nature, conclude, that the WHOLE, considered as one system, is, in every period of 
its existence, ordered with perfect benevolence; and that the utmost possible 
happiness will, in the end, result to all created beings, without any mixture of 
positive or absolute ill or misery. Every physical ill, say they, makes an essential 
part of this benevolent system, and could not possibly be removed, even by the 
Deity himself, considered as a wise agent, without giving entrance to greater ill, 
or excluding greater good, which will result from it.261  
Hume showed, however, that this entails the same problem that Voltaire illustrated in 
Candide: “But though this topic be specious and sublime, it was soon found in practice 
weak and ineffectual,” for example, to the man who is “lying under the racking pains of 
the gout.”262 It works in principle but not in practice: “These enlarged views may, for a 
moment, please the imagination of a speculative man, who is placed in ease and security; 
but neither can they dwell with constancy on his mind, even though undisturbed by the 
emotions of pain or passion; much less can they maintain their ground, when attacked by 
such powerful antagonists.”263 This shift in focus will be an important aspect of this 
dissertation’s proposal of a tragic understanding of creation. 
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Second, it is of consequence that, in his discussion of theodicy, Hume has Philo in 
the Dialogues begin with natural evil, not moral evil. Traditionally, moral evil had been 
considered the more vexing problem. As Leibniz wrote in Theodicy: “Now that I have 
disposed of the cause of moral evil; physical evil … will be less troublesome to explain, 
since these are results of moral evil.”264 It may be that Hume had recognized the other 
implication of the increase in knowledge of the natural world: the fact that the less 
mysterious the natural world becomes, the more glaring become the problems raised by 
the severity of the suffering that it causes. With Hume, nature, with her “abortive 
children,” has moved to the center of the discussion of suffering, displacing the topic of 
sin. A romantic view of nature extols its beauty; Demea, however, says “The whole earth, 
believe me, Philo, is cursed and polluted. A perpetual war is kindled amongst all living 
creatures. Necessity, hunger, want stimulate the strong and courageous: Fear, anxiety, 
terror agitate the weak and infirm.”265 Philo agrees: “The stronger prey upon the weaker, 
and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety. The weaker too, in their turn, often prey 
upon the stronger, and vex and molest them without relaxation.… And thus on each hand, 
before and behind, above and below, every animal is surrounded with enemies, which 
incessantly seek his misery and destruction.”266 God as the author of nature is on trial; the 
consideration of God as the author of sin, so important for Leibniz to defend, is sidelined 
by Hume. 
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With these objections to the design argument, Hume painted a vastly altered 
picture of the universe and the place of human beings in that universe, with a picture of a 
cosmos that is at best indifferent, and at worst opposed, to human flourishing. The 
eventual philosophical impact was enormous, and contemporary philosophy of religion 
bears the stamp of Hume’s objections. As one writer put it, “Hume has not only 
countered the theistic proofs but left us with a feeling of existential abandonment.”267 This 
did not affect his good humor, however; by all accounts, including those of his 
ideological opponents, Hume was a charming guest and always perfectly genial.268 Adam 
Smith wrote that “His constant pleasantry was the genuine effusion of good nature and 
good humour, tempered with delicacy and modesty, and without even the slightest 
tincture of malignity.”269 For all the warmth of his personality, however, the effect of his 
philosophy was chilling. 
William Paley: It is a happy world 
At least, it was eventually chilling. Gaskin describes Hume’s arguments as 
“terminally destructive”; Livingstone as invoking feelings of “existential abandonment”; 
Tilley writes that “The enduring significance of the Dialogues lies in its showing how the 
Enlightenment theodicy project in particular and the Enlightenment design argument in 
general are untenable.”270 Nonetheless, this “terminally destructive” critique did not 
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prevent the design argument from remaining ubiquitous throughout the intellectual life of 
the nineteenth century, only increasing in popularity, and even being considered 
axiomatic for many of the scientists working in the period. It is fascinating to note that, 
throughout the nineteenth century, and especially in the second half of that century, it was 
assumed that it was Cleanthes of the Dialogues, the empirical theist, who most 
represented Hume’s position, and that Philo’s assent to the arguments of natural theology 
at the end of the work was sincere and reflective of the author. (James A. Harris 
documents several examples of this assumption appearing in nineteenth-century 
literature.)271 If anything, natural theology was more popular in the nineteenth century 
than it had been in the eighteenth; the marriage of science and the design argument 
carried on apace, “largely unscathed by the criticisms of either Hume or Kant.”272 The 
resilience of natural theology, especially in England, is less of a mystery, however, when 
one considers the particular milieu of the time. J. H. Brooke suggests several reasons why 
natural theology maintained its intellectual popularity.  
First, even after the publication of Hume’s Dialogues, a natural theology that 
involved the design argument was attractive to people of a range of theological opinions. 
Deists, for example, were encouraged by the fact that, if knowledge of God can be 
deduced from facts in the world, then revelation becomes less and less important, and 
perhaps can eventually be done away with altogether: natural theology, consistently 
                                                 
271
 James A. Harris, “The Reception of Hume in Nineteenth-Century British Philosophy,” in The Reception 
of David Hume In Europe, ed. Peter Jones (London: Continuum, 2005), 315. 
272
 John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives, Cambridge History of 
Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 209; cf. Peter Addinall, Philosophy and Biblical 
Interpretation: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 39. 
86 
 
pursued, could lead to a thoroughly naturalistic religion. Those supporting a traditional 
position, on the other hand, found natural theology as supporting the traditional attributes 
described in Scripture and tradition, thereby confirming the authority of revelation; 
William Paley (1743–1845), for example, wrote that “The existence and character of the 
Deity, is, in every view, the most interesting of all human speculations. In none, however, 
is it more so, than as it facilitates the belief of the fundamental articles of Revelation.”273 
The same evidence, in other words, could be, and was, interpreted in very different ways. 
Brooke writes that, “The fact that natural theology could be used both to attack and 
defend Christianity may be confusing, but that very ambivalence also helps to account for 
its resilience.”274 Both sides of the controversy found that natural theology bolstered their 
case, and it was a conversation in which skeptics of the Humean variety simply did not 
have a voice. In such a situation, natural theology itself would endure.  
Second, the task of natural theology was not the same task that Hume’s characters 
had discussed, and perhaps demolished, in the Dialogues. Natural theology’s function at 
that point in history was not to convince non-believers of the existence and goodness of 
God beyond the shadow of a doubt; rather, it was meant to assist believers in their own 
thinking about God, helping them to articulate their beliefs in light of the rapidly-
developing science of the day. Natural theology served as “evocation rather than proof,” 
as Brooke puts it, and thus philosophical arguments against it were unlikely to be 
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persuasive to those predisposed to belief.275 The leading thinkers of the day—including 
Paley, but also Newton, Berkeley, and Joseph Butler—did not have personal faith as a 
consequence of the persuasiveness of the design argument; they accepted the design 
argument as a consequence of their personal faith.276  
Third, natural theology had a unifying function for the scientific community in 
two ways. First, natural theology helped to prevent fragmentation of the scientific 
community over political or religious disagreements. Second, an assumption of a 
connection between religious knowledge and scientific knowledge meant that religion 
and science did not need to be adversarial; had they been perceived as such, that fact 
would have hindered support in some quarters for scientific work. Such was the case in 
France, for example, in the conflict between the materialism of the revolutionaries and 
the reactions of the counter-revolutionaries. As a result of that discord, there were intense 
political overtones to any discussions relating religion and science. Brooke writes that “In 
these years following the French Revolution, the contrast between England and France is 
particularly striking because it would have been difficult, in France, for scientists to 
revive the arguments of natural theology without appearing to be supporters of the ancien 
régime.”277 The result was “an intellectual civil war,”278 and soldiers in a civil war have 
little time to devote to other activities, including scientific activities. Britain did not have 
that division, and thus scientific societies were able to flourish and do their work with 
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little popular opposition and the participation of a diversity of members—including an 
abundance of clergy.  
A conservative concern with the French Revolution also provided a fourth 
justification for the practice of natural theology in England. A world that has been 
designed, with each tiny detail being put in place by God, could be used to buttress the 
justifications for the existing political and economic status quo. If God had taken infinite 
care over every minute part of an animal’s body, how much more must God have been 
concerned when designing society and establishing the rules that govern it? One finds in 
Paley, for example, talk of the pleasures of owning property (“Instead of coveting the 
beauty of distant situations, it teaches every man to find it in his own”279) and a defense of 
the class structure: “Again; there are strong intelligible reasons, why there should exist in 
human society great disparity of wealth and station.”280 Scientists in Britain, uniformly of 
the upper classes, were wary of a French-style conflict; consider that Paley’s Natural 
Theology was published only eight years after the “Reign of Terror” in France (1793–
1794). Natural theology was a safer strategy, in more than one sense, and it was in this 
context, with its social, political, religious, and scientific particularities, that Paley 
published his Natural Theology in 1802.  
Though he does not substantively engage with Hume’s objections to the design 
argument in Natural Theology, it is not the case that Paley was unaware of Hume’s work; 
quite the contrary. On the subject of ethics, in particular, there was a substantial, and 
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perhaps surprising, concord between the two; both were utilitarians, though Paley was 
understandably critical of Hume’s separation of ethics and religion.281 In addition, Paley 
was at least aware of Hume’s writings on religion, mentioning the “posthumous 
dialogues” of Mr. Hume in the penultimate chapter of Natural Theology, though the 
reference is in the service of a politically conservative discouragement of an overactive 
citizenry, who may become restless and prevent the things of civic life from being “in 
their order.” 282 Scholars differ on whether Natural Theology was a direct response to the 
Dialogues.283 Either way, Cleanthes had a supporter in Paley’s Natural Theology, which 
rehearses and expands his arguments. 
While Natural Theology was the last of Paley’s major works to be published, 
more than one author sees it as the key to his philosophical program,284 and in the 
introduction to Natural Theology Paley writes that his works “have been written in an 
order, the very reverse of that in which they ought to be read.”285 Simply put, the 
argument of Paley’s Natural Theology is that, because the natural world shows evidence 
of design and something that is designed requires a designer, the natural world is 
therefore the work of a designer. Further, only a person can be a designer, and that person 
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is God, because only God could design on the scale of the universe. This is the classic 
design argument made fresh for an early-nineteenth-century readership, and Paley begins 
making it in the first sentence of the book, laying out what would be the central analogy 
of the work as a whole: 
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked 
how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer, that, for anything I knew 
to the contrary, it had lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to 
show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the 
ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I 
should hardly think of the answer I had before given, that for anything I knew, the 
watch might have always been there.… There must have existed, at some time, 
and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers, who formed it for the purpose 
which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and 
designed its use.… Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of 
design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the 
difference, on the side of nature, of being greater or more, and that in a degree 
which exceeds all computation.286 
After stating the argument that, as a watch implies an antecedent watchmaker, so does 
contrivance in nature require an intelligent designer, Paley spends the bulk of the book 
providing example after incredibly specific example of the scientific evidence that 
demonstrates that contrivance is found in nature. The intricate mechanical workings of 
the world are analogous to the intricate mechanical workings of a finely-tuned clock, and 
Paley sets out to show the impressiveness of these organic mechanical workings, and the 
structures that enable them, which simply could not have arisen through chance. Unlike 
the design arguments of Newton, almost all of Paley’s evidence is drawn from organic 
life. Paley writes that “My opinion of Astronomy has always been, that it is not the best 
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medium through which to prove the agency of an intelligent Creator.”287 Flora, too, is 
inferior to fauna in displaying “designed and studied mechanism.”288 Instead, hundreds of 
pages are spent detailing the anatomy and operations of animals, including human 
animals.  
LeMahieu schematizes the five most common classes of evidence that Paley 
presents.289 First, there are the structural adaptations within organisms that allow the 
individual organism to flourish. For example, inner organs are complementary, working 
well together even under pressure. Second, one can see how organisms are structurally 
adapted to their environments. Animals in cold climates, for example, are covered in fur 
to keep them warm. Third, there are species’ “structural particularities,” which bear no 
resemblance to structures found in other species, but nonetheless are perfectly suited to 
their environments. The air bladder of a fish, for example, helps it regulate the depth of 
its swimming; there is no analogous structure in organisms that reside on land. Fourth, 
many species have “prospective contrivances”: structures that, though not immediately 
necessary for an organism, are nonetheless ready for use when the need arises. Infants 
have no immediate need for teeth, for example; still, they are provided for their eventual 
utilization. Finally, there are structures in organisms that are “compensatory,” where the 
compensation is for other deficiencies of the organism. Paley uses the example of spiders 
who spin webs to trap insects, since arachnids are unable to fly. Animals with no teeth get 
their nutrition from their ability to chew cud instead. The book is full of these examples. 
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It is in the final chapters of Natural Theology that Paley addresses directly how 
this design argument affects his understanding of God. While he identifies seven “natural 
attributes” of God (omnipotence, omniscience, etc.) in an early chapter in the final 
section, he spends very little time discussing these attributes, dispatching, for example, 
both “self-existence” and “necessary existence” in a single sentence each.290 Of the 
characteristics of God, he addresses only two: the “unity of the Deity” and “the goodness 
of the Deity.” Proof of the unity of God is found in the uniformity of the natural laws that 
are found throughout the universe; this is the “regularity” argument. Paley does not spend 
much time describing this, nor does he address any of the challenges to the view from 
Hume or others. 
The goodness of God, however, receives a good deal more attention from Paley; it 
is certainly the chapter specifically concerned with religious belief that is the most 
extensive. Paley makes two points regarding how what is observable in the world 
supports a conception of God’s goodness. The first is that the examples of contrivance 
that he has described all seem to have the purpose of increasing the flourishing of the 
organism. In the hundreds of examples he has given in the preceding chapters, all of them 
were salubrious, none deleterious, and the fact that the intricate design of animals is 
purposed to their own good reflects God’s benevolence. “The number of parts in each, 
their figure and fitness, the faculties depending upon them, the variety of species, the 
complexity of structure, the success, in so many cases, and felicity of the result” all point 
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toward a benevolent creator.291 While “evil no doubt exists,” he writes, it “is never, that 
we can perceive, the object of contrivance.”292 Now, however, as he draws the book to a 
close, he acknowledges possible exceptions, two in particular: “venomous animals” and 
“animals preying upon one another.”293 Paley acknowledges that the fact that these violent 
attributes are also the result of contrivance poses a threat to a conception of God’s 
goodness as reflected in the world.  
For both of them, however, he identifies mitigating circumstances and 
justifications that show why it is best for the situation to be the way it is, rather than some 
other way. He makes four observations regarding venomous animals.294 First, echoing the 
Thomistic approach, he points out that, though being bitten by a venomous animal is not 
good for the one who is bitten, it is good for the animal doing the biting. That organism is 
then able to eat; what is bad for the bitten mouse is good for the satiated snake. Second, 
there are not many cases where the bites of venomous animals are able to kill large 
animals, such as humans; such a thing happens quite rarely. Third, there are a minimal 
number of snakes, for example, that are actually poisonous; Linnaeus had identified only 
32 lethal species out of 218 total. Finally, human beings often go to the wrong places, 
traveling to where the venomous animals are, and then complain about being bitten. Had 
they not ventured to where they were not safe, venomous animals would not have been a 
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problem. He concludes, therefore, that, while venomous attributes are clearly designed by 
the creator, they nonetheless have a minimal effect on human flourishing.  
This raises, however, the issue of nonhuman flourishing, specifically “animals 
devouring one another.” The sophisticated anatomical mechanisms by which this process 
occurs clearly reveal it to be the result of contrivance, and Paley recognizes it as “the 
chief, if not the only instance, in the works of the Deity, of an economy, stamped by 
marks of design, in which the character of utility can be called into question.”295 He 
addresses this issue with three points. First, given that nonhuman immortality is 
impossible, and even undesirable for various reasons, the options for animal death are 
either disease, decay, or violence. He does not see evidence of disease in animals, leaving 
them with only decay or being prey as opportunities for death. If animals could only die 
of decay, Paley reasons, we would have a “world filled with drooping, superannuated, 
half starved, helpless and unhelped animals.”296 Surely allowing the predator/prey 
relationship is better than that situation. Second, the pursuit of prey is an enjoyable aspect 
of much of animal life; to take that activity away is to take away a source of pleasure for 
an uncountable number of creatures. His final point is more extensively illustrated. 
Drawing on, but modifying, Thomas Malthus, he describes a world of 
“superfecundity,”297 which exceeds the ability of nature to support it.298 Therefore, it is 
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required that some animals do not survive, either from starvation or from the actions of 
one against another. (This Malthusian “struggle for existence” in a world of finite 
resources will be a significant component of Darwin’s development of the theory of 
natural selection.) Nonetheless, this natural fecundity, along with the limitations imposed 
by finite resources, has the advantage of maintaining an appropriate balance between the 
different organisms, “as different purposes of utility may require.”299 
Paley’s utilitarian ethics are obvious in these descriptions; the maximization of 
happiness is clearly his assumption about God’s intentions, and Paley finds a way to 
calculate that greater happiness will result from each situation that might otherwise be 
identified as deficient. Indeed, this ubiquitous happiness forms the second observable 
natural characteristic providing evidence for God’s goodness. The pleasure that 
organisms feel throughout their lives is far in excess of what is minimally necessary for 
the maintenance of life. It is a joy that has been “superadded” to the experience of living 
that Paley identifies as the gratuitous gift of a creator who wants creatures to be happy 
and so designs them in such a way as to make that possible. In what reads almost as a 
direct response to Hume, Paley writes “Nor is the design abortive. It is a happy world 
after all. The air, the earth, the water, teem with delighted existence.”300 As Paley himself 
clearly took delight in the world around him, amazed at its intricacies and its beauty, he 
projects that delight onto the world as a whole, seeing everywhere in the natural world 
the joyfulness of living: in recently-born flies (manifesting “the exultation which they 
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feel in their lately discovered faculties”), bees in spring (“one of the cheerfullest objects 
that can be looked upon”), fish (“so happy, that they know not what to do with 
themselves”), and even shrimp (“if they had meant to make signs of their happiness, they 
could not have done it more intelligibly” than in jumping into the air from the shallow 
water).301 The act of eating itself serves as the ultimate example. Paley asks, “Why add 
pleasure to the act of eating; sweetness and relish to food? Why a new and appropriate 
sense for the perception of the pleasure? Why should the juice of a peach applied to the 
palate, affect the part so differently from what it does when rubbed upon the palm of the 
hand?”302 There is only one explanation: “This is a constitution, which, so far as appears 
to me, can be resolved into nothing but the pure benevolence of the creator. Eating is 
necessary; but the pleasure attending it is not necessary.”303  
Even if one remains unmoved by Paley’s argument, his description of the details 
of anatomy and function, in particular, must be acknowledged as impressive. For 
example, not only are insects described in general, but so too are a variety of specific 
examples of different kinds of insects, to show how perfectly each has been contrived to 
flourish. Though not a natural scientist himself, Paley incorporated the best of then-
contemporary science to make his larger philosophical point. This effort had been 
undertaken scores of times before, but never as successfully; LeMahieu describes Natural 
Theology as “the most consistent and searching statement of the teleological argument in 
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the English language.”304 As a result, his project manifests the Enlightenment ideal of 
science and religion working hand in hand, assisting each other, guiding each other, 
encouraging each other. This Anglican cleric saw a larger devotional purpose for the 
Natural Theology, forthrightly declaring the purpose of the book to be the increase of the 
“stability and impression” of the religious doctrines in the hearts of his readers,305 whether 
or not the text was intended to serve as incontrovertible proof for God’s existence and 
characteristics. Recognition of contrivance throughout the world, especially in biology, 
means that simple observation of the natural world, by the professional or the amateur, 
systematic or occasional, confronts the viewer with the magnificence of God. Every 
moment of living should drive one toward the worship of the good and unified God. This 
has a partisan religious edge to it as well: superstition, emotionalism, and arguments from 
authority cannot have that effect. Natural theology, however, gives the scientifically-
aware modern Christian a basis for his wonder, love, and praise. Therefore, in spite of the 
philosophical forces arrayed against it, but concordant with the intellectual milieu of the 
time, Paley’s work flourished. “It is hard to overstate the impact of Paley’s Natural 
Theology on the discourse of natural theology as a whole,” writes Stuart Peterfreund; the 
book went through 20 editions in 18 years.306 In prose that is concise, clever, and 
compelling, Paley did a particularly good job expanding upon the design argument to a 
public ready to receive it, and showing the evidence for the argument, gathered from the 
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best science of the day. Paley’s Natural Theology became an integral part of the 
curriculum in schools in both England and America, and natural theology as a study by 
some of the most esteemed scientists and theologians only increased in popularity in the 
nineteenth century.307 
While Darwinian theory may have made the problem of natural evil more 
poignant, Paley’s extensive writing on the subject in Natural Theology shows that the 
topic itself had already begun to supplant the primary place of moral evil in the 
theological agenda. A hundred years earlier, Leibniz had felt moral evil to be the biggest 
threat to his theory of the best possible world. However, like Hume, Paley, though from 
the other direction, addressed primarily natural evil in his theodicy. References to moral 
evil in Natural Theology are few.308 Paley may not have had a choice but to concentrate 
more on natural evil: after all, his entire argument rests on the deduction of God’s 
attributes from the mechanics of nature as they are observed. 
Theologically, Paley encountered the same problem that others did writing in the 
tradition of theodicy: being forced either to minimize the intensity of the suffering that 
occurs through natural evil, deny it altogether, or show how, ultimately, it is for the best; 
the latter requires for him to promote the maximal aggregate happiness. LeMahieu 
describes the result: “Paley bravely endeavored to offer an answer consistent with his 
exuberant optimism. Yet, even his most compassionate sympathizers would probably 
grant that he failed; his reflections on the origin of evil contain some of the most jarring 
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statements in the entire essay.”309 Like all design arguments that seek to establish the 
goodness of creation, and thus the goodness of God, Paley’s description of the world 
could encompass many of its details but not all of them and, being forced to confront the 
kinds of illness and physical debilities about which Augustine wrote in City of God, Paley 
felt the need to justify them as rare (“Few diseases are fatal”310) and those that do occur 
have “the great use … to reconcile us to death” in a way that allows for a “calm expiring 
of a patient at the close of his disease.”311 In a manner reminiscent of Leibniz, then, Paley 
found evidence for his thesis in the assertion that the weight of pleasure in the world was 
emphatically greater than that of suffering; there is a surfeit of pleasure, and only a 
modicum of suffering. Even bodily pain itself leads to a feeling of pleasure upon its 
alleviation: “[Pain] may be violent and frequent; but it is seldom both violent and long 
continued: and its pauses and intermissions become positive pleasures.”312 In other words, 
the cessation of periods of pain, which are few enough as it is, results in a pleasure that 
would not have been experienced otherwise, and, in that sense, the experience of pain 
itself has the effect of increasing the happiness of the individual.  
It is important to note how Paley’s personal optimism results in a sunnier view—
and thus one more “jarring” when considered in light of observable personal 
experiences—than that of any of the philosophers that have come before him considered 
previously in this dissertation. This would place him in a particular bind going forward. 
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First, recall that Voltaire’s implied criticism of Leibniz in the Candide had 
mischaracterized Leibniz’s position; Leibniz did not hold that this is “the best of all 
possible worlds” for all people considered individually. Voltaire’s criticism would have 
been applicable, however, to Paley, who thus puts himself in the unfortunate position of 
then having to justify every particular physical evil as increasing the happiness of every 
individual—both human and nonhuman—that suffers from it. Augustine, Aquinas, 
Leibniz, even Bayle in his own way: none of them made such claims, and thus none of 
them had to establish justifications to the extent that Paley’s system required him to. 
Paley’s design argument for creation’s goodness was therefore vulnerable to a single case 
of suffering that did not also include a concomitant good for the individual.  
Similarly, Paley did not share the philosophical hesitation that the other writers 
exhibited when they acknowledged the appearance of great evil in the world. They had 
held that that perception was due to the limits of human knowledge and the inability to 
have the view of the whole: only God has perfect awareness, and that leaves human 
beings, in an important sense, in the dark. Further, Augustine, for example, had found 
hope in the eschatological world. One does not hear that recourse in Paley, but rather gets 
the sense that the world itself, directly perceivable and experienced by human observers, 
gives its own unimpeachable evidence that “the common course of things is in favor of 
happiness.… [H]appiness is the rule; misery, the exception.”313 Paley intentionally 
bypassed the metaphysical arguments that Leibniz had used, finding them “of a nature 
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too wide to be brought under our survey,” and Paley focused instead on examples of a 
“more determinate kind,” that is, specific cases.314 For the purposes of philosophical 
realism, this is salutary; testing one’s theories against the world as it is experienced is a 
productive way to do philosophy. This too, however, left him vulnerable to 
straightforward empirical observations that could, and would, leave some unconvinced 
that “the common course of things is in favor of happiness.” 
Further, this emphasis on the testimony of the natural world considered by itself 
would also leave him vulnerable to changing states of physical evidence in a way that the 
previous authors had not been. Once Paley had staked the whole of his argument on the 
state of nature, changes in a scientific understanding of nature would be enormously 
consequential for the credibility of his theory. Specifically, this version of the design 
argument required the creation of the finely-tuned universe in one fell swoop; this 
included the requirement of a stable number and type of (well-contrived) species across 
time. Paley was not ignorant of the critiques of fixity of species: while Darwin’s Origin 
would not be published for fifty-seven years, the idea of the transmutation of species was 
not unknown by 1802, due to the writings of Jean-Baptists Lamarck and Erasmus 
Darwin. A thoroughgoing empiricist, however, Paley had the perfect rejoinder to these 
theorists: there was simply no widely-accepted evidence for the concept of species 
transmutation. First, the most minute details of human and animal anatomy could be 
studied closely by anyone with the time, equipment, and predilection to do so, and these 
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details revealed well-organized groups of plants and animals uniquely fitted to their 
environments. There was nothing that could show the same kind of evidence for design 
over time; the idea lacked proof. Second, the necessity for the intentional volition of a 
mind to design anything can be clearly seen in the analogy of the watch and the 
watchmaker; no such analogy, based in observable phenomena, could be presented for 
transmutational biology. Finally, the reasons why species had gone extinct, as the 
transmutation argument held, was not addressed by the argument itself. As data 
answering these objections would be discovered, however, and a unifying theory for them 
found, the hundreds of pages of Paley’s proofs would come to seem otiose. There was 
another, naturalistic explanation for why animals are fitted to the environments, and 
Darwin would give it. Additional difficulties would arise from the eventual acceptance of 
the gradualist theory of the earth’s development, which would further undermine Paley’s 
reliance on the fixity of species. 
Considered in the trajectory of theological considerations of natural evil 
throughout the tradition, therefore, one feels that Paley almost stacked the deck against 
himself, in both theological and scientific ways, by presenting a more robust and 
assertive design argument as evidence for the goodness of creation and the goodness of 
God, thereby leaving himself uniquely vulnerable to further developments in the 
sciences. And, while Paley did not invent the design argument, with its long and 
distinguished pedigree that includes many of the greatest Western philosophers, it was his 
version of the argument that was assumed to be normative in the cultural and intellectual 
world of Charles Darwin when, having returned from his trip in the HMS Beagle, he 
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began working on the ideas that would eventually be published as the Origin. Paley 
himself was not without his critics. These included some evangelical writers, who 
worried that his reliance on natural theology would assist the deist cause, and the Roman 
Catholic (by 1845) John Henry Newman, who criticized the anthropomorphizing 
consequences of natural theology.315 These critiques, along with those of the French 
philosophes, Hume, and Kant, were present, but they were not prevalent. Paley’s view 
was dominant. He had combined an ancient form of argument with the newest science 
and written a concise and entertaining book for which the British world especially was 
primed.  
The view of nature that it required, however, would come to seem increasingly 
incredible to Darwin after the development of his theory of natural selection. The 
development of that theory is the subject of the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Evolution before Darwin 
Even while writing Natural Theology, William Paley was aware of the other 
theories of human development that were being advanced. One of the consequences of 
new scientific discoveries, including the discovery of fossils, as well as a growing 
skepticism in some quarters regarding the catastrophic view of geological history (i.e., 
that the surface of the earth as currently observed was the result of dramatic, even 
supernatural, changes), was that the transmutation hypothesis was becoming more 
popular. In its simplest form, the transmutation hypothesis held that species had 
developed over time. This was, of course, a direct contradiction of the principle of the 
fixity of species, the view that all the species currently existing had all been created, at 
the same time, in their current form, by God. Changes to species, in that view, were not 
possible. The supporters of transmutation, however, asserted that it was through changes 
over time that a particular species became more complex.  
For the biological transmutationists, opinions differed on how, and why, these 
changes would occur. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829), one of the most prominent 
evolutionists of the era, held that species changed due to the behavior and needs of an 
organism over time, or what he called “the inheritance of acquired characteristics.”1 
These characteristics emerged as a result of the influence of the organism’s environment. 
For example, a bird, living by a body of water and catching its prey there, will need to 
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avoid having its body fall into the mud. Therefore that bird “makes its best efforts to 
stretch and lengthen its legs.”2 Lamarck’s view was that these efforts would eventually 
result in longer, and thinner legs for individuals in that species: “The long-established 
habit acquired by this bird and all its race of continually stretching and lengthening its 
legs, results in the individuals of this race becoming raised as though on stilts, and 
gradually obtaining long, bare legs, denuded of feathers up to the thigh and often higher 
still.”3 This is the “first law” of the inheritance of acquire characteristics: “In every 
animal which has not passed the limit of its development, a more frequent and continuous 
use of any organ gradually strengthens, develops and enlarges that organ, and gives it a 
power proportional to the length of time it has been so used; while the permanent disuse 
of any organ imperceptibly weakens and deteriorates it, and progressively diminishes its 
functional capacity, until it finally disappears.”4  
This would also have effects on all of the future descendants of those stretching 
birds, and it was in this way that species evolved. As Lamarck describes it in his “second 
law,” “All the acquisitions or losses wrought by nature on individuals, through the 
influence of the environment in which their race has long been placed, and hence through 
the influence of the predominant use or permanent disuse of any organ; all these are 
preserved by reproduction to the new individuals which arise, provided that the acquired 
modifications are common to both sexes, or at least to the individuals which produce the 
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young.”5 Therefore, “such a change is thus handed on to all succeeding individuals in the 
same environment, without their having to acquire it in the same way that it was actually 
created.”6 
It was not only future members of the species that would be affected. This process 
even resulted in the formation of what scientists would recognize as new species 
altogether. Carl Linnaeus (1707–1778) had created a vast and orderly taxonomy, with a 
place for everything, and everything in its place. Lamarck, however, recognized, as 
Darwin would, the vague manner of demarcating species in scientific literature. The 
different schema are “artificial devices,” Lamarck wrote, “while nature has made nothing 
of this kind.”7 Organisms go about their business of attempting to flourish in their 
respective environments, changing as necessary, and passing down those acquired 
characteristics. It is only once that process has resulted in organisms that are able to be 
distinguished from others that the natural scientist comes along and declares them a new 
species. Lamarck writes,  
Suppose, for example, that the seeds of a grass or any other plant that grows 
normally in a damp meadow, are somehow conveyed first to the slope of a 
neighbouring hill where the ground although higher is still rich enough to allow 
the plant to maintain its existence. Suppose that then, after living there and 
reproducing itself many times, it reaches little by little the dry and almost barren 
ground of a mountain side. If the plant succeeds in living there and perpetuating 
itself for a number of generations, it will have become so altered that botanists 
who come across it will erect it into a separate species.8 
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In Larmack’s view, this is how all the species now known have come about: “Every 
living body underwent greater or smaller changes in its organization and its parts; so that 
what we call species were imperceptibly fashioned among them one after another and 
have only a relative constancy, and are not as old as nature.”9 The same process happens 
in reverse as well: the disuse of an organ will leads to its shrinking and, eventually, to its 
disappearance.10  
Lamarck did not believe, however, that any particular species was irretrievably 
lost.11 Indeed, given his theory that species could adapt to changing conditions, the only 
reason a species would be lost would be to a wholesale destruction, caused either by 
human beings or by natural disaster. Therefore, when the fossil record reveals creatures 
that have no extant analogues, Lamarck asks, “May it not be possible … that the fossils in 
question belonged to species still existing, but which have changed since that time and 
become converted into the similar species that we now actually find”?12 The alternative 
theory, as he saw it, was that a “universal catastrophe” had somehow caused the mass 
extinction of many species at one time. However, Lamarck pointed out that “in all 
nature’s works nothing is done abruptly, but that she acts everywhere slowly and by 
successive stages” and therefore “There is no necessity whatever to imagine that a 
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universal catastrophe came to overthrow everything, and destroy a great part of nature’s 
own works.”13 
Lamarck’s methodology, the way he went about constructing his theories, was 
significant in the history of biological science for being wholly naturalistic, not relying on 
supernatural explanations of one kind or another. Lamarck found the machinations of 
nature sufficient to explain the variety of life that he could see and rejecting religious 
methods of studying natural phenomena: “If we are studying nature she alone should 
occupy our attention; and we should confine ourselves exclusively to the examination of 
the facts which she presents, in our endeavour to discover the physical laws which 
control the production of these facts; lastly, we ought never to introduce into our theories 
any subjects that are outside nature, and about which we shall never be able to know 
anything positive.”14 Even the highest intellectual features of the most sophisticated 
vertebrate—the human being—came under the scope of scientific review, and were 
shown to be continuous with the nervous systems of other creatures, not entirely 
independent of them; the human capacities and anatomy were discussed right alongside 
those of the every other organism.  
In Zoological Philosophy, Lamarck insists that he does not mean his evolutionary 
explanations to “diminish the grandeur” of God: “Doubtless, nothing exists but by the 
will of the Sublime Author of all things, but can we set rules for him in the execution of 
his will, or fix the routine for him to observe? Could not his infinite power create an 
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order of things which give existence successively to all that we see as well as to all that 
exists but that we do not see?”15 Nonetheless, all involved were aware that these ideas had 
religious implications, whatever one’s theological or scientific opinions.16  
The transmutation scheme—a kind of organic version of “self-improvement”—
was amenable to late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century public. Adam Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, held that it was individual effort that led to 
flourishing. His laissez-faire version of economic organization resisted outside 
intervention, and a view of hard-working organisms perpetually seeking, and achieving, 
improvement was agreeable to it. As Ruse writes, “There is no question that organic 
evolution is the child of the social doctrine of progress. Men like Erasmus Darwin and 
Jean Baptiste de Lamarck were ardent social progressionists and they read this doctrine 
into the world of animals and plants, and then usually read it right back out as 
confirmation of their social beliefs!”17 
Darwin before the Origin 
It was into this rapidly-changing world of the nineteenth century that Charles 
Darwin was born. Darwin was fully a member of the British upper class of the Victorian 
age, “born into Jane Austen’s England,” as Darwin biographer Janet Browne describes 
it.18 Indeed, his socioeconomic position would play a decisive role in the development of 
his life’s work. Darwin as a young man had considered being ordained to the ministry in 
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the Church of England, at his father’s suggestion, after Darwin had demurred from being 
a doctor. Darwin was reluctant. In the Autobiography he writes that “I had scruples about 
declaring my belief in all the dogmas of the Church of England; though otherwise I liked 
the thought of being a country clergyman.”19 After two years as an undergraduate at 
Edinburgh, he left for Cambridge with that goal in mind, reading Paley during the course 
of his studies there. In fact, he writes of Paley’s work that he was so familiar with it that 
“I am convinced that I could have written out the whole of the Evidences with perfect 
correctness, but not of course in the clear language of Paley. The logic of this book and as 
I may add of his Natural Theology gave me as much delight as Euclid.”20 Darwin 
remained convinced of the veracity of the natural theology of which Paley was a 
representative for years to come, including throughout his time on the Beagle. Dov 
Ospovat gives evidence that, even though Darwin would have rejected the explicit 
versions of natural theology by the late 1830s, after reading Malthus, he maintained some 
of the traditional ideas, including the perfect adaptation of organisms to their 
environments, into the 1850s.21  
It was not divinity but biology, however, that captured the young Darwin’s 
interest at Cambridge. Specifically, the collection of beetles, with its methods of 
capturing and cataloging specimens, occupied much of his time. As he reports in his 
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autobiography, “No pursuit at Cambridge was followed with nearly so much eagerness or 
gave me so much pleasure as collecting beetles.”22 Eager to the point of being an object 
of other students’ teasing, Darwin collected and recorded the varieties of beetles 
alongside a fellow student, and cousin, William Darwin Fox, who was similarly inclined. 
Later, his scientific investigations also included attending to geological studies alongside 
Adam Sedgwick, a professor of geology. (Sedgwick was an ordained Anglican priest; 
Fox would be as well.) Darwin was able to join the geologist, then president of the 
Geological Society of London, on a week-long trip to north Wales in the summer of 
1831. On this expedition, the two of them gathered the evidence necessary for a major 
revision of a portion of the geological map of the area.23 With Sedgwick, Darwin learned 
the techniques of scrupulous scientific fieldwork that would serve him well on the 
Beagle.  
Darwin’s famous travels on the Beagle lasted from December 7, 1831 to October 
2, 1836. His invitation to join Captain FitzRoy on the Beagle’s second journey had more 
to do with the captain’s desire for the companionship of a fellow gentleman than a 
recognition of the young Darwin’s scientific acumen—the English class system at work. 
In fact, the on-board surgeon was by tradition the natural historian for the voyage, by dint 
of his position, a fact that led to severe friction between Darwin and the surgeon, with the 
latter finally leaving in frustration.24 Nonetheless, the well-financed Darwin was well-
equipped for the voyage—better equipped than the surgeon—and spent hours each day 
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cataloging specimens and recording the observations that he had made. During the trip 
itself, Darwin had a significant amount of time available to explore foreign terrains; most 
of his time away was actually spent on terra firma. Browne writes that, “his journey on 
the Beagle was not so much a voyage at sea as a series of miscellaneous travels on land. 
Although he was away from home for five years, Darwin was at sea for a combined total 
of only eighteen months in all, with the longest single stretch aboard being forty-seven 
days.”25 It was to the eventual benefit of the scientific community that “Darwin was on 
shore, exploring the countryside and going about his business, for roughly three-fifths of 
the expedition.”26 After two years exploring the eastern side of South America, including 
time spent on land at Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, and the Falkland Islands, the team 
remained on the western side of the continent for a little over one year before arriving at 
the Galapagos Archipelago on the autumn of 1835. At that point it had been almost four 
years since they set sail from Plymouth. They would stay there for just over one month.  
It was in the Galapagos that Darwin was alerted by a resident Briton to a fact that 
would later have enormous significance. Nicholas Lawson, the warden of a small penal 
colony on Charles Island, mentioned to Darwin that Galapagos tortoises had different 
shells, depending on which island they came from: some of the shells were flanged, while 
others were flared. In addition, Darwin noticed variations in the mockingbirds that he 
himself had collected from the islands of Charles, Chatham, and later James. In addition, 
all were related in some way to other South American birds he had cataloged earlier. It 
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was not until much later, however, when he combined these facts with others he had 
made throughout the voyage, that he recognized the importance of this observation.27 
Indeed, it was not until 1857, while corresponding with Harvard botanist Asa Gray, that 
Darwin was able to fully articulate evolutionary divergence—a letter that would later be 
of significant consequence.28  
The five years in London following the trip were of immense importance to the 
development of Darwin’s own thought. His notebooks from the time reveal that the major 
innovations he would introduce to the scientific world in the decades to come—including 
the origin of species by natural selection, theories of reproduction and heredity, the 
relationship of human morality and nonhuman animal instincts, and emotional expression 
in nonhuman animals—were developed during that period.29 The variations in the famous 
Galapagos finches were pointed out to Darwin by John Gould, a taxonomist with the 
Zoological Society who was classifying the specimens Darwin had sent back, and 
discovering what he thought were entire new species of finches, not just varieties of a 
single species. They discussed the options in March of 1837. Browne writes that “This 
moment more than any other in Darwin’s life deserves to be called a turning point.”30 In 
light of the diversity of finches and rheas, the idea of a common ancestry—not only for 
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the finches, but indeed for all living organisms—presented itself as a live option. The 
theory of transmutation became “the central, undisclosed hub” around which the rest of 
his intellectual, and even social, life revolved, as he filled up notebook after notebook 
with his thoughts on the topic.31  
The influence of Charles Lyell 
In the energetic work that Darwin commenced after his return, he remained 
heavily influenced by Charles Lyell. Lyell (1797–1875) was a geologist who studied the 
age of the earth through observation of his contemporary world. He and Darwin 
eventually became close friends. Darwin writes in his autobiography, “I saw more of 
Lyell than of any other man both before and after my marriage,” and describes him in 
adulatory terms.32 Drawing on the earlier work of French naturalist George Louis Leclerc, 
Comte de Buffon (1707–1788), in the 1830s Lyell advocated the principle of 
“uniformitarianism” in geological methodology: the idea that the only causes that one can 
ascribe to geological change in history are ones that are also currently observable, and at 
a scale that is currently observable. This ruled out the then-popular “catastrophism” 
method of explanation, the assumption that catastrophic events could and did effect 
changes—the destruction of mountain ranges, changes in ocean levels, movement of 
continents—in a very brief period of time. If Lyell and the uniformitarians were right 
and, for example, the destruction of mountains could only occur through the extremely 
slow process of erosion, then the age of the earth must be significantly greater than 
                                                 
31
 Ibid., 363. 
32
 Darwin, Autobiography, 83. 
115 
 
previously thought, and certainly much older than the 6,000 year estimate given by 
seventeenth century “young earth” scholars such as James Ussher, who postulated that 
4004 BC was the year of the earth’s creation. (While most of the catastrophists did not 
appeal to supernatural explanations, Lyell found it expedient to say that they did, and the 
charge stuck.)33 Lyell himself was a committed theist, albeit one frequently at odds with 
the Church, and he maintained support for the design argument for God’s existence and 
goodness.  
The stamp of Lyell’s Principles of Geology is evident in Darwin’s work, and 
Lyell’s influence on the young Darwin was immense. In many ways it shaped the 
decisive experience of Darwin’s travels after he received the second volume of the 
Principles in 1832, having set sail with the first volume in hand. Browne writes, “In one 
of the most remarkable interchanges in the history of science, Lyell’s book taught Darwin 
how to think about nature. Without Lyell there would have been no Darwin: no 
intellectual journey, no voyage of the Beagle as commonly understood. His influence—
and his impact—on the young traveler can hardly be overestimated.”34 Though Lyell was 
explicitly opposed to the transmutation hypothesis, particularly in the second volume, 
during Darwin’s time on the Beagle from 1831–1836 Darwin pondered whether the 
uniformitarianism that Lyell applied to geological formations could also be applied to the 
biology of life. Among other implications, this would mean that there was sufficient 
historical distance for exceedingly small, gradual changes in organisms to result in the 
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emergence of wholly new species. Lyell’s gradual changes, appealing only to natural 
causes, were to form a cornerstone of Darwin’s theory of biological evolution, providing 
support for his theory of natural selection. “I … believe,” Darwin would come to write in 
the Origin, “that this very slow, intermittent action of natural selection accords perfectly 
well with what geology tells us of the rate and manner at which the inhabitants of this 
world have changed.”35 Direct divine intervention in creating the variety of living 
organisms was unnecessary given both sufficient time and adaptations similar to those 
artificially manufactured by breeders of dogs and pigeons. With enough time, all 
conceivable biological changes could take place. In Darwin’s later work, therefore, this 
long view of natural history, derived from Lyell, would shape his characterization of 
evolution.  
It is worth noting the nuanced nature of the relationship between religion and 
science at this time of rapid scientific advance. Lyell’s work is a perfect example. On the 
one hand, Lyell’s naturalism denied that there was any teleological aspect to geological 
motion. There was no guiding divine effort evident in the changes of geology, he held, 
but only the uniform movements of the earth’s structures, acting in present days at the 
same scale as they ever have in the past. The structures of the earth are moving, one 
could say, but they are not being guided to any place in particular, or for any purpose in 
particular. On the other hand, part of Lyell’s vehement denial of evidence of progression 
in the fossil record was at least partly out of an abhorrence of the idea of a common 
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ancestry for humanity and other animals. He wrote in his Principles that “It is, therefore, 
clear that there is no foundation in geological facts, for the popular theory of the 
successive development of the animal and vegetable world, from the simplest to the most 
perfect forms.”36 There could not be successive development, Lyell believed, without 
impugning the dignity of the human being. This was the inevitable eventual result of 
Lamarck’s theory, which Lamarck himself did not realize, but which Lyell did: the 
relinquishment of “the high genealogy of [the human] species.”37 And, in fact, Lyell’s 
fearful prediction about this came true: as early as the late 1830s, Darwin was doubtful 
that human beings were the crown of creation, and was certain that any laws that applied 
to other species would apply to human beings as well.38 
The influence of Thomas Malthus 
Prior to 1838, Darwin lacked knowledge of the mechanism by which changes in 
species would take place without external intervention, and here Lyell was no help. 
Instead, Darwin would be inspired to articulate the mechanism of natural selection by the 
writings of Thomas Malthus, an Anglican clergyman, economist, and political 
conservative. Like Darwin, he was a member of the British upper class. Malthus was a 
controversial figure, even in his own day, because of his principled opposition to attempts 
at social reform. Malthus held that poverty was not a social failure, or the result of 
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preventable social inequality, which should be ameliorated by government or charity. 
Rather, poverty occurred for the simple and scientific reason that human populations 
always reproduce exponentially. As he wrote in An Essay on the Principle of Population 
in 1798, “Population, when unchecked, goes on doubling itself every twenty-five years, 
or increases in a geometrical ratio.”39 A population like this would crowd the earth if left 
to its own devices, and there are not enough resources to support all the offspring that 
would result. Demand always vastly outstrips supply. Therefore, there will always be a 
“struggle for existence” in which some individuals live and procreate, and others die of 
starvation. This struggle was the way that population sizes were kept in check. It also had 
a morally beneficial effect: for the socially conservative Malthus, this scarcity was also 
the mechanism by which God encouraged industriousness and prudence in human beings. 
Survival was the best incentive for individuals to live moral lives and diligently apply 
themselves to hard work.  
Darwin read Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population in the fall of 1838. 
Though he would have come across references to Malthus at Cambridge, the experiences 
Darwin had recently had, and the scientific and philosophical investigations he was in the 
middle of, meant that Malthus “at once” made an impact on him and influenced the 
version of the transmutation hypothesis on which he was working.40 Upon reading 
Malthus, Darwin realized that, in addition to the teeming masses in England’s cities, 
nonhuman populations reproduced geometrically as well, with those populations in the 
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wild also being constrained by limited resources. Therefore the nonhuman world, like the 
human one, was marked by this struggle for existence brought on by a population that 
would always exceed the ability of the surrounding environment to support it. In this 
struggle, a miniscule advantage—“the slightest difference of structure or 
constitution”41—could make the difference between an individual organism being able to 
thrive and produce offspring, and an otherwise-identical one that would not be able to do 
so. If that miniscule advantage is heritable, and Darwin believed that most characteristics 
are heritable,42 then the characteristic that results in the advantage will be maintained in 
the offspring of that organism: “In such case, every slight modification, which in the 
course of ages chanced to arise, and which in any way favoured the individuals of any of 
the species, by better adapting them to their altered conditions, would tend to be 
preserved” across generations.43 This process, which resulted in the continuance of 
favorable changes in the species, and the rejection of unfavorable changes, Darwin would 
later term natural selection: nature “selecting” characteristics to be preserved over time 
the same way that agriculturalists had selected the characteristics they wished to have 
maintained in their own plants or animals. In this case, however, it was not the breeders 
who were choosing the traits, but nature itself. 
These gradual alterations would increase the relative fitness of some individuals 
over others in the struggle for existence. Some individuals would be able to reproduce 
and have reproductively-successful progeny, while those less adapted would die before 
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being able to reproduce. In that way, the new characteristics of those anomalous 
individuals would be passed down to their offspring, who would themselves have a better 
chance of producing successful progeny, and thereby spread those characteristics in the 
population. It was Darwin’s insight to realize that these incremental benefits, which he 
called “descent with modification” (the word “evolution” appears only once in the 
Origin—as the last word), lead not only to changes in the make-up of a species over time, 
but even to new species altogether. Over extensive periods of time, it would be possible 
for successive generations to have changed so much from the previous organisms that 
they would branch off from the parent species, and from other populations that were the 
results of other inherited variations. Darwin realized that, in this sense, evolution is not 
linear as early supporters of transmutation thought. Evolution is dynamic, following its 
own paths, according to the dictates, so to speak, of natural selection. A branching tree, 
rather than a set of straight lines, is a better illustration of the process of evolution. That 
branching tree was, in fact, the one illustration that he included in the Origin. 
The fact that these branching organisms lead to new species meant that a mortal 
struggle for life over death was the great engine of evolutionary change. It became clear 
to Darwin that the cause of the great diversity of life on the planet is the death of the less 
fit, and the survival and reproduction of the more fit, over the vast expanse of time 
described by Lyell. Sex and death: these were what mattered in the development of 
species. This is “the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal 
121 
 
and vegetable kingdoms.”44 As Ruse describes the competitive aspect of the mechanism 
that Darwin discovered, “Adaptation was a function of the peculiarities of the organisms 
that won out. Winning, and only winning, was what counted. Thus was born the idea of 
natural selection as an evolutionary mechanism. Some organisms win, because they have 
helpful characteristics the losers lack; and in the long run these characteristics add up to 
full-blown adaptations and significant evolutionary change.”45  
Though Darwin came to this insight in 1838, it would take another several years 
before he would begin to prepare for publication the evolutionary views that he was now 
committing to paper in private. Darwin began work on a planned large-scale treatise on 
the subject in 1856, having continued his research in the intervening years. A “treatise” in 
the nineteenth-century was an exhaustive study of the topic at hand, with as many 
examples and details as possible; Lyell’s three-volume Principles of Geology is an 
example of such a work. Darwin wished to provide scientific evidence for every one of 
his claims, using as examples both the experiments that he carried out at home, as well as 
the wealth of data he had brought back from his travels aboard the Beagle. 
However, in June, 1858, after having worked on this project for two years, 
Darwin unexpectedly received in the mail an unpublished essay, written by a naturalist of 
Darwin’s acquaintance named Alfred Wallace. In the letter accompanying the scientific 
work, Wallace asked Darwin to pass the essay on to Lyell, for the latter’s evaluation of its 
quality. To Darwin’s great surprise, the essay described many of Darwin’s own 
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conclusions, which Wallace had reached independently while travelling and studying in 
Malaysia and Indonesia: the struggle for existence; the endless competition that could 
result in extinction; the examples of artificial breeding; the way that species could 
diverge over time. Evolution by natural selection, Darwin’s discovery, had also been 
recognized by Wallace, and he had also been inspired by Lyell and Malthus. Darwin was 
devastated, but a sense of honor compelled him to send the essay to Lyell as Wallace had 
requested. Darwin included a note: “So all my originality, whatever it may amount to, 
will be smashed.”46 After twenty years of work, Darwin’s great insight would take second 
place to Wallace. 
Or so he thought. Darwin’s old friend Lyell, however, was intent on maintaining 
Darwin’s importance and the priority of his discovery. In part, not only their friendship, 
but the British class system, came into play again. Lyell requested that Wallace’s essay 
would be read at a meeting of the Linnean Society in London, on July 1, 1858. Wallace’s 
paper would not be presented by itself, however. A hastily-composed paper by Darwin, 
edited together from the work he had already done, would also be read. For the purposes 
of establishing priority, paperwork submitted to the secretary of the society provided the 
needed documentary manuscript evidence to show that Darwin had sent the ideas that 
would be presented at the meeting both to Joseph Hooker in 1844 and to Asa Gray in 
1857, fully a year before Darwin received Wallace’s essay. The way that the two papers 
would be received by the scientific community would be influenced by the fact that 
                                                 
46
 Janet Browne, Charles Darwin: The Power of Place (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 
17. 
123 
 
Darwin was a member of the society; Wallace was not. Darwin was part of the landed 
gentry, as were most of the society’s members; Wallace was not, and, lacking a rich 
father, had to sell curios to finance his expeditions. Darwin had published articles in 
learned journals; Wallace published in popular magazines. Darwin had the support of 
Lyell and Joseph Hooker, fellows of the society; Wallace was not only absent, but had no 
representative at the meeting—indeed, still overseas, he did not even know that his paper 
was read until word reached him weeks later. Further, the papers were delivered and 
published for the fellows in alphabetical order by author: Darwin first, with his sketch of 
1844 and letter to Gray of 1857, and only then Wallace’s essay of 1858. Wallace’s 
contribution appeared to be tacked on to Darwin’s. 
After the meeting, now aware that others—or at least one other—were working 
on similar projects, Darwin immediately began writing what was to become Origin of 
Species, moving quickly. The idea for a lengthy treatise had to be shelved, and he began 
to prepare a briefer abstract of his ideas for publication instead. When it was finished in 
May, 1859, after only nine months of work, the planned “abstract” had turned into a 500 
page book, and it would be printed on November 24, 1859 as On the Origin of Species by 
Means of Natural Selection. 
The Origin of Species and natural selection 
Ernst Mayr summarizes the five major components of evolution that Darwin 
hypothesized in The Origin of Species: “1. The nonconstancy of species (the basic theory 
of evolution). 2. The descent of all organisms from common ancestors (branching 
evolution). 3. The gradualness of evolution (no saltations, no discontinuities). 4. The 
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multiplication of species (the origin of diversity). 5. Natural selection.”47 The first two 
were accepted fairly quickly after the publication of Origin; three, four, and five were not 
the consensus of the scientific community until the twentieth century. 
There were two primary arguments to support these claims that Darwin made in 
the Origin. The first was the idea that similar but distinct species had a common ancestry. 
This challenged the belief in a fixity of species, which was the view that species were 
immutable and thus never changed significantly. Indeed, this immutability of species was 
not an unreasonable expectation, quite apart from any religious considerations, but rather 
seemed self-evident to many scientists. An everyday observation of nature showed how 
exquisitely well-adapted species were to their environments. If a species changed, as the 
transmutationists claimed, how could it still remain so appropriate for its ecological 
context? The answer to this question was the second argument. The mechanism of this 
change was the process of natural selection, which favored those organisms that are better 
adapted to their environment relative to others; natural selection, therefore, was the 
reason that observations of nature revealed those exquisitely well-adapted species. 
Further, this mechanism of natural selection explained two evolutionary phenomena: 
first, the changes that occurred in individual species, such that its characteristics can 
change over time; second, the common descent of two different species from one 
ancestor. The first phenomenon was the evolutionary transmutation of species familiar 
from Lamarck. The second, as Darwin articulated it, was new.  
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One notes that this view of a Malthusian world of necessarily fatal competition 
among individuals as being at the root of development in nature is a long way from the 
pleasant view of the world as described by Paley, who had held that it was the 
harmonious functioning of the natural world that was proof of the existence of God. 
While Paley did acknowledge a less-intense form of a “struggle for existence,” both he 
and Malthus saw it as being applicable to humans only, as a part of God’s good 
providence for the promotion of virtue in the human species and the overall flourishing of 
human beings. Both Paley and Malthus believed that the struggle for existence acted as a 
useful moral scourge for humans, effective for discouraging indolence and encouraging 
hard work. This incentive for virtuous behavior had the result of making the world more 
harmonious, however, not less. Darwin, however, was asserting that this struggle 
extended to all organic life, even among species for whom virtue was not an applicable 
concept. Ubiquitous harmony is an illusion. 
Therefore, Darwin’s version of the universal “struggle for existence” in all 
organic life was in opposition to the nineteenth century’s widespread understanding of 
what one might call the nature of nature. The world he describes is, at its very root, quite 
a bit bleaker. On the one hand, Darwin agrees with Paley’s surface-level perception of a 
world of pleasure, writing, “We behold the face of nature bright with gladness, we often 
see the superabundance of food.” But, he continues, “We do not see, or we forget, that 
the birds which are idly singing round us mostly live on insects or seeds, and are thus 
constantly destroying life; or we forget how largely these songsters or their eggs, or their 
nestlings, are destroyed by birds and beasts of prey; we do not always bear in mind, that 
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though food may be now superabundant, it is not so at all seasons of each recurring 
year.”48 Underneath the surface, this struggle for existence is constantly functioning, 
always silently at work, even when it is not explicitly obvious to the observer. “In 
looking at Nature, it is most necessary to keep the foregoing considerations in mind—
never to forget that every single organic being around us may be said to be striving to the 
utmost to increase in numbers; that each lives by a struggle at some period of its life; that 
heavy destruction inevitably falls either on the young or old, during each generation or at 
recurrent intervals.”49 These conflicts are ongoing, among competitors who are nearly-
perfectly matched, though the process itself happens very slowly. This results in the fact 
that from a distance no real change is visible. Indeed, nothing but Paley’s harmonious 
flourishing might appear to the untrained eye. Darwin puts it this way: “Battle within 
battle must ever be recurring with varying success; and yet in the long-run the forces are 
so nicely balanced, that the face of nature remains uniform for long periods of time, 
though assuredly the merest trifle would often give the victory to one organic being over 
another.”50 The slightest variation that increases reproductive fitness will result in the 
natural “selection” of the individual with the variation, and of the progeny of those 
individuals inheriting that variation. But fitness is relative to other individuals, not 
absolute: for each better-adapted individual, others must be less well-adapted.  
This process of inheritance of variation, a combination of Lyell’s gradualism and 
Malthus’ struggle for existence, gave Darwin a succinct explanation for descent with 
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modification: “For as all the inhabitants of each country are struggling together with 
nicely balanced forces, extremely slight modifications in the structure or habits of one 
inhabitant would often give it an advantage over others; and still further modifications of 
the same kind would often still further increase the advantage.”51 Over a long enough 
period of time it would be inevitable that some species would change their characteristics 
as a result of the natural selection of some traits over others; long periods of time would 
also see the extinction of the species that were unable to adapt sufficiently. Darwin 
describes this natural selection as the undercurrent of all organic life, always vigilant, on 
the look-out, so to speak, for advantages and disadvantages: “It may be said that natural 
selection is daily and hourly scrutinising, throughout the world, every variation, even the 
slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good; silently 
and insensibly working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement 
of each organic being in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life.”52  
Darwin recognized, however, that this selection is a selection of anomalous 
characteristics that differentiate an individual organism from its peers. Without such 
modifications, no selection can occur: “unless profitable variations do occur, natural 
selection can do nothing.”53 These variations are slight ones, and Darwin believed that 
only the helpful ones were preserved: “Natural selection can act only by the preservation 
and accumulation of infinitesimally small inherited modifications, each profitable to the 
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preserved being.”54 Against a view of direct divine creation of species in a single stroke, 
therefore, Darwin saw that the diversity of species currently observable requires gradual 
changes over time, writing that “Nothing can be effected, unless favourable variations 
occur, and variation itself is apparently always a very slow process.”55 
As noted above, this process of the accrual of advantages does not only lead to the 
emergence of new species; against Lamarck, Darwin held that natural selection also leads 
to the extinction of existing species altogether which are less fit and thus lose the 
competition for resources: “For as new forms are continually and slowly being produced, 
unless we believe that the number of specific forms goes on perpetually and almost 
indefinitely increasing, numbers inevitably must become extinct.”56 It is important to 
note, however, that the ones that become extinct are the ones most closely related to the 
“incipient species,” because they are the “forms” most immediately competing for the 
same resources, such that “The forms which stand in closest competition with those 
undergoing modification and improvement, will naturally suffer most.”57 This is, we 
might say, an intimate process; the winners and losers of the struggle for existence are not 
only the prey of predators, as natural selection is often depicted, but any organism that is 
unable to flourish in its environment relative to its “peer” organisms which are competing 
for the same resources: “Consequently, each new variety of species, during the progress 
of its formation, will generally press hardest on its nearest kindred, and tend to 
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exterminate them.”58 Evolutionary competition is primarily among individuals of the 
same species in the same geographical area.  
In parting company with Lamarck on the matter of species extinction, and thereby 
dissenting from a view of the intrinsic harmony of creation, Darwin was refuting a view 
that he himself had earlier held. In the traditional view of a harmoniously functioning 
world, entire species do not simply become extinct. One of Lamarck’s motivations for 
denying extinction had been religious: the irrationality of a world in which species come 
into being, and then perhaps blink out of existence, was anathema to his deist 
sensibilities. Darwin, for many years before writing the Origin, agreed.59 For both of 
them, at least at first, acknowledging adaptation was a way of showing how harmony was 
maintained in nature even when environments changed, and this was the fulfillment of 
the creator’s purpose. Extinction was not part of their transmutation program, nor did it 
need to be: without convincing evidence otherwise, it was not illogical to believe that 
species that were unfit, rather than disappearing completely, instead had offspring that 
were more fit to the environment. In this way the species, now modified, survived, 
maintaining the harmony of creation. Lacking fossil evidence to the contrary, a 
transmutationist could reasonably hold that species did not disappear altogether; they 
changed as necessary, and those changes became new, permanent features of the species. 
By the late 1830s, however, within a few years of Lamarck’s death, the extinction 
of species was an accepted fact in the scientific community. It was clear that perfect 
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adaptation of species to environments, maintained over time by adaptability, did not fit 
the facts as revealed by the fossil record. Nonetheless, Darwin’s views were informed by 
his beliefs in natural harmony up until 1838, when they began to change (partly as a 
result of reading Malthus). As Ospovat puts it, “Not only did Darwin not reject the 
harmonious view [prior to 1838]. It seems fair to conclude that it had not occurred to him 
to think of nature in any other way. He continued to see nature as the culture of early-
nineteenth-century Britain taught him to see it, and this should not be surprising.”60 
Natural theology was the air the scientists breathed, less a contested theory than an 
unexamined worldview. In this fact one can see the intellectual imagination that was 
required for Darwin to articulate evolution by natural selection; it required not just 
deducing conclusions from evidence, but an entirely different way of looking at the 
world. One can also see, then, a foreshadowing of the cultural disruption that the Origin 
would cause at its publication; worldviews don’t disappear in a single stroke and, when 
they do, the effects are enormous, spreading far beyond a single discipline. In spite of the 
initial resistance, in the coming decades the theories of Lamarck and the others, even in 
the manner in which they had been adopted (with more or less controversy) into the 
British worldview, would be under increasing strain.  
Darwin did not dissent from all of Lamarck’s theories, however. Lamarck’s 
assumption of the effects of use and disuse on animal structure over time was still held by 
Darwin, even in the Origin; it is not the case that by the time the book was published in 
                                                 
60
 Ibid., 59. 
131 
 
1859 Darwin had completely rejected all concepts of Lamarckian evolution. For Darwin, 
natural selection was one way that species changed—and perhaps the primary way—but 
not the only way. Mayr, writing in the introduction to the reprint of the first edition of the 
Origin, points out three sets of “concessions” that Darwin makes to a Lamarckian view.61 
First, there are four statements in the Origin regarding the direct influence of the 
environment on inherited characteristics; for example, Darwin writes, “In looking at 
many small points of difference between species … we must not forget that climate, food, 
&c., probably produce some slight and direct effect.”62 Second, Darwin was hampered by 
the lack of genetic knowledge that Mendel would quietly introduce in 1865, and later 
scientists would develop. As a result, Darwin had difficulty explaining how variations 
came about and therefore, like Lamarck, described the environment as having an 
influence on the introduction of variability as well: “Variability is governed by many 
unknown laws, more especially by that of correlation of growth. Something may be 
attributed to the direct action of the conditions of life. Something must be attributed to 
use and disuse. The final result is thus rendered infinitely complex.”63 Third, most 
similarly to Lamarck, Darwin also writes in the Origin about how the use and disuse of a 
characteristic could effect evolutionary change. “In this he is perfectly clear,” Mayr 
writes, locating thirteen examples from throughout the book.64 In addition to natural 
selection, Darwin writes, “I think there can be little doubt that use in our domestic 
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animals strengthens and enlarges certain parts, and disuse diminishes them; and that such 
modifications are inherited.”65 Even decades later, writing his autobiography, the 
possibility is still held out that use and disuse have an effect on organic structure, 
alongside natural selection. While insisting on the role of natural selection, Darwin writes 
that he also believes that “all the corporeal and mental organs … of all beings have been 
developed through natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, together with use or 
habit.”66 Nonetheless, Darwin’s conviction that any other causes are secondary to natural 
selection is obvious when he writes, for example, “Over all these causes of Change I am 
convinced that the accumulative action of Selection, whether applied methodically and 
more quickly, or unconsciously and more slowly, but more efficiently, is by far the 
predominant Power.”67  
The concept of natural selection would meet resistance from the scientific 
community for a number of reasons, however, and would continue to be challenged into 
the twentieth century. Even some readers who supported transmutation doubted that 
natural selection was an adequate mechanism to accomplish species change. In addition 
to the fact that the mechanism of the inheritance of variation remained unexplained, it 
could easily be imagined that very slight variations would be lost due to simple chance, 
and thus not result in the modification of successive generations. The very slight 
variations that Darwin posited simply did not seem robust enough to explain the extent of 
the vast diversity of organic life. Heredity, variation, reproductive rate, random events, 
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survival rates: all of these factors would need conceptual clarification and further 
scientific evidence in order for natural selection to be proven the “predominant Power” 
that drives evolutionary change. Such evidence would not be available for many decades, 
and would require dramatic scientific advances in other fields, and significantly improved 
technology, to be found.  
Thus, opposition to evolution by natural selection did not only come from those 
invested in religious doctrines that seemed to conflict with it, though it must be granted 
that the intertwining of religion and science at that point makes it difficult to ascribe 
motivations solely to one or the other purpose. Nonetheless, it should be evident from the 
description of natural selection offered here that many of the planks of the natural 
theology platform would under be under increasing threat by Darwin’s theory.  
It is also important to note, however, that Darwin recognized early that natural 
selection wasn’t the only factor in evolution. He began another line of inquiry by starting 
with the observation that the process of sexual reproduction is an extremely costly one. 
Thus, he reasoned, there must be some advantage that could be gained through the 
practice, and this he identified as the fact that advantages can accrue to an organism when 
it is more capable of breeding; by mating more, it increases the presence of its genes in 
any community. Darwin noted however that these traits did not directly benefit the 
adaptation of an organism to its environment; in some cases it even seemed to decrease 
fitness. Instead, those traits seemed to increase the chances that the individual would be 
selected by a mate, or give it more access to mating partners. This added evolutionary 
pressure he termed “sexual selection” and discussed it at length in his 1871 book The 
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Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871), he added much to it; perhaps 
two-thirds of the book concerns how sexual selection may operate in both humans beings 
and other species. His contention was that natural selection epitomizes the survival 
struggle, and sexual selection embodies the struggle to reproduce. He determined that 
there were two primary methods for sexual selection: combat and display. 
In most cases of combat, males would grow larger and stronger, and evolve 
weapons to derive an advantage in combat. By defeating other males, the male could then 
access more females and perpetuate its genetic material. Examples of these evolved 
weapons include elongated boar teeth (tusks), the large canines of baboons, the antlers of 
all male deer, and the horns of insects. In other cases, animals simply grew larger, such as 
walruses and elephant seals. Bigger, larger animals would stake out prime mating 
territory, fighting off competitors, and thus obtain access to more females when they 
arrived later at the mating grounds.  
The evolution of display comes from the fact that brightly colored or adorned 
males sometimes are selected more frequently by females. This costly adaptation was 
interpreted by females to mean that this specimen was particularly healthy and its health 
would be passed on to offspring. Examples of this that have been observed in nature are 
the throat sacks of frogs, other inflatable dewlaps, peacock tails, rooster wattles, vivid 
coloration and ornamentations like baboon butts, elaborate plumage in birds, and colors 
in fish scales. 
Darwin predicated his conclusions for sexual selection on his finding from 
comparisons of a great number of species. He found that there was a greater sexual 
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dimorphism in polygynous species than monogamous species. Specifically, he reasoned, 
polygynous species would be more developed to increase chances to mate with as many 
females as possible, either through combat or display. The monogamous species invested 
less in sexual dimorphism because it was unnecessary. He tested his theories on sexual 
selection by plucking tail feathers from game cocks, cutting the “eyes” out of peacock 
feathers, and shortening, or artificially enhancing tail-length to see the effects; the results 
bore out his theories. 
Darwin’s religious beliefs 
These new theories did have an effect on Darwin’s own religious beliefs, though 
the chain of causation is difficult to establish. What is evident from his notebooks, 
however, is that he increasingly became agnostic about religious matters after his return 
from sea, beginning in 1938, and perhaps under the influence of the study of David Hume 
he had undertaken.68 (While on the Beagle, on the other hand, he reports being “quite 
orthodox,” to the point of being mocked by the crew on account of his strong belief in 
Biblical authority.)69 There is no doubt that, later in life, he no longer held the convictions 
about natural theology that he once found so convincing. By the time of the publication 
of his autobiography in 1876, Darwin could write, “The old argument of design in nature, 
as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of 
natural selection has been discovered.… There seems to be no more design in the 
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variability of organic beings and in the action of natural selection, than in the course 
which the wind blows. Everything in nature is the result of fixed laws.”70 
It was in no small part the problem of natural evil, “this very old argument”71 as 
he refers to it, and particularly as that issue was aggravated by natural selection, that led 
him away from his earlier faith. Darwin found the prevalence of suffering, particularly in 
nonhuman animals with no prospect of moral improvement through experiences of 
suffering, a testimony against the existence of a benevolent personal deity. In his 
autobiography, he was willing to claim that “happiness decidedly prevails [over 
suffering], though this would be difficult to prove.”72 However, surely the God of the 
Christian tradition could do better than what seems to be the case in the world as it is: “A 
being so powerful and so full of knowledge as a God who could create the universe, is to 
our finite minds omnipotent and omniscient, and it revolts our understanding to suppose 
that his benevolence is not unbounded, for what advantage can there be in the sufferings 
of millions of the lower animals throughout almost endless time?”73 This endless 
suffering of sentient creatures may or may not disprove God, but it supports “the view 
that all organic beings have been developed through variation and natural selection.”74 
Darwin’s theory could account for the suffering in nature in a way that traditional theism 
could not. 
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There were other considerations, however, that tempered Darwin’s loss of 
religious convictions. While he found an emphasis on religious feelings as proof for God 
unconvincing, there was another issue that was relevant. “Another source of conviction in 
the existence of God … impresses me as having much more weight,” he wrote. “This 
follows from the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of conceiving this immense 
and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity for looking far backwards and 
far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity.”75 This fact alone is enough to 
inspire religious conviction: “When thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to a First 
Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve 
[then] to be called a Theist.”76 However, after this reverie, he soon remembers the frailty 
of the human brain. Should the human intellect, he asks, which has “been developed from 
a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animal, be trusted when it draws such 
grand conclusions?” Perhaps religion is merely a natural, inherent human instinct. With 
such “grand conclusions” of the kind the religious beliefs come to, the reach of the 
human being has exceeded his grasp. Perhaps the sense that “blind chance or necessity” 
is impossible to produce such a marvelous universe is the same kind of sense that 
perceives a “connection between cause and effect which strikes us as a necessary one, but 
probably depends merely on inherited experience?”77 (Shades of Hume.) Perhaps this 
feeling is an instinctive response that is the result of early exposure to religious belief, 
such that those so exposed are no more able to eliminate those religious impulses than “a 
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monkey to throw off its instinctive fear and hatred of a snake.”78 He concludes, “I cannot 
pretend to throw the least light on such abstruse problems. The mystery of the beginning 
of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic.”79 
He maintained his agnosticism to the end of his life, even when pressed to profess 
atheism by its partisans.80 Despite Darwin’s vilification by some later religious thinkers, 
and celebration by their non-religious counterparts, Ruse doubts that religious 
considerations were much of a factor in Darwin’s thought. He writes, “It seems that 
Darwin simply cared less about religion than many other men…. He just wanted to get on 
with his science, whatever the consequences. From Darwin one never gets the burning 
religious zeal to be found in, say, Sedgwick or, in a different sense, Huxley.”81  
It is also clear from the Origin, however, that Darwin himself did feel some of the 
wonder that is reflected in Paley’s Natural Theology, even where natural selection is 
concerned: “Slow though the process of selection may be, if feeble man can do so much 
by his powers of artificial selection, I can see no limit to the amount of change, to the 
beauty and infinite complexity of the coadaptions between all organic beings, one with 
another and with the physical conditions of life, which may be effected in the long course 
of time by nature’s power of selection.”82 He expresses amazement at “the great Tree of 
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Life, which fills with its dead and broken branches the crust of the earth, and covers the 
surface with its ever branching and beautiful ramifications.”83  
Darwin died in 1882. Days after his death, at the urging of Francis Galton, 
William Spottiswoode, president of the Royal Society, requested that Darwin be interred 
at Westminster Abbey.84 The dean of the Abbey agreed. Darwin was buried there, with 
great pomp and circumstance, and without great controversy, on April 26.  
Evolution after Darwin 
The evolutionary synthesis 
It would take a few years before the religious challenges of Darwin’s theory were 
addressed at length. Part of the reason for the muted religious response to Darwinism 
after the publication of the Origin was that it was perceived by religious communities not 
as a religious challenge, but as a scientific failure.85 They had good reason for thinking 
so: the transmutation hypothesis was almost universally dismissed by the scientific 
community in the 1850s, and few scientists immediately pledged their allegiance to 
Darwinian evolution. Many religious intellectuals assumed that scientists themselves 
would eventually discredit it.  
Further, even when Darwin’s theory of descent with modification was accepted, 
other questions were still left unanswered. As mentioned above, even those scientists who 
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supported evolution of one kind or another questioned the efficacy of natural selection, 
and posited alternative hypotheses. The Lamarckian inheritance of acquired 
characteristics remained a popular option, as did the concepts of evolution by sudden 
changes (saltationism) and evolutionary progress through an inner momentum in the 
organism (orthogenesis). Selection itself did not fully catch on, even as evolution itself 
served a variety of cultural and ideological purposes. As Ruse writes, “Evolution became 
the popular science par excellence, but it struggled to become a fully mature professional 
science, with all that such status entailed.”86 This was partly because of this explanatory 
gap in the theory. This led to the “eclipse of Darwinism,” as Julian Huxley would 
describe the time period after the publication of the Origin but before the modern 
synthesis.87 Darwin and his contemporaries could not identify that source of the 
hereditary variations that they observed, which would have helped to make the case for 
natural selection. At the time of the publication of the Origin, Darwin did not have what 
Mayr refers to as “a single clear-cut piece of evidence for the existence of” natural 
selection, and lacked the mechanism of inheritance that enabled the modification.88 Even 
T. H. Huxley, “Darwin’s bulldog,” was skeptical about natural selection.89 
In fact, a consensus view of what evolution entailed only began to develop in the 
1900s, and the modern synthesis was not adopted widely until the 1940s, when genetic 
discoveries allowed the process by which variations occurred to be understood. 
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Mendelian genetics, named for Gregory Mendel (1822–1884), only became a flourishing 
field of study decades after that scientist’s death. Though Mendel had published his 
important paper Versuche über Pflanzenhybriden (“Experiments on Plant Hybridization”) 
in 1866, his research remained unknown for most of his life, and it may be that Mendel 
himself considered his genetic theory of hybridization to be an alternative to Darwinism, 
not its confirmation.90 The statistical thoroughness of his experimental studies, however, 
encompassing over 29,000 pea plants that he cultivated, proved valuable to those later 
scientists who rediscovered Mendel.  
The primary theory at the time of Mendel’s experimentation was the “blended 
model” of inheritance, in which the properties lent by each parent would blend to create a 
completely new property. Over time variations would be eliminated. Even Mendel's own 
experiments partially supported this thesis: his work showed that on the simple single 
element level he was testing, traits bred true, but looking at the big picture, one could 
“see” that successor generations inherited some characteristics from the father and some 
from the mother. Thus, the offspring appeared blended. The science at the time didn’t 
understand the scope and complexity of inheritable characteristics, so blending seemed 
likely. 
Contrary to this prevailing belief, which had also been held by Darwin, Mendel 
had reported on experiments that found that the genetic characteristics of an organism are 
inherited on an all-or-nothing basis, or what is called “particulate inheritance.” For 
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example, Mendel found that, if one plant from a tall variety was cross-fertilized with one 
plant from a shorter variety, the resultant offspring would all be tall; none of them had a 
height somewhere in the middle of the two sizes.  
T X s  (First generation) 
(Tall)  (short) 
= T, T, T, T  
The hybrid offspring could themselves be matched, however, and then the short 
characteristic would re-appear, with some plants being tall, and others being short, in a 
ratio of three to one.  
T X  T (Second generation) 
= T, T, T, s 
The scientists that followed Mendel deduced that a single unit of some kind, 
within the organism, must be what determined each of these characteristics, and that that 
single unit must have two potential states as possible consequences; in this example, tall 
and short. Further, Mendel’s experiments had shown that one of these states is dominant 
(tall), and one is recessive (short), as reflected in the first generation of hybrid offspring. 
The scientists also knew that, given the nature of sexual reproduction, each parent 
organism must contribute a single unit that expresses that characteristic. In this way they 
could explain how the first generation of offspring were all tall, while the second 
generation had a mixture of tall and short, with the three-to-one ratio. Thus, they were 
able to schematize this process in a more refined way than Mendel had, utilizing 
dominant and recessive categories.  
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As in Mendel’s experiment, the first generation is a cross of two pure strains of 
two different varieties: 
TT X ss (First generation) 
(Tall)   (Short) 
= Ts  
(Tall) 
The second generation is a cross of the hybrid strains that resulted: 
Ts X Ts  (Second generation) 
(Tall)  (Tall) 
= TT Ts sT ss 
(Tall) (Tall) (Tall) (Short) 
Further experimental work seemed to show that every characteristic of an 
organism followed these rules, though later scientists would realize that most 
characteristics of living beings relied on a number of sets of inherited units, not just one. 
Contrary to the Lamarckian position that use and disuse may lead to a change in inherited 
characteristics, Mendel’s experiments revealed that characteristics were inherited 
independently of the individual needs of the organism, and were only the result of the 
interaction of genetic information. Genes, the (at that point, hypothesized) transmitters of 
inherited characteristics, are “hard”: they cannot be modified by the organism’s 
interaction with the environment. Bowler describes the significance of these discoveries: 
“Genetics thus succeeded where Darwinism had failed: it eliminated the teleological 
approach to evolution implicit in the analogy with individual development.”91 Genes, in 
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other words, are not themselves goal-oriented. The gap in the Darwinian understanding of 
evolution would eventually be closed, as the scientific community learned how 
characteristics are inherited and, more importantly, how new characteristics are added 
and old ones disappear.  
Other developments in evolutionary biology also occurred in the nineteenth 
century. In 1872, In 1872 Ernst Haeckel formulated his biogenetic law, famously stating 
that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” Haeckel was, in his turn, influenced by Karl 
Ernst von Baer (1792-1876), writing before the publication of the Origin, who had noted 
that earlier developmental stages show similarities not seen in the adults. Haeckel was 
wrong strictly speaking, as many contemporaries argued at the time, because while there 
may be gross similarities in a chicken embryo with a fish or reptile embryo, there is no 
correlation showing all of its ancestral history: from single celled organism, to multi-
celled invertebrate ancestor, fish, lizard-like reptile, ancestral bird, and then finally, baby 
chick, for example. Instead, very early, fundamental things must take place at a certain 
scale dictated by the range at which key molecules are able to act: putting legs in the right 
place, making the head different from the body, etc.  
Because fruit flies and humans, for example, use the same genetic toolkit to 
accomplish vastly different things, it is on and off switching that makes the difference in 
what cells become. Subtle difference in regulation—how much a gene is turned on, when 
it is turned on, when it is turned off—are what make the biggest differences. 
A sophisticated understanding of this process, however, required significant 
development in the field of biology. Mendelian genetics, with its emphasis on breeding 
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experiments and their effects, would be superseded by molecular genetics, which would 
emphasize instead the physical nature of the units of heredity. In particular, the discovery 
of DNA would clarify this physical process. It would be found that the manner by which 
the inheritance process occurs depends on cell division and the consequent replication of 
genetic information. In the nucleus of every cell is a number of pairs of chromosomes; 
the number of chromosomes depends on the organism. Each chromosome is made up of 
one piece of DNA, which is twisted and coiled to fit inside the chromosome. Each 
molecule of DNA consists of two strands, in the “double helix” pattern discovered by 
Watson and Crick in 1953, joined together by a sequence of “bases”: adenine (A), 
guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine (T). All of the base pairs in this sequence are 
combinations of A and T, and C and G. A commonly accepted definition of a gene, as a 
unit of heredity, is that it is a section of that DNA, composed of an arrangement of 
thousands of bases, that is coded to make a specific protein through the combination of 
amino acids, and thus influence a particular trait.  
During the preparation for mitotic cell division, each chromosome makes a copy 
of itself. This is accomplished by an enzyme (helicase) unwinding the DNA double helix 
and separating it into two separate strands. Each base is matched with its appropriate 
complement. When the process is finished, the result is two complete helical strands of 
DNA within two complete chromosomes. If there are no errors in replication, the two 
DNA strands would be identical to the original strand that existed prior to the beginning 
of the process. All of the chromosomes must be duplicated, or cell division will fail. After 
the cell’s nuclear membrane dissolves, the two chromosomes, referred to as sister 
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chromatids, are separated to opposite ends inside the cell body, and eventually the cell is 
divided into two daughter cells.  
Eukaryotic organisms inherit particular DNA sequences through a similar process, 
that of meiosis, which occurs in sex cells. As in mitosis, DNA replication precedes the 
beginning of the first stage of meiosis. In meiosis, however, cells are produced with half 
the number of chromosomes (“haploid”) of the mother cell, rather than the full 
complement of chromosomes that is produced through mitosis (“diploid”). The two 
stages of meiotic division result in four haploid cells, known as gametes, or sex cells. 
Sperm, ova, and pollen are examples of gametes. Because of the random alignment of the 
homologous pairs of chromosomes, and the crossing over between members of a 
homologous pair, these four haploid cells are different from each other. Crossover usually 
occurs when matching regions break and reconnect to the opposite chromosome and is 
essential for the normal segregation of chromosomes during meiosis. This generates 
genetic diversity. During fertilization, haploid cells will fuse to produce diploid offspring. 
As in mitosis, errors can occur in the replication of the bases on a strand of DNA, which 
is known as genetic mutation. This can result in a different amino acid being inserted into 
the protein chain, resulting in a different protein being created than would have been had 
the error not been made. (Safeguards and redundancy can often correct such errors.) In 
some cases there can be deletions (also called gene deletion, deficiency, or deletion 
mutation) caused by errors in chromosomal crossover during meiosis. The result is 
serious genetic disease and frameshift. If the indel (insertion/deletion) is not divisible by 
three it will change the grouping of codons (the reading frame) rendering a different 
147 
 
translation. Variations of this nature generally result in spontaneous abortion, especially 
with monosomes and trisomes. 
The copy of the DNA that results therefore is not a perfect match with its 
antecedent, and the organism’s genotype, or genetic constitution, will be different from 
the mother cell. The erroneous version is referred to as the mutation. The function of the 
mutated gene for the organism will determine the effect that the mutation has on the 
organism’s phenotype. The phenotype of an organism is the totality of its physical 
characteristics: its physiology, biochemistry, behavior, and structure. The phenotypic 
effect can range from the undetectable to the dramatic. The frequency of mutation in the 
replication process is fairly low and, as a result, mutation considered in isolation would 
not bring about significant changes in a population. Instead, it is the phenotypic effect of 
the genetic mutation on the survival and reproductive success of the organism—i.e., 
natural selection—that drives the population-level changes. Once this genetic mechanism 
is clarified, the evidence for evolution by natural selection is much more robust. 
Because of the way in which inheritance occurs, however, natural selection is not 
the only mechanism of evolution: random genetic drift, for example, is also extremely 
important. Sometimes the individuals that survive and reproduce, thereby passing down 
their genes, do not succeed because of a relative fitness advantage, but simply due to 
chance. This random process nonetheless affects the genetic makeup of a population, and 
is therefore a mechanism of evolution, though it does not result in adaptations. The 
neutral theory of molecular evolution, pioneered in the late 1960s by Motoo Kimura, 
suggests that genetic drift, not natural selection, is responsible for the majority of the 
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changes that occur at the molecular level over time.92 According to the theory, only a 
fraction of the DNA changes that occur are adaptive. The great majority of DNA 
sequence changes are neutral with regards to fitness. Though neutral, they can 
nonetheless become “fixed” in the genotype of a species and constitute part of its 
evolutionary development. These neutral changes are not affected directly by selection. 
The phenotypic changes that occur through genetic drift or mutation can be 
beneficial, deleterious, or neutral, for the fitness of the organism. If the change is 
beneficial, it will increase the potential evolutionary success of the organism, favoring the 
organism and its (new) genetic makeup in the process of natural selection. Deleterious 
changes that decrease an organism’s relative fitness will not be favored by natural 
selection, though the genotype may appear multiple times in a population due either to 
repeated mutation or to its reintroduction by external populations, for whom the genotype 
is advantageous in their context. Neutral changes will not have an immediate selective 
effect. These neutral genetic differences can eventually affect evolutionary development 
in two ways, however. First, the new genes may later interact with other new genes to 
affect the phenotype of subsequent offspring. Second, while changes in populations will 
generally be slow when the environment is relatively stable, when environmental 
conditions change dramatically those previously-neutral changes may turn out to be 
evolutionary advantageous in the new environment, and thus be preserved in a larger 
proportion of the population than was the case previously.  
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This modern synthesis of evolutionary biology and genetic science became the 
generally-accepted understanding of the way that evolution proceeds. Scientists drew not 
only from evolutionary biology and genetic science, but also from systematic biology and 
natural history, in a quest to find a comprehensive explanation of the dynamics of 
evolution. One outstanding puzzle, for example, was the way in which even small 
mutations, which provided only a slight advantage, could spread quickly through a 
specific group. The study of this and related processes was termed population genetics. 
Populations genetics was pioneered by Sewall Wright, writing in the 1930s. Wright 
introduced the metaphor of an “adaptive landscape,” with peaks and troughs of relative 
fitness depending on the different genotypes, to depict the relationship between the 
species and its environment.93 While natural selection tends to move a population toward 
the peak of adaptive fitness, environments are always changing, and thus what constitutes 
fitness changes, too. Population genetics became a cornerstone of the modern synthesis 
by showing mathematically how evolution can occur through natural selection without 
the influence of use or disuse as Lamarck (and Darwin) had thought. However, later 
developments in the field of epigenetics, discussed below, moderated the early 
confidence held by population genetics.  
Wright also introduced the utilization of sophisticated mathematical models to 
predict this interaction within a small population.94 He discovered that natural selection is 
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one way, but not the only way, that populations change. The rate of mutation, the 
movement of populations, random genetic drift, in addition to the pressure that is the 
result of natural selection, can effect change. Evolution therefore depends on many 
circumstances. This use of quantitative methods to analyze the distribution of genetic 
information in populations in nature transformed the study of evolutionary biology. Jean 
Gayon refers to the advent of population genetics as constituting “the major intellectual 
event in the history of theorizing about natural selection after Darwin,” and presents three 
reasons why this is so.95 First, the role of natural selection in any particular case, given 
the other relevant factors, could be clarified using statistical analysis, a result that 
provides much more nuance to previous understandings of how evolutionary changes 
occur. Second, theoretical population genetics provided the techniques whereby natural 
selection can be isolated as a factor, and thereby measured. Third, and perhaps most 
significant as a revision of Darwin’s own theory, population genetics reversed the 
importance of the Malthusian “struggle for existence” in evolution by natural selection. 
Geometric rates of reproduction were not the impetus for natural selection; natural 
selection was the impetus for geometric rates of reproduction.  
Theodosius Dobzhansky (1900–1975), drawing on Wright’s techniques and other 
developments in genetics, discovered that populations of the same species, but in 
different geographical areas, would usually have different genetic constitutions. His book 
Genetics and the Origin of Species, published in 1937, reported on the results of his 
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investigations of fruit flies.96 He found that different populations of otherwise identical 
species had unique chromosomal markers that differentiated them from others. A new 
species would come about when a particular new mutation spread throughout an isolated 
population. That population would then be genetically distinct from other populations of 
the same species, and some of those changes might make the changed group unable to 
reproduce with other, outside populations should they come into contact with them. With 
this, a new species has come into being. Dobzhansky is credited with unifying genetic 
research around a confirmation of Darwin’s theories. In light of the development of this 
synthesis, drawing on so many scientific disciplines, Julian Huxley could write about the 
“re-animation” of Darwinism after its “eclipse.”97 
Speciation 
With Dobzhansky’s achievement in place, later scientists were able to define the 
relationship of genes and species more precisely than Darwin could. Speciation refers to 
the way in which varieties form out of a single species, and then branch off into distinct 
species. Part of the problem for many scientists among the earlier generations of 
evolutionists was that they were not yet thinking in terms of populations, but still in terms 
of individuals. Individuals exist within populations which manifest great variety. When 
Darwin introduced population thinking, such a way of thinking was in opposition to a 
typological thinking about species that had been held since antiquity. The underlying 
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metaphysical assumption of typological thinking was that each species had an underlying 
essence that defines it. This idea is related to fixity of species, but not identical with it, 
because non-Darwinian evolutionists such as Lamarck, for example, could hold to 
essentialism while acknowledging gradual changes to species over time. Even if these 
changes could occur—a highly contested matter—at any one time species were seen as 
relatively invariable. Any seeming variation was accidental and irrelevant to the identity 
of the species itself. Essentialism was the dominant view of most people in most of the 
nineteenth-century; under the essentialist umbrella were such views as transmutation, a 
form of gradual evolution termed transformationism, and orthogenesis, a theory inspired 
by a view of cosmic teleology, or finalism. The latter view identified an intrinsic drive 
toward perfection in every creature. This teleological motivation operated by steadily 
improving species; the creation of wholly new species was not a part of the view. Darwin 
realized that scientifically it is more helpful to think of the natural world not as being 
made up of individuals with invariable essences based on species, but as groups of 
populations that are highly varied. The change in these populations is what evolution is. 
Essentialist thinking, however, was one of the greatest barriers to the acceptance of 
evolution by natural selection, and the theory’s further development. As Mayr writes, 
“The ultimate conclusions of the population thinker and of the typologist are precisely the 
opposite. For the typologist, the type (eidos) is real and the variation an illusion, while for 
the populationist the type (average) is an abstraction and only the variation is real. No 
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two ways of looking at nature could be more different.”98 Eventually these essentialist 
theories, and others like them, failed when they could not locate a mechanism by which 
these trends could operate, but this transition took many decades. Bowler describes the 
orthogenetic movement as continuing to be a live intellectual matter well into the 1930s.99 
The decline and eventual fall of this concentration on forms and final causes in scientific 
practice was part and parcel of a larger move away from scholastic metaphysics, with its 
views of essences and final causes, which had begun centuries before with Descartes and 
Francis Bacon.100 Philosophy both shaped, and was shaped by, scientific practice. 
Darwin himself was not able to solve the problem of speciation; it would take, 
first, methodological changes by naturalists and then a synthesis of this work with that of 
population geneticists. The geneticists, even after the rediscovery of Mendel’s work, were 
focused on researching single gene pools. It was only when the naturalists began to study 
different populations of the same species, in geographically isolated areas, at the same 
point in time, that true progress was made in this area. It was then that scientists 
conceived of the theory of allopatric speciation, which is the primary way in which 
speciation occurs. Allopatric speciation refers to the process of the evolution of barriers 
to reproduction that arise between populations that are geographically separated. The 
geographical separation prevents reproduction, and thus any genetic variations that occur 
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during the time of isolation may result in the prevention of the ability for genetic 
exchange to occur later between successor organisms. In this case, even if the 
geographically isolating feature is later removed, and the variants become sympatric 
again, the two groups will still be unable to exchange genes. The situation with the 
finches in the Galapagos is an example of allopatric speciation—even if the mechanism 
by which this occurred was not identified for many years. 
Cooperation 
Contemporary research also suggests that, along with natural selection and 
genetic mutation, there may be an evolutionary benefit to altruism and cooperation at the 
level of populations. Initially, this was seen as a form of group selection: the idea that 
natural selection acts at the level of benefiting groups, not only individuals. While there 
had been questions about group selection dating back to Darwin’s era, the modern 
understanding of group selection and its subsequent concepts traces back to V. C. 
Wynne-Edwards in the 1960s.101 Wynne-Edwards held that characteristics that are to the 
benefit of the group may be selected for, even including the suppression of behaviors that 
one would expect would be best for each individual. Wynne-Edwards observed, for 
example, that some animals self-limit their own reproduction rates in order to avoid the 
depletion of food resources. While any one animal would genetically benefit from 
reproducing as much as possible, the overall effect would be to exhaust food supplies, 
and thus prevent the overall flourishing of the group. Yet this is contrary to the traditional 
                                                 
101
 V. C. Wynne-Edwards, Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour (Edinburgh: Oliver and 
Boyd, 1962). 
155 
 
view of Darwinism, which holds that individuals work to increase their own descendants. 
Wynne-Edwards thus held that this social limitation “gives one a new insight on society, 
as being inherently competitive and deeply concerned with rank and possessions as status 
symbols. At the same time societies are brotherhoods, needing collaboration in the 
observance of conventions and in repelling invaders; they depend on allegiance and the 
virtues of conformity.” Wynne-Edwards maintained this position for the rest of his life, 
even as criticisms of group selection mounted.102  
The theory of group selection quickly came under severe criticism by three 
scientists in particular: J. Maynard Smith, W. D. Hamilton, and George Williams.103 The 
three were unified in their critique of group selection and a preference for the “gene’s 
eye” approach that would later be popularized by science writer Richard Dawkins.104 
However, differences between them emerged over time.105 Hamilton and Williams, for 
example, initially contrasted the genic approach with any consideration of group 
selection, though Maynard Smith realized that the two are not opposites: it is possible for 
group selection to be the means by which a gene’s frequency increases in a population. 
Thus, a genetic emphasis on evolution can be harmonized with the operation of group 
selection. Hamilton and Williams, on the other hand, but not Maynard Smith, did come to 
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recognize that different levels of selection might be in operation. Williams became an 
advocate of “clade selection.” (A clade is an ancestral species, along with all of its 
descendent species.) Most influentially, Hamilton formalized the idea of kin selection to 
explain altruistic behavior, as one way that an organism can make it more likely that the 
copies of its genes survive into future generations. It does this by assisting the 
reproduction of members of its extended family, since they likely share a significant 
proportion of the altruistic actor’s genes. Scientists refer to a trait as “kin-selected” if its 
evolution came about by causing organisms to help their extended kin. “Hamilton’s 
Rule” expressed this relationship mathematically, using the formula rb > c. In this 
description, r is degree of genetic relatedness between the two individual organisms; b is 
the fitness benefit to the intended recipient; and c is the cost to the altruistic organism. If 
rb - c > 0, then a behavior costly to the individual will nonetheless be favored by natural 
selection and thus spread in a population. Not only personal fitness, or the fitness of 
surviving offspring, but “inclusive fitness,” which includes the offspring of relatives, is 
applicable to the evolution of naturally selected traits. This maintains a gene-centered 
view while reconciling cooperation and altruism with evolutionary success.  
In addition to kin selection, reciprocal altruism is another way of explaining how 
altruism and cooperation could arise in populations within an inclusive fitness 
framework. It was first formulated in its modern form by Robert Trivers in 1971.106 For 
this phenomenon to occur, individuals must maintain mutually beneficial interactions 
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over time. To illustrate this mathematically, Lehmann and Keller used the formula ωmβB 
- C.107 In this equation, ω is the likelihood that the two individuals involved will interact 
again; m is the component of memory of previous cooperation; β is the individual’s 
response to its counterpart’s previous cooperative behavior; B is the benefit; and C is 
again the cost to the organism which acts altruistically. If ωmβB - C > 0, then reciprocal 
helping behavior (cooperation, altruism, or both) will be favored in evolutionary terms.  
Both kin selection and reciprocal altruism are examples of inclusive fitness. In a 
2006 review article on cooperation, Martin Nowak identifies three other potential 
mechanisms for the emergence of cooperation: indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, 
and group selection.108 Reciprocal altruism requires multiple encounters between the same 
actors over time, as well as similar levels of resources with which to help. Theories about 
indirect reciprocity, however, recognize the function that reputation plays in social 
interactions. Though a single instance of helping may not have a later direct benefit from 
the same recipient, being seen by others as someone who helps may be advantageous. 
Nowak and Sigmund formalized this as q > c/b: indirect reciprocity promotes 
cooperation if the probability of being aware of another actor’s reputation (q) is greater 
than the cost/benefit ratio (c/b) of the altruistic behavior itself.109 Thus the social pressure 
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of reputation maintenance influences behavior in a way that encourages the cooperation 
that makes for a robust and enduring social system. 
Network reciprocity, on the other hand, does not require knowledge of reputation. 
It is predicated on a context in which cooperating actors form a “cluster” among other 
actors. Instead of theorizing situations in which each participant is interacting with every 
other participant on an equally likely basis, this model recognizes that social networks 
form in cultures, and spatial dispersion influences the presence, absence, and quality of 
relationships. Ohtsuki, et al., write that network reciprocity can provide a cooperative 
advantage when b/c > k; the cost/benefit ratio must be greater than the average number of 
neighbors (k) per individual.  
Finally, there has also been a revival of a refined version of group selection in 
recent years. This refined version is multi-level selection, in which natural selection can 
operate, simultaneously, at the level of the gene, the cell, the organism, the group, and so 
forth. This revival has come about for several reasons. First, scientific research that was 
unavailable in the 1960s has increased both the theoretical plausibility of, and the 
scientific evidence for, multi-level selection.110 Some of the support for this lies in new 
evidence that the between-group benefits of individuals’ self-sacrifice can benefit group 
fitness as well, even after the within-group costs of self-sacrifice are considered. An 
example of this is the phenomenon of eusociality, when some members of a group 
become specialized for reproduction, and other members give up reproduction 
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completely. E. O. Wilson has found this, for example, in insect colonies, where kin 
selection played a much smaller part in the organization of the group than did other 
factors related to the environment.111 The latter members operate as sterile workers in a 
caste, and they are often physically distinct from the other members of the group that 
reproduce, in spite of the fact that they are genetically identical. (Darwin himself 
recognized the presence of these kinds of social structures as “cases of special difficulty 
on the theory of natural selection,”112 even if he did not find that it controverted it.) While 
the fitness of an individual organism that sacrifices itself obviously diminishes, the 
overall fitness of the group increases, such that a group with altruists is more fit than a 
group without altruists, effectively favoring the altruistic group in natural selection. As 
Wilson and Wilson concluded their 2007 study, “Selfishness beats altruism within 
groups. Altruistic groups beat selfish groups. All else is commentary.”113 
Second, some researchers have questioned whether the mathematics used in 
providing evidence of the success of the inclusive fitness theory is accurate.114 
Specifically, Allen et al., have made the case that the regression methods of analyzing 
costs and benefits are neither predictive nor do they provide causal explanations of 
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behavior, but only correlations.115 They agree that the inclusive fitness theory is useful as 
a heuristic tool, but inadequate as the ultimate explanation for all social behaviors. 
Discussions of group, or multi-level, selection remain animated in scientific 
literature, and contentious to an almost unprecedented degree.116 New research appears 
regularly that contributes to this debate. For each article promoting group selection or 
cooperation, another appears to refute it. A recent paper held that inclusive fitness theory 
is sufficient to explain experiments on parasite virulence when the density of organisms 
is high.117 In a Nature editorial, this paper was viewed as a possible “nail in the coffin for 
group selection.”118 This was quickly followed, however, by a refutation, signed by many 
scientists.119 From the other direction, Nowak’s paper, referenced above, also received an 
objection, that was signed by over 100 researchers.120 Okasha writes in Nature that “All 
of this disagreement [over levels of selection] creates the impression of a field in massive 
disarray,” and warns that it could eventually result in the loss of funding for evolutionary 
biology research.121 This dissertation is not the place to determine the accuracy of this 
contested issue in describing evolutionary dynamics. Nonetheless, the assumption that it 
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is true has figured in some recent theological responses to evolution that attempt to 
address the issue of the suffering inherent in nature as a result of Darwinian evolution. 
These responses, and others, are the subject of the following chapter.  
While the developments of the evolutionary synthesis required a revision of the 
details of Darwinian theory, it is nonetheless impressive just how durable the theory of 
evolution by natural selection has been. Even if cooperation is shown to be an 
evolutionary mechanism alongside mutation and natural selection, there is no doubt that 
the framework that Darwin constructed continues to endure to this day. In a scientific 
arena rightly full of robust disagreements on a wide variety of issues, no credible scientist 
seriously doubts the role of natural selection. The mechanism that Darwin posited in 
1859, despite having no “single clear-cut piece of evidence” for it at the time, has been 
repeatedly vindicated.  
Epigenetics 
Lamarck’s theory fell out of favor after the widespread adoption of the genetic 
synthesis and the discovery of DNA. It seemed clear that the “inheritance of acquired 
characteristics” was not a significant factor in evolutionary development. More recently, 
however, there has been a resurgence of this idea. It is a process termed “epigenetics” and 
an example of an alternate source of phenotypic variation. In this case, it is hypothesized 
that the environment itself serves as a factor of evolutionary change. The traditional 
theory holds that variations between individuals is only the result of genetic mutations, 
which themselves cause phenotypic changes that are adaptive or not adaptive in a 
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particular context. In that view, the environment acts only at the level of selection, as it 
affects which mutations are favorable, and thus more likely to be inherited. Epigenetic 
research, however, suggests another role for the environment: it can affect one 
generation’s phenotype in such a way that is inherited by the subsequent generation, 
whether or not the environmental pressures that affected the original generation are no 
longer present. This change in phenotype, however, is not reflected in a change in 
genotype. Bonasio, et al., give a simple definition of epigenetics: the term is used “to 
classify those processes that ensure the inheritance of variation (‘-genetic’) above and 
beyond (‘epi-’) changes in the DNA sequence.”122  
While the term has been in the scientific lexicon since the 1940s,123 epigenetics 
has been the subject of considerable discussion within evolutionary biology in recent 
years. An important milestone was the publication in 1998 of the article “Epigenetic 
inheritance in evolution,” co-written by Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb.124 The issue of 
Journal of Evolutionary Biology in which it appeared included twelve response papers by 
biologists, not all of whom were convinced. In their article, Jablonka and Lamb discussed 
“Epigenetic Inheritance Systems.” These systems facilitate the transmission of 
phenotypic differences across generations among individuals with identical genotypes. 
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Epigenetic explanations, which utilize these inheritance methods, do not supplant the 
traditional gene-based explanations, but are complementary to them.125 This is a retrieval 
of a scientific notion that had been thought to be obsolete after the advent of the genetic 
synthesis. Jablonka and Lamb even acknowledge that “the epigenetic approach … in 
some ways is a Lamarckian approach”126—a fact that may explain some of the resistance 
to it.  
Nonetheless, epigenetics has become more widely accepted as the mechanisms 
for the inheritance of variance have been identified. Genomic imprinting has been 
recognized as the “paradigm of epigenetic inheritance,” and a major factor in the 
expression of genes. 127 Genomic imprinting refers to the way in which the activity of a 
gene or chromosome is affected by its parental origin. One of the chief mechanisms of 
genomic imprinting is DNA methylation.128 In this process, which occurs post-replication, 
methyl groups are attached to the carbon-5 position of cytosine in a CpG dinucleotide 
sequence. The effect of this modification of a DNA region by methylation can be either 
to promote or inhibit the expression of the corresponding proteins in a wide variety of 
biological contexts. Importantly, the process of methylation can be affected by the 
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behavior of an organism. In this way, it serves as a physiological “memory” of an 
organism’s experience. The effects of this physiological footprint has been found in many 
mammals, including human beings. This is the way that diet, for example, can affect an 
individual’s susceptibility to cancer. Research in human beings who suffered malnutrition 
as children or adolescents during the “Dutch Hunger Winter” of 1944–1945 revealed that 
these individuals were less likely than their unexposed, same-sex sibling to develop 
colorectal cancer later in life, even though the nutritional context returned to normal 
following that particular year.129 The exposed individuals showed markers of less DNA 
methylation of the imprinted IGF-2 gene, even sixty years later. The environment had 
made a mark on those individuals’ genomes with lasting, and dramatic, consequences. 
There is also evidence that the pattern of DNA methylation, with its attendant 
effects on gene expression, can be passed down to offspring. A review of research in the 
topic on mammals confirmed that novel pressures in one generation’s environment, such 
as stress or the scarcity of food during early life as in the “Dutch Hunger Winter” 
example, can influence the phenotype of a subsequent generation in a way that is not 
attributable solely to either genes or culture.130 That these transgenerational effects were 
found in humans is significant for the field: early opposition to epigenetics as a major 
factor in evolutionary development included the belief that epigenetic changes occurred 
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primarily in unicellular organisms. 131 Johannes Bohacek and Isabelle Mansuy aggregated 
research showing evidence of transgenerational effects through fetal programming 
affected by maternal diet and prenatal stress.132 It is not only in an in utero context that 
epigenetic changes are transmitted to offspring; maternal behavior can also have 
epigenetic effects. It has also been found that epigenetic changes at the level of the 
germline can occur. The authors of the article in which those results were reported even 
suggest a prospective molecular mechanism for these changes, something that has been 
missing from previous discussions.133  
While inheriting the potential for disease can be one effect of parental epigenetic 
changes, it is also possible for epigenetic changes to serve a positive adaptive function. 
As Bohacek and Mansuy point out, epigenetic changes can be more rapid, and specific, 
than selected changes from classical inheritance. In an environment in which food is 
scarce, for example, mothers may develop an increase in insulin sensitivity. If that 
sensitivity can be passed on to offspring, that would give the second generation an 
advantage in the same environment. Further, Jablonka, et al., provide theoretical 
statistical evidence that these “carry-over effects” can be more advantageous than both 
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genetic and immediate behavioral changes, even in environments that change 
frequently.134 
These evolutionary mechanisms resemble Lamarck’s theories more than the neo-
Darwinian consensus of the mid-twentieth century. When discussing suffering in nature, 
it must be kept in mind that evolution by natural selection is not the only mechanism of 
biological evolution. Both cooperation, sexual selection, and epigenetics play their own 
roles in this complex, interdependent process.  
Worldview implications of contemporary Darwinism 
In his plea for cooperation and concord among scientists in 2010, Okasha noted 
that evolutionary biology has a tendency toward public controversy that exceeds that of 
other sciences, and identifies the cause: evolutionary theory that is applied to human 
behavior can result in social policies that affect large numbers of people in a significant 
way. He uses the examples of criticisms of evolution in the twentieth century by people 
on the left side of the political spectrum, who were concerned about it serving as an 
encouragement for social Darwinism, but the comment is true more broadly as well. 
Darwinian evolution has exerted a powerful influence in fields far beyond its home turf, 
shaping contemporary worldviews to an extent that is arguably unequalled by other 
sciences. The “Darwinian revolution” stands next to the “Copernican revolution” as 
discoveries that not only transformed science but, as Bowler puts it, “symbolized a 
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wholesale change in cultural values.”135 That change is ongoing, perhaps because there is 
an experientially immediate relevancy to evolutionary theory that is more dramatic than 
in other areas of contemporary study.  
This wholesale change was not unidirectional, from Darwin’s pen to the outside 
world. Even Darwin’s staunchest defenders recognize that the socio-cultural conditions 
of nineteenth-century Britain facilitated the advent of evolution by natural selection, by 
both Darwin and Wallace, in a way that other conditions may not have been as amenable 
to. As Michael Ruse writes,  
We must see the Darwinian revolution as part and parcel of general cultural 
movements in the nineteenth century, particularly in mid-century Victorian 
Britain. This was a time of change, when society and its members had to come to 
terms with the aftereffects of such developments as industrialism, urbanism, the 
collapse of traditional ways of thinking and acting (from the military to the 
ecclesiastical), the spread of universal education and much more.136 
In other words, there has never been a time when the science of evolutionary theory has 
been wholly independent from the surrounding culture. Ruse continues, “Britain—
Europe and America also—were different at the end of the nineteenth century from the 
way that they were at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Darwin and his revolution 
were part of this change from beginning to end” as both cause and effect.137 The culture 
was shaped by the new science, but the science was shaped by the culture as well. This 
did not end in the nineteenth century, either: even during the genetic revolution in 
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evolutionary studies, some scientists were affected by the potential moral implications of 
the theory, which led to their opposition to it. Thomas Hunt Morgan, for example, who 
became one of the founders of modern genetics, was initially one of the biggest 
opponents of the Darwinian synthesis because of the way it embedded suffering in 
natural processes.138 The group selection controversy since Wynne-Edwards has had 
political overtones, and the more recent multilevel selection debates have had religious 
subtexts—subtexts which occasionally come into public view. The influence of 
Darwinian theory can be seen in fields as diverse as art, philosophy, psychology, ethics, 
and many more.139 
However, religion may be the most prominent contact point between Darwinism 
and the broader social culture, and the story of that relationship is one that continues to be 
told in copious volumes of scholarship. Theologians, among many others, felt compelled 
to reexamine their own work in light of evolution by natural selection; as will be seen in 
the following chapter, that effort began in the nineteenth century and has continued to the 
present. This dissertation itself is part of that theological consideration of Darwinism, as a 
search for a theological accounting of the world in light of evolution by natural selection. 
The continued success of the evolutionary research program, particularly since the 
synthesis with genetics, leads to the inescapable conclusion that it is the best explanation 
for how the diversity of life on earth developed. This fact has clear implications for any 
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doctrine of creation, whether or not one is particularly concerned with the problem of 
suffering. The long list of creation’s highlights that is given by God in the latter chapters 
of the biblical book of Job, for example, must be primarily the result of the evolutionary 
processes described above. Any Christian conception of an Edenic world that follows the 
materialist guidelines of Aquinas will have to involve descent with modification. And 
conceptions of creation’s goodness must take into account the struggle for existence and 
the survival of the fittest. Darwin himself may have summarized this conjunction best at 
the end of the Origin:  
Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object 
which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher 
animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several 
powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that, 
whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from 
so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have 
been, and are being, evolved.140 
In this quote, one sees the combination of brutality and beauty that is found in creation, 
not only incidentally, but as part of its very engine of development. Further, later 
developments in evolutionary theory, after Darwin, have revealed that the fixed law of 
natural selection operates at the genetic level, even if it operates elsewhere also. In this 
way, the theologian concerned with the suffering in nature must acknowledge that the 
locus of the cause of natural suffering is literally microscopic: the mutations that manifest 
such significant consequences for the success of an organism occur at the level of the 
cell. Even if group or multi-level selection is a fact of the natural world, this merely 
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expands the arena in which natural selection operates, with the same destructive effects 
on the “losing” group. This evolutionary process is therefore not only ingrained in nature; 
it is constitutive of it, at its very root. One imagines that Darwin would not be surprised.  
For this reason, Darwinism has posed a particular challenge to doctrines of 
creation that take into account the dependency of evolution on the process of natural 
selection while trying to maintain a traditional concept of God and a “good” creation. 
Many philosophers and theologians, however, have taken up that challenge, constructing 
theodicies with evolution in mind. Their offerings are the subject of the following 
chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 The earliest religious responses to Darwinism perceived evolution in general as a 
view that would soon be relegated to the dust bin of history on scientific grounds, and 
thus not provoking particular religious concern. This changed after 1875, however, as 
evolution, if not the Darwinian version of it, gained credibility in the scientific 
community, both because of a widespread adoption of the transmutation hypothesis and 
due to the discovery of additional paleontological evidence supporting organic evolution.1 
As evolutionary theory increased in prominence, biological evolution did prove to be a 
difficult issue for large numbers of the faithful. This came to be the case even though “the 
eclipse of Darwinism” began among some scientists at the same time, as discussed above.  
A number of related theological concerns implicated in evolution by natural 
selection challenged customary religious thinking. First, Darwinism seemed further to 
undermine the argument from design for God’s existence, as outlined in the previous 
section. Not all thinkers were convinced that this conclusion was the only one that could 
be drawn from the evolutionary hypothesis. Asa Gray in particular, an early and 
important American supporter of Darwinism at Harvard, held to theistic evolution, 
asserting God’s guidance of evolution. In a set of three articles on The Origin of Species 
in The Atlantic magazine, which appeared in 1860, Gray sought to reassure American 
audiences that were skeptical of the religious orthodoxy of the Darwinian theory.2 On the 
issue of suffering, Gray wrote that the “seeming waste” of the evolutionary process is 
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“part and parcel of a great economical process” that is teleological in character.3 He 
continued, “In this system the forms and species, in all their variety, are not mere ends in 
themselves, but the whole a series of means and ends, in the contemplation of which we 
may obtain higher and more comprehensive, and perhaps worthier, as well as more 
consistent, views of design in Nature than heretofore.”4 Many religious thinkers joined 
him; while the brutality of nature seemed a great evil and a mark against the goodness of 
God, they took comfort nonetheless in the fact that that waste made progress possible. 
Unlike them, and unlike Gray especially, however, Darwin himself found his religious 
beliefs affected by the pain and suffering revealed by evolution by natural selection.5 His 
correspondence and autobiography reveal that this facet of evolutionary theory 
significantly troubled him. He wrote to Asa Gray that “I own that I cannot see as plainly 
as others do, and as I should wish to do, evidence of design and beneficence on all sides 
of us. There seems to be too much misery in the world.” 6 It was an issue about which he 
was ambivalent, however; in the same letter he reveals his inclination toward a vision of 
design in nature nonetheless.  
Second, Darwinism came to be seen in some quarters as simply irreconcilable 
with Scripture, in a way that previous scientific discoveries had not been. This is a 
complicated story, because the view of Scripture as completely literal and inerrant only 
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became a full-fledged cultural concern in the 1920’s, chronologically well after Darwin. 
While geological scholarship had inspired voluminous literature on the proper 
relationship between science and Scripture by 1850, the issue was far from settled, and 
the line between religion and science at that point in time remained blurred.7 Before 1870, 
there had been a prevalent sense that, since God is revealed both in the Bible and in the 
natural world, there must be some way to reconcile the two, even if that way was not 
totally apparent at first. Even scriptural views that had gone by the name “inerrant” had 
been in some sense accomodationist, with Scripture understood as requiring 
interpretation. This view is found as early as the reactions to Marcion in the second 
century CE, and is certainly evident in the scriptural commentaries of Augustine, such as 
those on Genesis in the fifth century. Historian Ronald Numbers writes that by 1879, 
twenty years after the Origin was published, “special creationists could name only two 
working naturalists in North America … who had not succumbed to some theory of 
organic evolution.”8 A literalist view of the modern sort, in other words, was a product of 
the late nineteenth century, without a clear warrant in the Christian tradition.9 The 
sentiment found in the statement of American Protestant leader Charles Hodge that 
“Darwinism is atheism” would have been unimaginable in a previous age regarding, for 
example, the findings of Newton or another natural scientist. Because it came to be seen, 
rightly or wrongly, as a direct assault on the authority of the Bible, Darwinism marked 
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the first wholesale rejection of a consensus scientific theory by the Protestant 
establishment, a decision that would have enormous consequences for the way 
Christianity developed in the modern period, especially in America. Prior to 1875, there 
had been no widespread consideration of the precise nature and scope of biblical 
inspiration or the relative authority of each of the “two books,” that is, the Bible and the 
natural world. Darwinism was an essential part of the context in which that conversation 
was carried out. 
Third, Darwinism’s success came as a result of methodological naturalism, since 
God was not needed to explain the origin or development of species from a common 
ancestor. By itself, this was not a blow to religious faith, as even complete 
methodological naturalism does not entail metaphysical naturalism. The work of what we 
would now call natural science by Thomas Aquinas, for example, was wholly naturalistic 
methodologically. It became clear to religious thinkers in the nineteenth century, 
however, that the emergence of a widespread metaphysical naturalism as a consequence 
of the popularity of methodological naturalism, coming in an already-skeptical Victorian 
age, was a real possibility. In this case, they were right. The increased professionalization 
of science, eager to establish itself as a distinct guild separate from the clergy who had up 
to that point frequently been part of the scientific community, encouraged the split.10 The 
success of methodological naturalism resulted in a sense that metaphysical naturalism 
should be the default philosophical stance in any field of study. Institutions of higher 
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learning adopted this view, and theological study, therefore, began to lose its warrant.11 
This led to its further marginalization in the culture. 
Fourth, especially in the wake of Darwin’s later work The Descent of Man (1871), 
Darwinism raised questions about the place of human beings in the world. The 
uniformitarian grounding of Darwinism questioned the involvement of God with humans 
in a mechanical sense. The human species had been seen as unique, formed separately, 
and endowed with capacities that set it off from the rest of the natural world. Darwinism, 
however, suggested that the human species was just another product of evolution, whose 
special capacities were not specially God-given but simply the result of providing 
reproductive advantage during the competition of natural selection. This was seen by 
some as putting the value of human beings on par with the value of other primates—a 
notion to which many responded with disgust.  
Finally, there were the potential ethical implications of evolution. To some 
religious thinkers, Darwinism replaced the traditional Christian ethic of love of God and 
neighbor with “evolutionary ethics”—that is, the struggle for survival as the greatest 
good. There was a concern, then, that in light of this new science the adage “without God 
everything is permitted” was being fulfilled. Indeed, there was some truth in this: the 
social Darwinist movement, though certainly neither endorsed by Darwin himself nor 
directly derivative from the writings of Malthus, nonetheless claimed their sanction. 
These practices were truly inhumane and worthy of the condemnation they received. That 
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social Darwinism claimed to be scientific highlighted the perceived split between science 
and religion. The social Darwinist view, in particular, was at the root of the Roman 
Catholic Church’s opposition to Darwinism, as it was often poorer, Roman Catholic 
immigrants to the United States who were considered the lesser humans.12  
Of the religious problems raised by Darwinian evolution, the issue of suffering 
remains the most difficult to wrestle with theologically. Darwinism’s perceived 
undermining of Scripture could be dissolved by looking at biblical hermeneutics dating 
back to the early Church. The adoption of metaphysical naturalism was a philosophical 
move that could be addressed on philosophical terms. Humans remain unique among 
animals because of their capacities; whether or not they are in some sense ontologically 
different depends on one’s ontology, not exclusively one’s scientific views. Widespread 
belief in the process of biological evolution has not led to ethical catastrophe. The issue 
of the suffering revealed by evolution by natural selection to be intrinsic to nature, 
however, became an important topic of scholarly investigation soon after the publication 
of the Origin, continuing to the present day. This chapter attempts to describe the main 
currents of that thought through the work of five representative philosophers and 
theologians.  
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Lux Mundi (1889) 
Some theologians, as early as the late-nineteenth century, made addressing the 
issues raised by evolution for systematic theology a major theological project. An early 
example of this was the publication of the collection of essays titled Lux Mundi in 1889.13 
Specifically, liberal Anglo-Catholics in England, such as Charles Gore and Aubrey 
Moore, identified Darwinism as evidence against what they saw as the far greater threat 
to Christianity in England: deism. By adopting the view that God guides evolution, these 
thinkers found in contemporary science proof that God was actively involved in the 
workings of the world. Darwinism showed, they believed, that God, pace Deism, was not 
the remote clockmaker found in Deist theology. In Moore’s words, where Newtonian 
science had “pushed the Deist’s God farther and farther away, and at the moment when it 
seemed as if He would be thrust out altogether, Darwinism appeared, and under the guise 
of a foe did the work of a friend.”14 In this view, proof of God’s immanence was restored 
by evolutionary theory, as God was seen as being intimately involved in course of 
organic development, working constantly to bring new life into being. In addition, 
English Modernist,s such as Charles Raven, N. P. Williams, and James Bethune-Baker, 
constructed new theologies of the person and work of Jesus Christ and the nature of the 
human being in light of evolution, revisiting issues such as the Adamic Fall and the 
relationship between divinity and humanity in Jesus Christ.  
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In addressing theology in light of evolution, many of these theologians were 
heavily influenced by the philosophical worldview known as “emergence,” a view found 
in such nineteenth-century thinkers as Samuel Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, and C. D. 
Broad, albeit in different fields and widely varying forms.15 Emergence is the view that 
new, more complex properties or objects emerge from lower levels of materiality, though 
these cannot be reduced to their constituent parts. Theories of emergence can be highly 
nuanced: some allow for reductionism in terms of matter; others hold to the appearance 
of new causal powers, and reject ontological reductionism. While there were diverse 
versions of emergence in the nineteenth century (as there are today), the theory was 
widely seen to stand between competiting views such as reductive materialism and 
matter-spirit dualism.16 Some theologians of the time viewed Jesus as bringing into 
existence a new, emergent humanity that differed in kind from prior humanity. J. R. 
Illingworth, for example, wrote that “In scientific language, the Incarnation may be said 
to have introduced a new species into the world—the Divine man transcending past 
humanity, as humanity transcended the rest of the animal creation, and communicating 
His vital energy by a spiritual process to subsequent generations.”17 In this kind of 
Christological view, the benefits of evolution are literally salvific, and the costs involved 
must be considered in light of the salvation they make possible.  
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Like Illingworth, Charles Gore also viewed Christ himself, by having an 
emergent, new kind of relationship with God, as for the first time bringing into existence 
the possibility of that new relationship for all of humanity. In 1922, he wrote that, in 
Christ, being “the eternal Word or Son of God, Himself very God, made man or ‘flesh,’ 
there was thereby constituted a new thing in nature, a new relation of the Creator Spirit, 
the Spirit of Life, to matter, a new level in the evolution of life, such as would naturally 
exhibit new phenomena.”18 In addition, his view of evolution led Gore to the conclusion 
that, as evolution revealed progress from lower forms of life (“animal”) to higher forms 
of life (“rational”), “this evolution reached a climax in Christ.”19 Gore articulated one way 
to draw out the positive—indeed, integral—role of evolution, as maintaining Christ’s 
continuity with the natural world while still holding to his unique, divine status.  
By the time of the publication of Lux Mundi in 1889, this set of Anglican 
theologians had recognized that the argument from design for God’s existence had lost its 
convincing power for many people. Even if this loss was not a definitive refutation of the 
Christian faith altogether, it was nonetheless traumatic for some. H. Scott Holland wrote 
that, in the time they were living through, as in the time of any great change, “while 
shifting from the old position to the new, we are in the very chaos of confusion.” 
Tellingly, he uses the death of natural theology as his example: 
It is the first shock of this enforced transition which is so calculated to terrify: as 
when, for instance, men see their habitual reliance on the evidence for design in 
nature, which had been inherited from Paley, yield, and vanish, under the review 
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of the facts with which the theory of evolution acquaints them. What they feel is, 
that their familiar mode of interpreting their faith, of justifying it, of picturing it, 
has abruptly been torn from them.20  
The design argument that had survived the assaults of Kant and Hume was for many 
finally defeated by Darwinism. Knowledge of the violence inherent in the natural order, 
in addition to damaging the design argument, required its own address. Illingworth 
considered this topic in his Lux Mundi essay “The Problem of Pain.”21 
Illingworth was clearly aware that Darwin’s discoveries effectively closed the gap 
between humans and other animals, and Illingworth was eager to re-open that gap, at 
least as far as the problem of suffering was concerned. The essay reads as if Illingworth 
was responding directly to Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals 
of 1872. The great mass of suffering that Darwin references in his letter to Gray could be 
nearly paralyzing to a sensitive individual, but Illingworth attempts to mitigate it, 
pointing out that we have no direct knowledge of animal pain. “What then do we really 
know about the suffering of animals?” he asks.22 After all, we don’t know how animals 
feel; they may have capacities far beyond ours, similar to the canine ability to hear noises 
humans do not. Further, “they would seem like children to give strong indications of 
slight pain,” making their visible reactions unrepresentative of the actual level of 
suffering they are experiencing. Given this doubt, Illingworth wrote, “We decline to 
arraign our Creator for a deed which we have not even the means of knowing that he has 
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done.”23 Later developments in physiology and neurology would increase what “we really 
know about the suffering of animals” in a way that would undermine Illingworth’s point.  
Further, Illingworth spends the bulk of the essay showing how pain functions in a 
positive way in the world: as a punishment, which is “a necessary element in the 
evolution of character”; as a corrective, leading to education; as a preventative, such as 
alerting an individual to disease; and as a spur to action, as the desire to remove pain 
from oneself or others has driven “the scientific discoverer, the patriot, the 
philanthropist.”24 Even the suffering of very young persons, however painful to observe, 
“may be a child’s call to higher things.” The juxtaposition of evolution and suffering 
appears in the closing paragraphs of the essay. Illingworth writes  
Rightly viewed, [suffering] is the climax and complete expression of the process 
to which we owe the entire evolution of our race. The pleasures of each 
generation evaporate in air; it is their pains that increase the spiritual momentum 
of the world…. We live upon the death of the animals beneath us. The necessities, 
the comforts, the luxuries of our existence are provided by the labour and sorrow 
of countless fellow-men. Our freedom, our laws, our literature, our spiritual 
sustenance have been won for us at the cost of broken hearts, and wearied brains, 
and noble lives laid down.25  
Suffering, including that of nonhuman animals in the course of evolution, is redeemed, in 
this view, because it lays the foundation for all of the good that follows it; it makes what 
is to come possible. Further, it has a redemptive function not only for those who suffer 
but also for the recipient of the advantages bestowed by the sufferings of others because 
“we find beneath all the superficial suffering the deep truth of the benediction ‘It is more 
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blessed to give than to receive.’”26 The interdependence of the sufferer and those who 
benefit from that suffering imitates on earth the interdependence of all people and God. 
“Pain unites us to each other, because … it unites us to God,” he wrote. “It unites us to 
God because it purifies us, because it detaches us from earth, because it opens our sense 
of dependence.”27 Where Darwin experienced knowledge of evolutionary suffering in 
nature as an impediment to seeing the world as designed by a benevolent creator, 
Illingworth nearly seamlessly incorporated it into a Christian theodicy that maintained 
support for seeing the world as designed, and designed well. 
He was not the only one of the Lux Mundi authors to find in Darwinism a 
motivation for faith, hope, and charity, even if moral progress was far from assured. 
Within decades, however, military battles the likes of which had never been seen would 
make their marks on the Western world. The cultural effects of World War I on British 
society have been well-documented, and the war’s theological consequences include the 
advent of Karl Barth’s neo-orthodoxy, possibly the most influential development within 
the discipline of theology in centuries. In his opening chapter in Lux Mundi, Holland had 
given the wise counsel that, once the controversy over evolution had been digested 
theologically, there would certainly appear yet another dispute, as yet unseen:  
Only let us learn our true lesson; and, in our zeal to appreciate the wonders of 
Evolution, let us hold our selves prepared for the day which is bound to come, 
when again the gathering facts will clamour for a fresh generalization: and the 
wheel will give one more turn; and the new man will catch sight of the vision 
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which is preparing; and the new book will startle; and the new band of youthful 
professors will denounce and demolish our present heroes.28  
No doubt Holland expected the “gathering facts” that needed incorporation into theology 
to be further developments in the natural sciences, and his prediction in that respect 
certainly came true. The gathering facts of the twentieth century which have also proven 
influential for present-day theology, however, came not only from the scientific 
laboratory but also from the battlefields of World War I and the factories of death of 
World War II. Among some philosophers and theologians, these two events made it more 
difficult to affirm the presence of necessarily redemptive aspects of suffering and called 
into question a philosophical and religious optimism that came to seem willfully, even 
cruelly, naïve. Part of the justification for this optimism had been taken from a 
progressive reading of evolution. Charles Raven (1885–1964), part of the successor 
generation of theologians who also addressed theology and evolution, in an essay 
published in 1943 described the previous generation (specifically mentioning Gore, 
Illingworth, and Holland) as maintaining “a blind belief in progress—a strange irrational 
faith in the automatic improvement in human life, based only upon a shallow view of 
evolution and a blinkered ignorance of what other men in other fields were doing.” He 
ends the essay abruptly: “The period ended in the bloodbath of the first Great War.”29 
Following the bloodbaths that had been and were shortly to come, if the Christian faith 
was not illegitimate altogether, that aspect of it that could claim with Illingworth that all 
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pain is somehow redemptive was difficult for many to believe. Yet that moment 
eventually passed as well, perhaps as a result of the horrors of the “first Great War” 
fading in the collective memory. Eventually, a renewed sense of progress returned to the 
theological landscape. 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955) 
The world of French Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a paleontologist and 
theologian, did not overlap with that of the English Anglicans, and the theology that he 
produced in light of evolution shows the significant distance between the two, both in 
form and content. The Lux Mundi authors hewed closely to the guidelines of traditional 
theology as a reference point, even if doing so was in the service of proposing significant 
revisions. Teilhard, on the other hand, wrote in a mystical vein only loosely tethered to 
the outlines of systematic theology as traditionally conceived. Like them, however, 
Teilhard felt sharply the need for theology to adapt to contemporary science, if only for 
reasons of contemporary relevance; he viewed it as “absolutely essential” that the 
understanding of the Christian religion presented to the educated public be one that is 
comprehensive of the magnitude of the universe, the immensity of which is “continually 
growing greater, beyond all measure.”30 In a universe the size of ours, how can Christians 
assert the primacy of God over all creation, much less make the religiously particular 
claim of the central importance of Jesus Christ? He saw the incorporation of evolutionary 
thought into theology as the way to frame the Christian vision for a modern world. While 
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Christian communities may have at first been “frightened for a moment by evolution,”31 it 
had become clear for Teilhard that evolution is in fact the great witness to God and God’s 
relationship with humanity, and should be embraced as such.  
Teilhard responded to the perceived challenge of evolution with an elaborate 
metaphysical system, a “cosmo-Christology,”32 that posited a future point toward which 
all history is aiming, a point that he termed “omega.” In addition to being that point in the 
future, omega is also the force that is driving the evolutionary process forward. As the 
process of biological evolution seems to increase complexity in living creatures over 
time, Teilhard predicted that this continually increasing complexity would eventually 
result in a final unity of all things, and that the last stage of this process had begun in the 
human being Jesus Christ, the Word become flesh. Christ, Teilhard writes, is the omega 
that holds together the universe in its development: “From the ultimate vibration of the 
atom to the loftiest mystical contemplation; from the lightest breeze that ruffles the air to 
the broadest currents of life and thought, [Christ] ceaselessly animates, without 
disturbing, all the earth’s processes.”33 Christ both transcends the universe, in his function 
of supporting it, and is immanent in the universe, in his function of holding it together. 
Teilhard found scriptural justification for identifying that immanent, transcendent source 
of attraction as Christ in the Epistle to the Colossians, when Paul writes that it is in Christ 
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that “all things hold together” (1:17). Christ, therefore, is both “the organic centre of the 
entire universe” and “its principle of synthesis.”34  
While Teilhard’s theological innovations continue to inspire Christians interested 
in both science and a religious worldview, there are both theological and biological 
difficulties with his thought. Scientifically, his firmly teleological view of evolution is 
problematic, as he assumes that evolution is end-directed toward an ultimate goal and 
proceeds in a progressive fashion. While it is true that the history of evolution evidences 
an increase in complexity, it is not a uniformly progressive development, nor can there be 
an expectation of eventual perfection or perfect fitness through the evolutionary process, 
as Darwin himself noted.35 The endurance of modifications depends on the particular 
context of a given population; should the context change, the usefulness of the previous 
modifications may change as well. Indeed, Teilhard’s view of evolution more closely 
resembles the theory of progressive evolution espoused by Herbert Spencer than 
Darwinian evolution by natural selection. Like Spencer, there is a sense in Teilhard that 
both biological changes and cultural changes are two types of an overarching dynamic of 
progress.36 This view was a controversial one even in the Victorian age of Spencer. While 
Teilhard writes that, “The radical defect in all forms of belief in progress, as they are 
expressed in positivist credos, is that they do not definitely eliminate death,”37 his own 
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“belief in progress” differs only in its adding the transcendent dimension to the 
progressive development. This is evident elsewhere in Phenomenon of Man. For instance, 
he writes, “However improbable it might seem, [humanity] must reach the goal…. What 
we should expect is not a halt in any shape or form, but an ultimate progress coming at its 
biologically appointed hour; a maturation and a paroxysm leading ever higher into the 
Improbable from which we have sprung.”38 He continues with the areas in which this 
progress will occur: spiritual life, scientific research, self-knowledge, and the conjoining 
of science and religion.39 Teilhard’s conception of evolution is a holistic one, 
encompassing nearly all areas of human concern. 
Though it would not be reasonable to expect Teilhard, a paleontologist, to be up 
to date on the latest details of developments in evolutionary genetics of his time, the idea 
of natural selection as an evolutionary mechanism operative at the level of gene variation, 
was, as the previous chapter showed, in the mainstream of evolutionary thought by the 
time he was writing. It is not reflected in his work, however. This scientific omission is 
all the more notable given that Teilhard explicitly states his desire for his writings to be 
themselves scientific; in the preface to The Phenomenon of Man, for instance, he writes, 
“If this book is to be properly understood, it must be read not as a work on metaphysics, 
still less as a sort of theological essay, but purely and simply as a scientific treatise.”40 As 
a scientific work, however, the book was lacking, even by the standards of 1955, the date 
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of its original publication.41 If Phenomenon of Man was to be judged “pure and simply as 
a scientific treatise” that judgment would most likely not redound to the text’s favor. This 
critique is not only a matter of scientific exactitude, however. Holding to the view of 
progressive development does not facilitate, and may even impede, a full grappling with 
the problem of natural evil that is most pointedly brought to the fore by natural selection. 
By omitting natural selection from the primary discussions about the engine of 
evolutionary development, Teilhard therefore effectively sidelines the issue of the 
suffering intrinsic to the evolutionary process.42 
In addition, Teilhard’s identification of Christ with the evolutionary process itself 
adds a new wrinkle to the question of natural evil that further problematizes the issue. For 
example, Teilhard writes that, “Evolution, the way out towards something that escapes 
total death, is the hand of God gathering us back to himself,” that is, through Christ.43 If 
evolution is a direct action by God, with the goal of “gathering us back,” then the costs of 
that gathering are extremely high and, it should be said, borne through Christ by victims 
who had no say in the matter. It is one thing to say that Christ himself, the God-man, pays 
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the price of uniting God and humanity; it is quite another to say that Christ does so by 
creating other victims. This is, however, the way Teilhard depicts the salvific action of 
Christ: “The mystical Christ has not reached the peak of his growth … and it is in the 
continuation of this engendering that there lies the ultimate driving force behind all 
created activity … Christ is the term of even the natural evolution of living beings.”44 
But, again, Teilhard’s setting aside the issue of natural selection allows him to turn a 
blind eye to those costs that are incurred. He is thus able to identify Christ only with the 
perceived benefits of evolution and not its liabilities.  
Indeed, in The Phenomenon of Man, Teilhard only addresses the problem of this 
kind of evil in an appendix. Responding to an imagined critique that he had not addressed 
the issue of suffering in nature, he replies, “What good would it have done to have drawn 
attention to the shadows on the landscape, or to stress the depths of the abysses between 
the peaks? Surely they were obvious enough. I have assumed that what I have omitted 
could nevertheless be seen.”45 Yet the previous three hundred pages concentrated, almost 
solely, on the progressive success of the human race, unencumbered by the costs of that 
progress. The choice of the appendix as the location of this caveat is telling. The costs of 
evolution are not part of the primary story that is being told about the nature of evolution. 
Certainly, not every text has to cover every topic. However, by omitting it, he makes 
peripheral one of the strongest objections to his claim. 
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A similarly revealing formatting choice is made in a relevant essay found in the 
collection The Future of Man. After discussing the “general tendencies” of the movement 
into the future—“unification, technification, growing rationalization of the human 
Earth”46—Teilhard inserts this footnote: “Which does not mean, alas, that the liberating 
process will not be accompanied by a certain amount of suffering, setbacks and even 
apparent wastage: the whole problem of Evil is restated (more comprehensibly, it seems 
to me, than in the case of a static world) in this vision of a Universe in evolution.”47 
Elsewhere in the same collection, Teilhard writes, “On the other hand Evil, in all its 
forms—injustice, inequality, suffering, death itself—ceases theoretically to be outrageous 
from the moment when, Evolution becoming a Genesis, the immense travail of the world 
displays itself as the inevitable reverse side—or better, the condition—or better still, the 
price—of an immense triumph.”48 Here still, the triumph justifies the “immense travail.”  
To his credit, Teilhard acknowledges in Phenomenon of Man how evolution can 
be perceived, with the imagery of “nature as a blind Fury trampling existence in the 
dust.”49 Like Malthus, he refers to the struggle for existence that is the result of geometric 
rates of reproduction: “Profusion is the first trace of this apparent brutality: like Tolstoy’s 
grasshoppers, life passes over a bridge made up of accumulated corpses, and this is a 
direct effect of multiplication.”50 This honesty regarding the costs of evolution is 
laudable. It is short-lived, however, as Teilhard immediately points out, “But in the same 
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‘inhuman’ direction orthogenesis and association also operate, in their fashion.”51 The 
universe is one, he insists, and this is the key to all interpretations of the natural processes 
that are bringing creation to the Omega.52  
There is another objection to be made to Teilhard’s description of a “Super-
Christ” (a term that a sympathetic commentator would later describe as “unfortunate”53), 
and it is one that is not unrelated to the previous objections regarding the near-invisibility 
of suffering in his cosmic system. In Teilhard’s work, Jesus Christ bears very little 
resemblance to Jesus of Nazareth, the Galilean Jew. Instead, Teilhard focuses almost 
exclusively on the cosmic Christ. For example, one of the few references to Christ in 
Phenomenon of Man comes toward the end, and the way that Teilhard characterizes him 
is telling: “Christ, principle of universal vitality because sprung up as man among men, 
put himself in the position (maintained ever since) to subdue under himself, to purify, to 
direct and superanimate the general ascent of consciousness into which he inserted 
himself. By a perennial act of communion and sublimation, he aggregates to himself the 
total psychism of the earth.”54 Teilhard’s focus is on Christ as a principle; Christ 
superanimates consciousness; Christ personally aggregates psychism. Nothing is reported 
of his birth to Mary, his living and working among his people, the immediate failure of 
his ministry, his agonizing crucifixion at the hands of religious and political authorities, 
or the resurrection of that crucified body on the third day. By ignoring this received 
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history, however, Teilhard runs the risk of veering off into a timeless mythology divorced 
from the historical particularity of first-century Palestine, and it is that historical 
particularity that so strongly affirms God’s relationship with material creation, not just 
with consciousness or psychism. Teilhard passes over the explicitly physical aspects of 
Jesus’ life in silence. In doing so, he avoids the scandal of the incarnate God hanging on 
the cross. This is of a piece with his avoidance of the scandal of a good creation being 
undergirded by an intrinsic suffering. 
Nonetheless, Teilhard’s evolutionary theology was highly influential in the 
development of the contemporary study of theology from a scientific point of view, even 
if his writings make clear that he was, as de Lubac would write, “not a theologian, nor a 
philosopher, strictly speaking, but a mystic.”55 Karl Rahner also wrote of Teilhard 
appreciatively: “It would do no harm for a present-day Christology to take up the ideas of 
a Teilhard de Chardin and to elaborate them with more precision and clarity.”56 Indeed, 
Teilhard’s attempt at an evolutionary synthesis of Christianity and evolution remains 
popular, as its mystical tone resonates with the wonder with which many view the 
vastness, complexity, and beauty of the cosmos. Teilhard, in a way more comprehensive 
than the Anglican theologians, depicted evolution as a vital resource for Christian faith, 
describing evolution as coming to “infuse new blood, so to speak, into the perspectives 
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and aspirations of Christianity”57 at a time when many Christian believers were feeling 
that new blood was desperately needed. Teilhard linked together the vast cosmos, 
supported at its foundation by the principle of Christ, with human experiences of 
transcendence, thereby giving a sanctity to nature, but a sanctity that maintains a 
Christian cast. It is even a sacramental view, and thus one that is ecclesially minded. For 
Teilhard, it is the same Christ that is present both in the Eucharist and that supports the 
universe; he wrote that “The sacramental Host … is continually being encircled more 
closely by another, infinitely larger, Host, which is nothing less than the universe itself.”58 
This has been a widely held view among many interested in religion and science. This 
sacramental notion of Teilhard’s was even cited positively by Joseph Ratzinger, writing 
in 2000 during his term as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith—
even though he had spoken out forcefully in 1965 against the detrimental effects of 
Teilhard’s theology on the Second Vatican Council.59 
However, Teilhard’s work has a significant blind spot when it comes both to the 
scientific theory of evolution itself and its corresponding implications for the problem of 
natural evil. As a guide toward forming a doctrine of creation accountable to the 
processes of organic development, Teilhard’s theology is inadequate. 
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John Hick (1922–2012) 
John Hick’s Evil and the God of Love, published in 1966, proposed an alternative 
approach to theodicy than that taken by most theologians. Hick begins by contrasting the 
Augustinian view, which he describes as predominant in the Christian discourse on evil, 
with a view he adapts from Irenaeus (130–202 CE), bishop of Lyons. Hick finds the 
source of the difference between Irenaean and Augustinian theodicy to be found in both 
the theological and philosophical strands of each writer’s thought. 
Hick’s primary critique of Augustinian theodicy is that it is too impersonal and 
thus unreflective of the personal qualities of God as communicated in the life and work of 
Jesus Christ.60 In Augustine’s work, assumptions regarding the place of divine fecundity 
in creation, with its Neoplatonist overtones, and in discussions of the concept of being, 
aesthetic perspectives on the universe, and sin as a principle, rather than sin as a breach of 
relationship, Hick finds the aspect of personal relationship insufficiently taken account 
of. This lack of personal address is a failure to take into account the centrality of the 
Incarnation to Christian faith.  
It may be a surprise to hear Augustine’s theology described as impersonal. The 
Confessions, after all, is directly addressed to God, with whom Augustine clearly 
believed he had a personal relationship. Hick claims that Augustine’s metaphysics, 
however, move away from this conception of personal relationship, and toward an 
                                                 
60
 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 193–198. 
195 
 
“impersonal or subpersonal” description of the Creator/creation association.61 For 
example, the act of creation, as Hick finds it in Augustine, is the overflowing plentitude 
of being, and thus goodness, in God, which God diffuses, out of God’s grace, throughout 
creation. Hick objects to this: the purpose of God’s creative act was the formation of a 
creature who is able to have a personal relationship of love with the “infinite divine 
Person.”62 For Hick, a Neoplatonic emanation of being lacks that personal connection; it 
is almost as if personal relationship is entirely incidental to the creative act.  
Hick has a similar objection to the aesthetic view of theodicy. In the aesthetic 
view, “The universe, including the finite personal life within it, is seen as a complex 
picture or symphony or organism whose value resides in its totality, and whose perfection 
is compatible with much suffering and sin in some of the constituent units.”63 From this 
perspective, the glory of God shines through in this wide diversity of creation, of which 
human beings are one part. Hick wants to emphasize, however, that human beings are 
valuable and able to be appreciated as ends in themselves, not because they contribute to 
some overarching goodness of the universe. Human beings are not illustrations of a 
principle; they are individuals created for, and called into, relationship with God. The 
impersonality of the Augustinian view results in Augustinian (and Thomistic) discussions 
of evil being concerned with abstract levels of being and discussions of the whole, and 
not the salvific work of God in Christ and its ethical consequences for human individuals 
and communities. A focus on the personal is Hick’s primary theological principle and the 
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one to which any theodicy must be held responsible: “our positive knowledge of God and 
of His manner of dealing with His creation is derived from the Incarnation. And the 
category that inevitably dominates a theology based upon God’s self-disclosure in Christ 
is the category of the personal.”64  
Hick finds a better method of theodicy in the lesser-known anthropological 
tradition begun by Irenaeus.65 Irenaeus’ proposal rests on a distinction between the image 
of God and the likeness of God, as reflected in Genesis 1:26: “Then God said, ‘Let us 
make humankind in our image, according to our likeness.” Irenaeus thus holds that image 
and likeness are not identical concepts, but both are potentially found in human beings. 
(Hick acknowledges that this distinction is “exegetically dubious.”66) For Irenaeus, the 
“image of God” held by human beings is responsible for the fact that humans have the 
cognitive ability to be in relationship with God and other people or to reject those 
relationships. It is the current existential state of human beings. The “likeness of God,” 
however, refers to a future state, one in which human beings have been perfected by the 
Holy Spirit. A human being can advance toward this state over the course of a life 
through the exercise of free choice. In this view, therefore, a human life is, optimally, an 
ongoing process of spiritual development that ends with participation in the divine 
perfection that is the likeness of God, a finite reflection of the infinite life.67 This is a 
forward-looking theology, in other words, one that points to an eschatological fulfillment, 
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not back to an innocent past that was corrupted, and it remedies many of the Augustinian 
faults that were based on an impersonal view of God. First, the Irenaean view does not 
rely on Neoplatonism for its metaphysics; as Hick puts it, it “is more purely theological in 
character and is not committed to the Platonic or to any other philosophical framework.”68 
Second, the Irenaean view shows how human beings are prized in and of themselves, not 
as contributors to a created totality. Third, the challenging aspects of creation that cause 
suffering are given a purpose that is potentially edifying for all people: movement toward 
God.  
Thus, an Irenaean theodicy identifies both the source and function of evil and 
suffering. Hick writes, “Instead of the doctrine that man was created finitely perfect and 
then incomprehensibly destroyed his own perfection and plunged into sin and misery,” 
and thus is responsible for that evil and suffering, as Augustine holds, “Irenaeus suggests 
that man was created as an imperfect, immature creature who was to undergo moral 
development and growth and finally be brought to the perfection intended for him by his 
Maker.”69 This, therefore, is the function of the suffering that occurs in the world: it helps 
form individuals into the likeness that is their intended final state. The “raw material”70 
that is the human being made in the image of God depends on those things that are 
perceived as evil in order to effect that transformation. 
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Hick describes this as a “‘vale of soul-making’ theodicy,” borrowing the term 
from John Keats.71 The world, as it is experienced, is a “soul-making” world. Its 
difficulties and obstacles provide the opportunities for human beings to develop. This 
answers many of the objections to how the world is structured: if it were any other way, it 
would not accomplish what Hick sees as its necessary function, which has been assigned 
by God. A world without challenges would result in a people without character. In fact, 
physical pain itself is required to provide the impetus for actions of various kinds since, 
without it, “The race would consist of feckless Adams and Eves, harmless and innocent, 
but devoid of positive character and without the dignity of real responsibilities, tasks, and 
achievements…. A soft, unchallenging world would be inhabited by a soft, unchallenged 
race of men.”72 That is not, however, a world in which soul-making occurs, and it is soul-
making for which the world was designed. The question should not be, “Why does the 
world contain so many ills?” Rather, the question is, “Is the world designed in such a 
way, inclusive of its ills, to optimize the potential for soul-making?” When that question 
is asked, Hick shows the many reasons why the answer should be in the affirmative. 
Changing one aspect of the world that would seem to increase pleasure would inevitably 
damage the world’s overall effect and thus would lessen the accomplishment of the 
divine purpose.  
However, there are two objections that Hick recognizes, both of which pertain 
particularly to an evolutionary worldview. First, the positive values of suffering for 
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human beings—the possibility for moral growth, for instance—do not exist for 
nonhuman animals, and thus the problem of animal pain seems to remain outside the 
purview of a soul-making theodicy. Since animal suffering lacks the possibility of 
potential moral edification, some find it “the most baffling aspect of the problem of 
evil.”73 Yet animal suffering is universal and, given the function of natural selection, 
requisite for organic development. For better or worse, this is a different problem for 
Hick than it is for other writers, however. For Hick, the suffering itself is not precisely 
the issue to be dealt with because a preference for pleasure is not the highest value for 
human beings: soul-making is. Hick writes, “The more fruitful question for theodicy is 
not why animals are liable to pain as well as pleasure—for this follows from their nature 
as living creatures—but rather why these lower forms of life should exist at all.”74 Again, 
that is because, for Hick, the purpose of the world, its processes and its structures, is to 
facilitate “soul-making” in human beings to bring them into communion with the divine. 
The purpose of the world is not primarily to provide pleasure. Since evolution by natural 
selection is the way in which the potential for soul-making creatures comes about, that 
process helps the world fulfill its task, and the suffering that is constitutive of it is 
justified. Indeed, that suffering is required in order for the world’s purpose to be 
accomplished. Hick writes, “If, then, the animal kingdom plays its part in this indirect 
way in the forming of man as a child of God in this ‘eighth day of creation’, the process 
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must be justified by its success.”75 Without evolution by natural selection, no soul-making 
would have become possible, and thus “the justification of animal pain is identical with 
the justification of animal existence,”76 that is, the creation of a vale of soul-making. For 
that reason, the individual experiences of animal pain that are the result of the 
evolutionary process are not of primary concern for Hick. As he writes, “The justification 
suggested has not been in terms of specific forms of animal life but in terms of a vast 
complex evolutionary development, with its own inner contingencies, which has 
produced man and which links him with the natural world.”77 The process by which 
animals endure suffering is the process by which they succeed as organisms, which is the 
process that facilitates the development of species, including the human species. 
The second objection Hick addresses is that of “excessive or dysteleological 
suffering,” that is, suffering that seems to serve no function whatsoever, including the 
edifying function of improving a soul. Hick gives two responses to this. First, Hick points 
out that “excessive” is considered relative to other things; particular experiences of 
suffering are thought to be excessive only because they exceed in magnitude the more 
mundane experiences. However, because the scale is relative, there will always be at least 
one experience that can be described as “excessive” simply because it is worse than all 
others. Therefore, he writes, “unless God eliminated all evils whatsoever there would 
always be relatively outstanding ones of which it would be said that He should have 
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secretly prevented them.”78 In a sense, therefore, the theological problem of excessive 
suffering does not differ in principle from the more everyday pains. The alternative to the 
presence of excessive suffering is not a milder version of reality, which would not truly 
eliminate what could be described as “excessive,” but an entirely circumscribed arena for 
moral choice. This, however, would result in a circumscribed ability to have a soul 
formed into the likeness of God. Even if the poles of the scale changed, this would not 
change the existence of “excessive” suffering, since one thing or another will always be 
seen as excessive.  
Nonetheless, Hick acknowledges another complication: the way in which 
otherwise good things can become the sources of such great suffering that they seem to 
destroy the soul altogether, not develop it. He quotes Hume’s Dialogues: “The winds are 
requisite to convey the vapours along the surface of the globe, and to assist men in 
navigation: But how often, rising up to tempests and hurricanes do they become 
pernicious? Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: But 
how often are they defective? how often excessive?”79 The examples could be multiplied 
endlessly. It is here that Hick seems to meet the limits of his justifications. Even granted 
the soul-making functions ingrained in nature’s operations,  
Still the question must be asked: Need the world contain the more extreme and 
crushing evils which it in fact contains? Are not life’s challenges often so severe 
as to be self-defeating when considered as soul-making influences? Man must (let 
us suppose) cultivate the soil so as to win his bread by the sweat of his brow; but 
need there be the gigantic famines, for example in China, from which millions 
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have so miserably perished? … Man must (let us suppose) face harsh bodily 
consequences of over-indulgence; but need there also be such fearful diseases as 
typhoid, polio, cancer, angina?80  
These types of experiences, and other examples he gives, are not in fact educative; they 
are only damaging: “These reach far beyond any constructive function of character 
training. Their effect seems to be sheerly dysteleological and destructive. They can break 
their victim’s spirit and cause him to curse whatever gods there are.”81 The death of a 
child from disease; the incapacitation of a “charming, lively, and intelligent woman” due 
to brain injury; birth defects that will make an individual for the length of his life “an 
object of pity to some and revulsion to others,” of these, Hick writes, “when such things 
happen we can see no gain to the soul, whether of the victim or of others, but on the 
contrary only a ruthlessly destructive process which is utterly inimical to human 
values.”82 Quoting King Lear, he continues, “It seems as though ‘As flies are to wanton 
boys, are we to the gods, They kill us for their sport’.”83 Indeed, it is not only indifference 
to humanity that Hick observes at that moment, but an “implacably malevolent” nature.84  
Hick recognizes the challenge this poses to his Irenaean theodicy. Dysteleological 
suffering reveals that the Irenaean view assumes a certain amount of order in the 
universe, such that decisions that are made that are good will have ultimately edifying 
consequences and poor ones will be harmful. For this position to be the case, there must 
be a somewhat equal spreading out of troubles in order to give everyone the opportunity 
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to accomplish soul-making. This does not seem to be so, however: “The problem consists 
rather in the fact that instead of serving a constructive purpose pain and misery seem to 
be distributed in random and meaningless ways, with the result that suffering is often 
undeserved and often falls upon men in amounts exceeding anything that could be 
rationally intended.”85 If the world has been designed by the creator in order to have as its 
purpose the making of souls, the excessive examples are such that it does not appear that 
they could have been “rationally intended” by the designer.  
In the face of his conundrum, Hick finds his recourse in mystery, in two ways. 
First, after affirming his rejection of traditional theories, such as primordial fall 
narratives, while acknowledging that he does not have an alternative to them, Hick 
concludes, “The only appeal left is to mystery.”86 The dysteleological experiences cannot 
be part of the creation’s intended functioning. The reason why they exist is mysterious. 
However, Hick’s is a strange kind of mystery because it is one that he still positions 
within the soul-making function of the world. He writes, “This is not, however, merely an 
appeal to the negative fact that we cannot discern any rationale of human suffering.”87 
Rather, “It may be that the very mysteriousness of this life is an important aspect of its 
character as a sphere of soul-making.”88 But this is a shallow form of mystery. As Hick 
describes it, it is a mystery that functions positively. However, this would seem to make it 
less mysterious. On the one hand, Hick presents the extreme suffering as an open 
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question for his theodicy. On the other hand, he gives the caveat that it is the very 
openness of the question that is edifying. That it is edifying, however, provides its 
justification, and thus, it is not truly a mystery. Hick’s case, in summary, is this: extreme 
suffering is a mystery; that it is a mystery is edifying; thus extreme suffering is edifying; 
therefore it still fits within the Irenaean model. The mysteriousness of the mystery 
evaporates. 
Hick’s second, and final, appeal is to the eschatological. He writes, 
A vale of soul-making that successfully makes persons of the desired quality may 
perhaps be justified by this result. But if the soul-making purpose fails, there can 
surely be no justification for ‘the heavy and the weary weight of all this 
unintelligible world’. And yet, so far as we can see, the soul-making process does 
in fact fail in our world at least as often as it succeeds. At this point a further, 
eschatological, dimension of Christian belief becomes importantly relevant.89 
There is no doubt that the eschatological weighs upon all aspects of theology, in greater 
or lesser degrees. It is certainly not invalid to invoke eschatology when attempting to 
articulate some other theological topic; indeed, the eschatological implications will be, 
and must be, part of the constructive effort of the present project. However, the present 
constructive effort is an attempt to characterize creation as it presently is. Hick’s own 
work shows, however, that when one stays within the context of this world, the 
justification of all of the world’s sufferings as being part of “a vale of soul-making” is 
lacking. Those episodes sometimes do serve this function to be sure, but, as Hick notes, 
they sometimes fail in that effort, and occasionally quite dramatically. Hick points 
heavenward in order to justify those failures, but, in doing so, he essentially undoes that 
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which makes them failures in the first place. He is careful to say that this is not a case of 
cosmic “book-keeping” such that those who suffer most in the world benefit most in the 
afterlife.90 Nonetheless, he does repeatedly say that those benefits will fully justify 
whatever difficulties were met during the earthly pilgrimage; they will all be revealed to 
have been “worth while.”91 The role of eschatology for a doctrine of creation will be 
further considered in a later chapter of this dissertation. For now, with regards to Hick, it 
must be sufficient to note that the afterlife serves as his final recourse to the problems of 
the “excessive or dysteleological” suffering that is part of the natural functioning of the 
world, including evolution by natural selection. 
There are further difficulties with Hick’s proposal. With regards to Hick’s critique 
of Augustine, for example, Mathewes points out that, while Hick invokes mystery to 
justify his theodicy, Augustinians are able to do so as well, and they with a more 
parsimonious appeal.92 Augustine only references one mystery: that of God’s creation of 
creatures who have the capacity to fall. Hick, however, has to claim more: that every 
negative facet of human existence will eventually be shown to have been for the 
edification of the individual affected, in some way facilitating the ability of that person to 
have a fully developed relationship with God. That particular critique of Augustine, then, 
may fall short.  
Finally, one will note that, since the universe has been structured in such a way as 
to facilitate the teleological development of the human being, Hick’s proposal asserts the 
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primacy of the human species over all others. Unlike writers who would see humans as 
players in the universal drama, alongside all the other players, unique but not privileged, 
Hick describes the universe as being designed as it has been for the benefit of human 
beings in particular, and perhaps exclusively: “In view of [the unique capacities of human 
beings] it seems more probable that God initially willed to create beings who could live 
in relationship with Himself and created a material universe as the appropriate 
environment for them.”93 This is a particularly strong anthropocentrism, presenting 
humanity as the intended end of all of creation, from the beginning of time. Regardless of 
whether or not this is the case, there is an ethical criticism to be made of it, however, and 
one which is prominent in many works by contemporary theologians with ecological 
concerns.94 While this is not the place to adjudicate those particular arguments, Hick’s 
anthropocentrism does influence the reception of his proposal. Though his later religious 
beliefs would change considerably, Hick’s method of philosophical theology became 
widely adopted. In many quarters, especially in the England and America, this style of 
analytic philosophy has been increasingly utilized to address theological issues. Hick 
serves as a bridge figure, therefore, to the next philosopher of religion to be considered in 
this chapter.  
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Richard Swinburne (b. 1934) 
In Richard Swinburne’s primary work on the problem of evil, Providence and the 
Problem of Evil,95 he addresses the fact that the prevalence of suffering has been used as 
an argument against God’s existence; the argument of the book is structured to refute that 
claim. While the matter of God’s existence is not the concern of this dissertation, 
Swinburne’s comments on natural evil in the course of the argument have been 
influential, and in their general outline are indicative of the analytic school of thought in 
Christian philosophy. Further, Swinburne’s argument about God’s design of the world 
implicitly contains consequences for a doctrine of creation. As Swinburne sets up the 
issue, for God to have the set of characteristics x, creation must have the characteristics y. 
Swinburne’s argument is to establish y. 
Therefore, Swinburne sets as his task the construction of a theodicy that 
establishes possible reasons that God might allow negative states of affairs to occur. 
These negative states are states that a believer might otherwise have expected God to 
prevent, assuming certain values that characterize God. Swinburne defines God as, “a 
being who is essentially eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, creator and sustainer of the 
Universe, and perfectly good.”96 This is, he writes, the “general Western 
understanding.”97 If Swinburne can find a possible justification for each situation of 
natural evil, or justifications for the general categories in which they occur, he will 
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consider this “an adequate total theodicy” that shows how the world’s state of affairs is 
consonant with the claims about God’s characteristics.98  
Swinburne’s primary, though not exclusive, tactic in establishing this theodicy is 
to argue for what he terms the “greater-good defense.” In this view, it is for the “greater 
good” that God permits certain negative states of affairs. As described by Swinburne, the 
defense follows this form: 
a) God has the right to allow [the bad state] E to occur. 
b) Allowing E (or a state as bad or worse) to occur is the only morally 
permissible way in which God can bring about a logically necessary 
condition of a good G. 
c) God does everything else logically possible to bring about G. 
d) The expected value of allowing E, given (c), is positive.99 
These greater goods are frequently morally good actions. For example, the free will 
defense is a customary justification for moral evil: God permits moral evil because to 
remove the possibility for moral evil is to remove the capacity of free will. Without free 
will, while humans would not commit moral evils, they also would not be able to commit 
moral goods either. It is better—a greater good—for humans to have the opportunity to 
perform morally good acts than it would be for God to remove free will. In Providence 
and the Problem of Evil, however, Swinburne applies this argument to natural evils as 
well: it is for the greater good that God allows natural evils to occur, and for reasons that 
are not unlike the free will defense of moral evil.  
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Swinburne is committed, for his “adequate total theodicy,” to finding at least the 
possibility of a greater good coming from any state of affairs. For the problems 
associated with the natural evils that affect nonhuman animals specifically, Swinburne 
addresses the difficulty as it was raised in classic form by William Rowe (b. 1931). 
Rowe’s article on this topic in 1971 was a seminal one to which many philosophers of 
religion dealing with natural evils have repeatedly returned. Rowe wrote, 
Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest 
fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for 
several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn’s 
intense suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be any greater good 
such that the prevention of the fawn’s suffering would require either the loss of 
that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse. Nor does there seem 
to be an equally bad or worse evil so connected to the fawn’s suffering that it 
would have had to occur had the fawn’s suffering been prevented…. Since the 
fawn’s intense suffering was preventable and, so far as we can see, pointless, 
doesn’t it appear that … there do exist instances of intense suffering which an 
omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some 
greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse?100 
For Rowe, the dying fawn in the burning forest becomes a symbol of the waste that can 
occur in the natural world in certain cases. In this particular case, there is no benefit that 
could conceivably outweigh the fawn’s agony; nothing profits from the act. It is 
“pointless.” To use Swinburne’s terminology, there is no way that “The expected value of 
allowing E, given (c), is positive.” Rowe starts out making a probabilistic argument, but 
ends with a statement of fact.  
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Swinburne, however, denies Rowe’s claim that the fawn’s suffering and death are 
pointless. Instead, Swinburne focuses on the responses for which natural evil, of 
whatever kind, provide the opportunity. For human beings, for example, the kind of 
events that we associate with natural evil “extends enormously the range of good desires 
which agents have and may cultivate”101 in initiatives designed to provide relief to those 
who are suffering. These laudable and character-forming efforts, which are taken only to 
alleviate the suffering of others, would not have been possible unless suffering was a 
possibility in the world. “If things always went well with someone,” he writes, “there 
would be no scope for anyone’s deep concern.”102 Humans would lack the ability to 
exercise that concern and take actions that reflect compassion, to the diminishment of 
their characters: 
Natural evil provides the opportunity not merely to be heroic, but to make 
ourselves naturally heroic. Without a significant amount of natural evil, we 
simply would not have the opportunity to show patience and sympathy on the 
heroic scale required for us to form heroically good characters. It is a great good 
for us to be able, through free choice over time, to form such characters.103 
Without those opportunities to form character, the world would be a poorer place. 
But what of the fawn? Unlike, for example, Hick, Swinburne does not limit this 
argument to human agents, which have reflective powers and the ability to choose 
courses of action of a higher-order kind. He includes nonhuman animals in the scope of 
this argument as well. Swinburne makes appeals to the possibility of some kind of 
morally good actions in nonhuman animals. He does this on the basis that good actions 
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can be good even when carried out by creatures that lack free choice. “It is good that 
there be animals who show courage in the face of pain,” he writes. “An animal life is of 
so much greater value for the heroism it shows.”104 This potential for heroism in 
nonhuman animals, undertaken in response to natural evils, is the greater good that forms 
part of Swinburne’s theodicy. Examples such as “the courage of a wounded lion, 
continuing to struggle despite its wound, the courage of the deer in escaping from the 
lion, the courage of the deer in decoying the lion to chase her instead of her offspring, the 
mourning of the bird for the lost mate,”105 all improve the overall moral texture of not 
only the individual but even the world as a whole, in a way that exceeds the extent of 
evils themselves. As in humans, the lack of those opportunities for good actions in 
nonhumans results in less-good individuals and thus a less-good world.  
The objection could be made, however, that God could have created ways for 
animals to manifest courage that do not require actual suffering. A lion could struggle 
without being wounded, or at least being fatally wounded, for example; the deer could 
show courage in making efforts to escape without there actually being deer that do not 
escape. Swinburne holds, however, that for both humans and nonhumans, heroism 
requires true threats to respond to, not just the appearances of threats. The stakes have to 
be high, foreseeable based on prior experience, and realizable at least in principle in order 
for the action to have its morally good valence: “Nor can an animal intentionally avoid 
the danger of a forest fire or guide its offspring away from one unless the danger exists 
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objectively. And that cannot be unless some animals get caught in forest fires.”106 The 
virtue of rescue requires for its possibility the risk of a failure to rescue, and that risk 
must sometimes—at least one time—be fulfilled in order to make it anything other than 
an empty threat. “Fawns are bound to get caught in forest fires sometimes,” he writes, “if 
other fawns are to have the opportunity of intentionally avoiding fires, and if deer are to 
have the opportunities of rescuing other fawns from fires.”107 Without the actual existence 
of victims that are not rescued, the other animals cannot recognize the need for rescue: 
“The only morally permissible way in which God could give the opportunity of 
exercising such higher-level virtues as compassion is by actually allowing or making 
others suffer.”108 
This in summary is Swinburne’s greater-good defense of natural evil: the 
potential for the morally good action of rescue is the consequence of natural evil, and that 
opportunity for heroism is the greater good that results from, for example, the interaction 
of forest fires and fawns. While it is conceivable that there could have been a world 
without any of these natural evils, there would be a corresponding lack of some good. 
Instead, the lives of animals are “richer for the complexity and difficulty of the tasks they 
face and the hardships to which they react appropriately. The redness of nature ‘in tooth 
and claw’ is the red badge of courage.”109 In Swinburne’s description, Rowe’s fawn 
becomes, quite against Rowe’s intention, something necessary to the edification of the 
                                                 
106
 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 171. 
107
 Ibid., 172. 
108
 Ibid., 165. 
109
 Ibid., 173. 
213 
 
lives of other creatures, specifically the deer earning the red badge of courage, and thus is 
not pointless at all.  
However, Swinburne makes a stronger case still. This greater good for the world 
is not the only benefit of the existence of natural evil. Rather, he holds that a greater-good 
defense is also applicable within the scope of any particular life. He writes, “God must 
choose to give each of us a life which is objectively in our best interest. There is not, I 
suspect, such a thing as a maximally good life which God could give to anyone: whatever 
life you describe, there could be a better. But it must be overall a good life.”110 The most 
generous interpretation of Swinburne’s statement is an Augustinian one: to exist is better 
than not to exist, and any diminution of the experience of existence nonetheless remains 
an experience of an existing being. Thus, any life itself, regardless of how it is 
experienced, counts as “overall a good life.” A less expansive interpretation, however, 
but one that I think may be closer to Swinburne’s intention, is to read Swinburne as 
saying that any being capable of reflecting on their life, if the reflection is well 
considered, will conclude that it is, or has been, a good life, if only because even a 
seemingly bad life has provided the opportunity to be of service to other creatures111 and 
to God.112 In other words, the opportunities for courage and heroism that are provided by 
natural evils, as described above, necessarily entail that lives are good. Some individuals 
may not recognize that that is the case, but that is usually because they do not value 
sufficiently the good of being of use, and judgments “which do not take that into account 
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are likely to be wildly in error; and that most lives which seem (unless we take that into 
account) to be bad on balance are not really so.”113 Swinburne recognizes that animals 
lacking reflective abilities may not themselves have the capacity to recognize that their 
lives are good for them, if only in being good for others.114 Nonetheless, he implies that 
an objective, outside observer, given sufficient data, could conclude that any particular 
life is overall good, including the fawn in agony in the forest fire. Indeed, God has a 
moral responsibility to ensure that there is more good than bad over the course of the life 
of an individual and must provide a limit to the intensity of suffering, even if the 
alleviation of that suffering requires death.115 
Note that this is close to Paley’s argument, and, like Paley’s argument, more 
aggressive than that of Leibniz. As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is entirely possible within 
Leibniz’s view of this world as “the best of all possible worlds” that the discrete 
experience of any particular creature may be, on balance, not any kind of life that can be 
recognized as “overall a good life.” Swinburne, however, has placed a kind of floor 
underneath the idea of how bad an individual’s experience can be within the scope of his 
schema: it must be, in the aggregate of perspectives, good. This, of course, as seen above, 
is a matter of some judgment. In his argument, Leibniz had taken issue with the fact that 
people, with their limited perspectives, try to make these kinds of judgments at all. These 
critics make grand statements on the qualities of the world as a whole, even as they are 
able to observe only a fraction of it. For Leibniz, human observation is not conclusive 
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evidence about the nature of creation because there is no way for a human being to 
comprehend the whole of the universe and thus to take into account all relevant data. 
Swinburne, however, rejects the notion that appearances can be deceiving to such an 
extent. His Principle of Credulity states that “other things being equal, it is probable and 
so rational to believe that things are as they seem to be (and the stronger the inclination, 
the more rational the belief).”116 This is to set a high bar. Most other writers have held that 
God exists with the specified characteristics in spite of the fact that it may appear 
otherwise. However, Swinburne—like Paley—holds that God exists with the specified 
characteristics as evidenced by appearances, given their rightful interpretation. 
One must note, however, that Swinburne does attach an other-worldly rider to the 
divine contract between creator and creation. Though it does not form a central part of the 
book, Swinburne does briefly acknowledge the possibility that some lives in the course of 
earthly time may, in fact, be in the aggregate negative.117 For these lives, however, God 
can, and would, provide the balancing out after death. If an instance of that kind of life 
reaches its end, “God would be under an obligation to provide life after death for the 
individuals concerned in which they could be compensated for the bad states of this life, 
so that in this life and the next their lives overall would be good.”118 This is not to say that 
any intensity of suffering is justifiable by eschatological redress, since “there are limits to 
the extent to which God ought to allow us to be harmed on Earth even if there is eventual 
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compensation in the world to come.”119 Presumably, it is theoretically possible that there 
may exist a life, the horrors of which cannot be assuaged adequately postmortem. 
Swinburne seems to doubt, however, that this is in practice possible, as he immediately 
notes that benefits often are not recognized for what they are.120 He even quotes Kant 
approvingly when the philosopher says that human beings must be treated as ends in 
themselves and not only in their possibility of service to others; this requirement must 
apply to God too. But Swinburne insists that the Kantian ethic must be understood as 
applying “on balance,” not just in terms of any particular event.121 The eschatological 
aspect is not a part of Swinburne’s argument that he spends much time discussing in 
Providence and the Problem of Evil. This is unfortunate. By expanding the definition of 
what the scope of “life” includes, such that it includes life after death, Swinburne 
essentially provides the final answer to any objections to his argument. He writes about 
the fawn’s experience as providing the “greater good” for the world that justifies the 
natural evil of fawns in forest fires. He and Rowe may disagree about whether such a 
greater good exists or whether it justifies the experience itself. But if Swinburne is going 
to include postmortem life in the scope of his argument, then he is antecedently removing 
the possibility that the fawn is, when taken on balance, a victim.  
Stepping back from details of the arguments, one gets the sense that the difference 
between Swinburne and his opponents may come down to temperament. In the absence 
of the possibility of precise measurements, Rowe, for example, finds it highly unlikely 
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that all experiences of pain are justifiable either as facilitators of a greater good or as a 
prevention of worse evil. Rowe writes:  
It seems quite unlikely that all the instances of intense suffering occurring daily in 
our world are intimately related to the occurrence of a greater good or the 
prevention of evils at least as bad.… In the light of our experience and knowledge 
of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in the world, the idea that 
none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without 
thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an 
extraordinarily absurd idea, quite beyond our belief.122 
Swinburne, on the contrary, does not find it beyond belief at all. In his response to the 
fawn in the forest example, he seeks to show that the proposition is quite reasonable. To 
adjudicate their disagreement would require Rowe and Swinburne to agree on how to 
measure goods and evils in order to tally them up. In the absence of such calculations, the 
disagreement seems to fall back on their overall impressions of the world. Their 
impressions are in conflict, with no obvious way to determine who is right. 
The focus of the present dissertation is on guidelines for a doctrine of creation; the 
focus is not on a doctrine of God, religious epistemology, or the potential warrants for 
religious belief. Instead, I am making the argument that tragedy is an appropriate 
category to use in a doctrine of creation, given present-day knowledge of the natural 
world. Swinburne and Paley would deny that it is so, since they believe that a reflective 
being can reasonably conclude that any existence is overall good. Unlike either 
Swinburne or Rowe, however, my argument does not depend on an imagined estimated 
aggregation of pleasure and pain in order to find the scales tipped in one direction or the 
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other. Positing such an aggregation in either direction is, to my mind, unhelpful, since 
such a calculation will inevitably elide some important component of an experience. 
Instead, a doctrine of creation utilizing tragedy allows for vast amounts of suffering, as 
well as a surfeit of pleasure, to exist side by side, without applying the kind of caveats 
that Swinburne must. 
Christopher Southgate (b. 1953) 
Christopher Southgate is unique in his approach to addressing evolutionary 
suffering. Where Hick leaves the dysteleological aspects of life to the end, Southgate 
addresses them up front in his book The Groaning of Creation.123 He confronts 
straightforwardly the universality of suffering in the natural world, which is not limited to 
humanity but extends to all living creatures. In a way different than the other 
philosophers and theologians written about so far, Southgate recognizes that it is the 
suffering of individual creatures in their particularity that poses such a challenge to 
Christian theology, in the light of which the value of the system overall is subordinate. 
He writes, “This is evolutionary theodicy at its sharpest—not consideration of the overall 
developmental system that evolution has made possible, but of the individual creature 
and its predicament.”124 He takes seriously what it means for such agony to be intrinsic to 
the natural order, and recognizes that it is in those specific situations that the problem 
resides with greatest difficulty: “Rather the crux of the problem is not the overall system 
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and its overall goodness but the Christian’s struggle with the challenge to the goodness 
of God posed by specific cases of innocent suffering.”125 Referencing Ivan Karamazov’s 
famous protest, he continues, “Even if the system as a whole is full of value, even if it 
may be the only way such value could be realized in creation, the suffering of individual 
creatures might lead one to return one’s theological ticket.”126 In the opening chapter of 
The Groaning of Creation, he rejects outright the idea that the suffering of individuals 
could be overlooked in favor of a teleological justification, the line of reasoning that is so 
common in theological writings on evolution and evil. In describing the “core of [his] 
approach to evolutionary theodicy,” he affirms that, “A God of loving relationship could 
never regard any creature as a mere evolutionary expedient.”127 It will not do for one 
creature to die for the people. Southgate accurately recognizes that this “key move” in his 
evolutionary theodicy is one that is quite rare (specifically differentiating his view from 
that of Holmes Rolston).128 He acknowledges being influenced by David Bentley Hart’s 
book, The Doors of the Sea, written in response to the December, 2004 tsunami in the 
Indian Ocean.129 It is particular instances of suffering that cut so close to the Christian’s 
religious responses; when the focus shifts from the process as a whole to the flailing of an 
individual child drowning as the waters rush in, teleological justifications of any kind 
come to seem naïve at best and cruel at worst.  
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It is worth underlining the novelty of Southgate having taken this as his focus. An 
emphasis on the whole, rather than the part, is far more common and traditionally has 
been so. As I showed in the first chapter, Aquinas, for example, affirms that all created 
things fall under divine providence, and that providence directs things to an end that is 
best for the creation taken in the aggregate. Aquinas wrote, 
We therefore say that defects and death are contrary to the individual’s nature. 
But they still fall within the aim of nature as a whole—in so far as deficiency in 
something can lead to the good of something else, or to the good of the universe 
as a whole. For the passing away of one thing is the coming to be of something 
else, and this is a way in which species are preserved. For if he prevented all evil, 
many good things would be lacking in the world. Lions, for instance, would never 
survive if they had no prey on which to feed.130 
It is for the good of the whole that “defects and death” are necessary and providential. 
Southgate’s approach is otherwise. In making “key” to his theology a focus not on 
the system overall but on the particular instances of suffering, he addresses immediately 
and without hesitancy what is most difficult about Darwinism for a Christian theology 
concerned with the problem of suffering in the natural world. Expediency, he writes, is 
not a suitable justification for the kind of suffering that happens in the process of 
evolution by natural selection. However, this admirable conviction, asserted so 
prominently at the commencement of his monograph, does not remain a plumb line for 
the theology in its remainder. In the course of the later pages of The Groaning of 
Creation, he returns to a mitigation, if not a justification, of the suffering of individuals 
by invoking the fact that the values that God sees as positive and edifying have arisen 
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through the process of evolution. While he had denied that it could be so at the beginning 
of his text, it seems that his later conception is that a creature can, in fact, be an 
evolutionary expedient (perhaps just not “a mere evolutionary expedient”131). He even 
goes on to insist that “the scheme I am developing here is a strongly teleological one.”132 
This teleology serves as a kind of global justification for evolutionary suffering in nature. 
It is a more humble justification than that found in many other writers, but it is a global 
justification nonetheless.  
Southgate’s understanding rests upon the idea that evolution is the “only way,” or 
at least the “best way,” that God could create a world of such value.133 He writes, “The 
sort of universe we have, in which complexity emerges in a process governed by 
thermodynamic necessity and Darwinian natural selection, and therefore by death, pain, 
predation, and self-assertion, is the only sort of universe that could give rise to the range, 
beauty, complexity, and diversity of creatures the earth has produced.”134 The “best way” 
argument is that these qualities are God’s goals for creation and evolution is the best way 
for God to accomplish them. For that reason, “The suffering of creatures is instrumental. 
It serves God’s purposes, if those purposes are to realize more and more sophisticated 
and better adapted ways of being in the world,” which he implies that they are.135 A God 
who uses creatures instrumentally, however, is precisely not a God of loving 
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relationship—no matter how good the results. Rather, it is a God that treats creatures as 
means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves. 
As we have seen, to posit that God accomplishes an intended end in this way 
involves God in some very messy business. Knowledge of the genetic mechanism of 
evolution makes the problem all the worse, as it embeds the problem at the deepest level 
of the creature’s physicality. Indeed, as I have hinted at earlier, this genetic mechanism 
embeds it at the deepest physiological level of all sentient creatures, in a way that should 
be theologically troubling. It is worth articulating here in more detail why this is so 
because this is a place where the animal nature of human beings is made particularly 
clear, and the issue of natural evil is revealed to affect both human and nonhuman 
animals in ways that are not dissimilar, but both implicated in the evolutionary process. 
For instance, it may be possible to look upon a pack of lions stalking antelopes with a 
certain amount of detachment, even appreciation, and remark upon God indirectly 
guiding the development of those species through natural selection. We can even identify 
the main process by which this occurs. With contemporary knowledge of genetics, we 
know that it is the process of genetic mutation resulting in new characteristics for the 
organism which are inherited by offspring and enable the evolution of species for greater 
fitness in a specific environment. For example, the slower lions will die out, as will their 
genes, and the genetic material of the faster lions, who carry the new mutation that 
enables their increased speed, will continue. This is unfortunate for the lions without the 
beneficial mutation, of course, who will go hungry, but is for the greater good of lion-
kind. Painful though it may be for the slow lions, genetic mutation leading to 
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evolutionary adaptations is the best process—the “best way” as Southgate says—to bring 
about the grandeur of creation and accomplish God’s purposes.  
While Southgate seeks to keep the focus on nonhuman animals, creatively taking 
up what is less common in the literature, a comparison with an analogous situation in 
humans may be illuminating. For instance, while lion-kind can perhaps be viewed with 
an objective detachment, it would be more difficult for many to look upon a child with a 
genetic disease such as Tay-Sachs and make the same observation. The evolutionary 
mechanism, however, is identical: it is a genetic mutation that over the long course of 
time eventually leads to lighter bones for birds and stronger leg muscles for lions; it is 
also a genetic mutation that, for example, results in lysosomes being unable to process the 
lipid ganglioside in humans. Ganglioside build-up leads to a progressive degeneration of 
the nervous system, which results in children becoming blind, deaf, and unable to 
swallow after six months of age and usually results in death within four years. If God 
uses the evolutionary process instrumentally to serve God’s purpose, then God has 
participated, at least passively, both in the development of the lion’s survival-enhancing 
capacities and the child’s lack of them. There is no teleology that helps the child in his 
distress, or those who love her. The antelope and the child with Tay-Sachs are the 
collateral damage of God’s “instrumental” use of them. If we are truly to focus on the 
individual only, then it is the particular antelope and the particular child with Tay-Sachs 
that must remain the focus of our consideration.  
Like many of the theologians who write in this area, Southgate finds some 
consolation in the face of wasteful suffering, which presumably includes cases of this 
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kind, in an eschatological age free of suffering. However, he also introduces the issue of 
divine suffering to this discussion. Southgate suggests that God, in God’s divine nature, 
undergoes suffering alongside the suffering of every sentient creature, in a gesture of 
solidarity and compassion. Interestingly, the sources of this thought can be traced to the 
Lux Mundi authors and their successors, writing in the wake of Darwinian theory, who 
were the first generation of theologians to reject divine impassibility and begin to do 
theology under the assumption that God suffers, in se, with the suffering of creatures—a 
now-common and widespread theological conviction that has its roots in those early 
Anglicans.136 Southgate writes that in the process of evolution God’s activity is a 
“suffering presence … of the most profoundly attentive and loving sort.”137 This presence 
is efficacious, acting as a consolation for the benefit of the creature, since God’s suffering 
presence is “a solidarity that at some deep level takes away the aloneness of the suffering 
creature’s experience.”138 Setting aside the question as to whether it is coherent to speak 
of a “deep level” of experience in every conceivably sentient creature, the God Southgate 
describes is disingenuous; if the suffering of the creature is instrumental to the fulfillment 
of God’s own purposes, then the suffering creature is due an apology, and perhaps 
gratitude, not a co-suffering presence. Further, even if God’s suffering presence does 
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mitigate the suffering of the creature by giving it companionship, the creature could still 
point out that mitigation is good, but alleviation is better, and prevention is the best 
option of all. (Oddly, Southgate mentions that he draws specifically from Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, more than Jürgen Moltmann, as a theologian who supports the doctrine of 
divine passibility from which he draws,139 though this is not the mainstream view of von 
Balthasar’s opinion on the topic.140) Southgate quotes Paul Fiddes with approval when 
Fiddes writes, “God freely chooses to be open to the hurt that will befall [creatures], with 
its unpredictability.”141 This seems a difficult view to harmonize with knowledge of a 
Darwinian world. If the process of evolution is the “best way” or “only way” for God to 
accomplish God’s purposes and evolution is the form of all natural processes in organic 
life, then the fact that hurts befall creatures is far from unpredictable; in fact, it is possibly 
the most predictable thing in the world. Paley was wrong: misery is not an exception. 
However, the theologian who pressed Southgate to consider the hard cases of 
individual suffering in the first place, David Bentley Hart, does not himself hold to a 
view of divine passibility, contra many of his contemporaries. In fact, Hart has been one 
of the most outspoken writers in favor of the classical notion of divine impassibility, 
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including in The Doors of the Sea.142 Against the idea that God suffers and thus changes 
in response to the suffering of creatures, Hart writes, “If God’s love were in any sense 
shaped by sin, suffering and death, then sin, suffering and death would always be in some 
sense features of who he is … [it means] that evil would be somehow a part of God, and 
that goodness would require evil to be good.”143 The suffering of every creature then 
becomes a necessary part of God’s own life. Suffering is then not only instrumental for 
the development of the world as a whole but also instrumental for the development of 
God as well. (Classical writers, of course, would not find “the development of God” a 
coherent concept.) 
For Hart, the crucial nature of the focus on individual cases militates against a 
role for God, even a passive role, in that suffering. Southgate’s willingness to adopt 
passibility nonetheless becomes another way of moving the focus away from the 
individual, because the focus on the individual militates against the idea of a role for God 
in that suffering. There is a reason that the author who has brought to Southgate’s 
attention the importance of individual suffering also opposes the divine passibility that is 
central to Southgate’s proposal. The issue of divine passibility and impassibility will be 
discussed in the fifth chapter. For now it must be sufficient to point out that the former 
holds such a prominent place in Southgate’s theodicy of evolution that, if it is incorrect, a 
major underpinning of Southgate’s proposal would be in question. 
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It is to his great credit that Southgate recognizes the difficulties in his position, 
and it keeps him from what Hart describes as “the vacuous cant about the ultimate 
meaning or purpose residing in all that misery”144 that is too frequently found in 
evolutionary theodicy. “The suffering of individual organisms, even [if] it promotes the 
flourishing of others, must still remain a challenge for theodicy,” Southgate writes.145 It is 
a challenge that undermines his constructive proposal, however, and the book’s move 
into the implications of evolutionary theodicy for the purposes of environmental ethics 
comes without sufficient conceptual preparation. Ultimately, the challenge itself is 
subsumed by a belief in the necessity of the process of evolution for the realization of 
God’s purposes. 
Conclusion 
My hope is that these five thinkers are representative of theoretical approaches to 
the suffering that is the consequence of evolution by natural selection. A few common 
themes can be seen across the various writers on natural evil. Michael Murray, in a book 
on theism’s relationship to animal pain more generally, gives one such taxonomy, albeit 
writing from an analytic point of view that is concerned primarily with questions of 
God’s existence.146 He describes strategies, such as the denial of animal pain itself (what 
he calls a “neo-Cartesian” view); the idea that animal suffering is the result of the 
Adamic fall; a defense of pain as a protective device, for example, as a warning sign for 
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potential harm; and finally the “nomic regularity” argument. The latter is the view that 
the laws of the universe, which must be stable in order to be predictable, necessarily 
require the possibility of pain for nonhuman animals. 
Philosophers and theologians concerned with the implications of evolution by 
natural selection have utilized some of these categories while also amending or adding to 
them. For each of them, however, there is a justification being made of the evolutionary 
process out of a conviction that the ends justify the means. Evolution by natural selection 
is, as Southgate puts it, the “best way” for God to, for example, develop free creatures 
capable of a relationship with God, develop creatures who can be redeemed by Jesus 
Christ, reveal the glory of God, or reconcile the universe to God through gradual 
progress. It is axiomatic for these thinkers that all evils are, ultimately, for the good. They 
may frustrate God’s purposes in the short term, but in the long term they must be 
permitted in order to allow, or even facilitate, God’s purposes. As I wrote above, 
however, when the focus remains on the individual creature, it becomes all too clear that 
this necessarily involves the use of creatures instrumentally. 
There is another aspect of evolutionary theory that has received recent attention 
from theologians, however, and it is one that was of interest to Darwin himself. Darwin 
struggled to understand the existence of self-sacrificial behavior in nonhuman animals. If 
traits are inherited, as Darwin believed they were, and these traits are transmitted only by 
those that are the more fit and able to reproduce, it seemed confusing to him how self-
sacrifice could be a trait that would survive the crucible of natural selection. More recent 
research, however, indicates that the presence of altruistic behavior in creatures may in 
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fact itself be a trait that is favored by natural selection. In this way, the “struggle for 
existence” that marks most aspects of natural selection may be supplemented by the 
contribution of what many would think of as ethical values, such as altruistic behavior. 
The spontaneous emergence of altruism, even within a non-teleological interpretation of 
evolution, would seem to mitigate, though obviously not eliminate, the concern about 
evolution by natural selection being the engine of organic development, since that same 
process may also result in positive ethical values being engrained in natural processes 
too.  
However, such self-sacrificial behavior is actually of limited use for a philosopher 
or theologian interested in constructing a doctrine of creation that takes into account 
evolution by natural selection and that justifies that process as appropriate for an 
omnipotent, omnibenevolent creator deity. A preliminary notion is to acknowledge, as 
Southgate has done more recently, that in a world of finite resources there are still 
winners and losers.
 147 Cooperation within a group, even if that cooperation is the result of 
natural selection, does not eliminate suffering in the natural world; rather, it merely 
changes the level of the competition. That “altruistic groups beat selfish groups,”148 as 
Wilson and Wilson put it, does not alter the fact that competition for resources exists, nor 
does it alter the inevitable results of that competition: the demise, usually by starvation, 
of the less fit organisms. On the contrary, whether selection is operating at the level of the 
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group, the individual, or both, tragedy is still an appropriate category for a consideration 
of the doctrine of creation, because the process of development remains the same. 
While I differ in some important respects from the thinkers described above, it is 
clear that they are not blind to the difficulties of this issue. Nearly all of them evince a 
sharp sensitivity to the “dysteleological” suffering found in nature; none is callous about 
it. Their efforts are well intentioned and carried out with integrity. Also, it is certainly a 
reasonable strategy to whittle the problem down as far as possible, as several have, in 
order to identify justifications for the issue and then acknowledge that there is still a surd 
element that escapes the justification paradigm. This technique can be seen in, for 
example, Teilhard’s Phenomenon of Man and Hick’s Evil and the God of Love. For both 
of them, the final chapters of their respective books appeal to mystery at the point that 
they acknowledge what cannot be integrated into their system. However, I believe that 
the surd element should be a constituent part of the description of the system as a whole. 
If the worst examples elude the theoretical model, then the theoretical model should be 
reconsidered. The use of a tragic vision, which is purposefully ambiguous, as a way to 
approach this issue theologically enables a truthful representation of the world, and the 
experience of sentient creatures in it.  
However, it is not self-evident that tragedy can be a coherent category for 
Christian theology, regardless of how the category is finessed. Indeed, some theologians 
hold that there is no such thing as tragedy after the Christ event. The defense of tragedy 
as a useful category in Christian theology is therefore the subject of the following 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Theorizing Tragedy 
In spite of its enduring influence, the age of Greek dramatic tragedy—basically 
the fifth century BCE—was a brief one, historically speaking, and shockingly few 
examples of the work have survived: seven plays by Aeschylus, seven by Sophocles, and 
nineteen by Euripides.
 1 Hundreds, perhaps thousands, once existed but are now lost. 
These plays were presented in groups of three at annual festivals dedicated to Dionysius. 
After the three tragedies were performed, they would be followed by a satyr play, which 
was a comic and sometimes obscene postlude. Different playwrights presented at the 
same festival, with an award going to the author of the best set of plays. Beyond this, 
little is known about many of the details of these festivals. The word “tragedy” itself 
seems to come from two Greek words—“goat” and “song”—though the reason even for 
this is obscure. P. E. Easterling writes, “What is lacking is systematic documentation 
from the fifth century itself” to answer the many questions one has about the context in 
which the plays were performed, but “there is no prospect that anything of the kind will 
ever be recovered.”2 
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Plato and Aristotle 
Though extra-textual details of the dramas may be missing, Greek philosophy 
does reveal an early recognition of the power of the tragedians. From the beginning, the 
effect of tragic drama on those who watched it has been recognized as an integral part of 
what tragedy is. It is precisely those effects on the audience that famously led Socrates, in 
book 10 of Plato’s Republic, to banish poets from the ideal city. In the dialogue, Socrates 
asks Glaucon, “And shall we not say that the part of us that leads us to dwell in memory 
on our suffering and impels us to lamentation, and cannot get enough of that sort of thing, 
is the irrational and idle part of us, the associate of cowardice?” (604d).3 Glaucon agrees. 
Thus, Socrates avers, “We should be justified in not admitting [the tragedian] into a well-
ordered state, because he stimulates and fosters this element in the soul, and by 
strengthening it tends to destroy the rational part” (605b). For that reason, “we can admit 
no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the praises of good men” which 
will increase civic virtue (607a). There is a gender component to this critique as well, 
with “lamentation” being associated with characteristics of weak women, who are seen as 
the opposite of the virile, courageous men that Socrates posits as appropriate for the 
idealized city. In the Phaedo, for instance, when the eponymous character reports on his 
last visit to Socrates, he says, “When we went inside [the prison] we found Socrates just 
released from his chains, and Xanthippe—you know her!—sitting by him with the little 
boy on her knee. As soon as Xanthippe saw us she broke out into the sort of remark you 
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would expect from a woman. ‘Oh, Socrates, this is the last time that you and your friends 
will be able to talk together!’” Socrates disapproves: “Socrates looked at Crito. Crito, he 
said, someone had better take her home.” So they do: “Some of Crito’s servants led her 
away crying hysterically” (60a). Tears must be expunged from the city, even from scenes 
of execution. Such is the Platonic depiction of the characteristics and usefulness of tragic 
drama.  
Though the thesis of this dissertation is that the category of tragedy is an 
appropriate and helpful one for describing creation theologically, the definition of tragedy 
itself is disputed, such that invoking it blankly is to leave unaddressed one of the most 
potentially difficult components of this proposal. Aristotle initiated sustained 
philosophical reflection on tragedy as a topic in its own right, and proposed its first 
definition. In his Poetics, he described the structure of tragedy and its effects: “A tragedy, 
then, is the imitation [mimesis] of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, 
complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in 
separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with incidents 
arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions” 
(1449b24-28).4 With the emotions expunged, the audience consequently leaves the 
theater uplifted.  
In Aristotle’s definition, tragic characters were noble characters of high social 
standing, and their nobility was reflected in their language. Character was secondary, 
                                                 
4
 The following translations are found in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: 
Random House, 1941). 
234 
 
however, to Aristotle’s primary interest: the action of the play, its plot, which is “the end 
and purpose of the tragedy,” its “life and soul” (1450a20; 1450b1). The action of the play 
is what reveals the other elements of the tragedy. Characters without a plot are useless. 
Aristotle writes, “Tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life, 
of happiness and misery. All human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end 
for which we live is a certain kind of activity, not a quality. Character gives us qualities, 
but it is in our actions—what we do—that we are happy or the reverse. In a play 
accordingly they do not act in order to portray the Characters; they include the Characters 
for the sake of the action” (1450a15). It is in the action that the tragedy is made manifest. 
The other elements of a successful tragedy are thought (as reflected in the language of the 
characters [1456a35]), diction (the meter of the verse [1456b5-10–1459a10-15]), and 
melody (the songs in the play, “the greatest of the pleasurable accessories” [1450b15]). 
Finally, spectacle, the visual elements of the drama, is the least important aspect of the 
play, and reflects the artistry of the set designer more than that of the playwright 
(1450b15); further, the effect of a tragedy can be realized even in just reading it, not only 
seeing it performed (1453b1; 1462a10). 
What of that famous dyad, “pity and fear”? The emotion of fear was discussed by 
Aristotle in his Rhetoric. There he defined fear as “a pain or disturbance due to a mental 
picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future” (Rhet. 1382a20). This must be a 
danger that is potentially imminent, not one that is a long way off. The prospect of 
painful evil is of course not expected by those utterly confident in their station in life 
(1383a1-5). This may be one reason why it is the nobility that populate tragic drama; they 
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are seen as having the most to lose, and the least expectation of losing it. The effects of 
experiencing fear and pity are described in Aristotle’s discussion of plot: “pity is 
occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of one like ourselves” (Poet. 
1453a1). That is to say, the fear experienced at a performance originates in the 
recognition that the cause of the suffering of the protagonist was the result of 
uncontrollable forces in human life—forces that could just as easily affect the spectator, 
nobility or not. Aristotle writes, “The cause of [the hero’s fall] must lie not in any 
depravity, but in some great error on his part” (1453a15). The error, however, is one that 
is not indicative of a character defect, but simply ignorance. It is not “vice or depravity 
but … some error of judgement,” errors that are the results of natural human limitations 
(1453a5). The fear remains, even if the catastrophe is averted in the end (1453b35); 
several plays have endings that, if not “happy endings,” are at least what has been termed 
“catastrophe survived.”5 These include Iphigenia at Tauris, Helen, Ion, Philoctetes, and 
Orestes. Aristotle nonetheless recommended an “unhappy ending” for a tragedy to be the 
most successful (1453a20). 
The tragic conflict thus compels the audience to face squarely questions that have 
no clear and actionable answers, because they depict a cosmos that is indifferent to 
human effort, with sometimes devastating consequences. The limitation of human free 
will, especially, is thus one of the issues raised: Oedipus is a man who exercised every 
means at his disposal to avoid his predicted destiny, but his agency instead served as the 
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means of his destruction. As Amélie Rorty put it, one of “the dark lessons of tragedy is 
that there are no lessons to be learnt in order to avoid tragedy.”6 This is the case even 
though the world of the dramatic characters—members of a nobility living once upon a 
time in a land far away—was far away from the real world of the audience. But the 
possibility of the audience’s own tragic end, even if on a smaller scale, was held in front 
of them for the period of the performance. Rather than something alien and distant, Hans-
Georg Gadamer wrote, “What is experienced in such an excess of tragic suffering is 
something truly common. The spectator recognizes himself and his own finiteness in the 
face of the power of fate.”7 The high style and formal restrictions of the genre may help 
displace the shock of the tragic, but they do not eliminate it completely. 
Aristotle’s was not the final word on tragedy, of course, and many theorists since 
have proposed definitions to capture the essence of the type. None has achieved 
philosophical consensus. Terry Eagleton writes that, “The truth is that no definition of 
tragedy more elaborate than ‘very sad’ has ever worked.”8 After undertaking research in 
tragic theory, I am inclined to agree with him. Even without a comprehensive formal 
definition of dramatic tragedy, however, there can be benefits to reviewing these efforts, 
since the word “tragedy” has resonances whenever it is used, and these resonances are, in 
part, a reflection of the centuries of scholarly discussion. 
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It is important to note, however, that when moving into reflections on tragedy 
philosophically, one has changed the subject matter under discussion. This is, however, 
my tack in this dissertation: self-consciously borrowing from the dramatic form in order 
to interpret real-world experience. This is not an unusual method of reflection on tragedy. 
In the introduction to an issue of Literature and Theology dedicated to the topic of 
theology and tragedy, for example, Jennifer Geddes writes that “the tragic does not refer 
to the literary genre of tragedy, but rather to a facet of human life that that genre can be 
said to explore.”9 Graham Ward holds to something similar when he says that when 
exploring the concept of tragedy, “we are not simply dealing with an aesthetic category; 
we are dealing with a rupture in all the orders of what we have come to inhabit as 
established.”10 While a common enough practice, it is a philosophical move that should 
be acknowledged as such. One is now dealing not merely with the structure and function 
of tragic drama, but with the study of a kind of analogue between that drama and certain 
events as they are experienced by people unmediated by the stage. In the next two sub-
sections, I will describe the work of the two most influential modern philosophers 
interpreting tragedy, G. W. F. Hegel and Friedrich Nietzsche. 
G. W. F. Hegel 
With Hegel especially, the concept of tragedy becomes a potential descriptive 
term for the world as a whole—indeed, for Hegel, reality as a whole—not only a term 
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relevant for drama. Adrian Poole writes that, “Hegel is the first thinker to produce a fully 
fledged theory of tragedy. He turns tragedy into Tragedy.”11 Hegel’s Aesthetics are based 
on lectures he gave in the 1820s, though there is also writing on Greek tragedy in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807. Many of his examples originate in the world 
of the Greeks, and possess applicability for Hegel’s own time. Specifically, he sees the 
tragic playing out historically in the world of law and ethics.12 Hegel’s conception of 
tragedy assumes an existing ethical order that transcends the individual. That is the 
“ethical substance” (Sittlichkeit), which is the shared ethos of a community. The ethical 
order is absolute and its laws are given, not constructed: “They are, and nothing more,” 
he writes. “It is right because it is what is right.”13 That ethical order is maintained—and 
must be maintained—through the resolution of tragic conflict, and sometimes (though not 
always14) that resolution requires the destruction of the tragic hero in order to maintain 
equilibrium: “Eternal justice is exercised on individuals and their aims in the sense that it 
restores the substance and unity of ethical life with the downfall of the individual who 
has disturbed its peace.”15 
Crucially, Hegel sees the tragedy as the conflict not between right and wrong, but 
between right and right. These two rights come into “collision.” On the one hand, “the 
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collision has its basis in a transgression,” something done wrong; on the other, it is “a 
transgression of absolutely justified interests and powers.”16 For example, Antigone’s 
“transgression” is the result of her upholding the principles of familial piety to the 
exclusion of any other values.17 Familial piety requires her to provide her brother 
Polynices with an honorable burial, which itself requires flouting the authority of Creon, 
who is responsible for maintaining order. As is clear from the Antigone example, the 
guilt incurred by the protagonist is therefore not a moral guilt per se; tragic guilt is a 
result of doing what is right in a structure where rights conflict.18  
The function of the dramatic tragedy for the audience member is to be reconciled 
to these tragic situations, on the stage and in real life, by realizing their necessity and 
value. “Action, reaction, and resolution of [the characters’] struggle” are the constituent 
elements of the dramatic dynamic.19 In the tragic resolution, harmony is restored both to 
the community represented in the tragedy and to the community observing the tragedy. 
Hegel writes thus:  
The tragic complication leads finally to no other result or denouement but this: the 
two sides that are in conflict with one another preserve the justification which 
both have, but what each upholds is one-sided, and this one-sidedness is stripped 
away and the inner, undisturbed harmony returns in the attitude of the chorus 
which clearly assigns equal honour to all the gods. The true development of the 
action consists solely in the cancellation of conflicts as conflicts, in the 
reconciliation of the powers animating action which struggled to destroy one 
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another in their mutual conflict. Only in that case does finality lie not in 
misfortune and suffering but in the satisfaction of the spirit, because only with 
such a conclusion can the necessity of what happens to the individuals appear as 
absolute rationality, and only then can our hearts be morally at peace: shattered by 
the fate of the heroes but reconciled fundamentally.20 
Framed in this way, it becomes clear that for Hegel tragedy is rational, both logically and 
historically. The dialectic unfolding in history of the world-spirit, the Geist, includes 
within it these moments of negativity, but the overcoming of these moments is what leads 
to its further development. In addition, if tragedy is rational, then it is able to be analyzed 
rationally, and its lessons can be used practically to advance social progress—and social 
progress had been a priority of Hegel since his university days.21 Tragedy, then, becomes 
useful in two senses. First, the discord and rupture that results from the opposition of 
rights is a rupture within Geist itself. The healing of that rupture through the tragic 
resolution is therefore restorative for Geist, and facilitates its continuing development. 
Second, the resolution in the realm of the political affirms the unity of the ethical; A. C. 
Bradley refers to the “self-division and intestinal warfare of the ethical substance” that 
occurs in tragic conflict of right with right, and which is healed with the resolution of that 
conflict.22 In Hegel’s architectonic system, these two dimensions are one: history is not 
where Geist occurs; history is Geist itself.23 The reconciliation of tragedy is a 
reconciliation of fundamental reality. 
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By situating tragedy within his universal teleological system, Hegel makes the 
tragic orderly. Eagleton writes, “There is little sense in Hegel of tragic art as piteous and 
harrowing. Indeed, his aesthetic could be seen as much a defence against the tragic as an 
exploration of it.”24 Even if the action-reaction-resolution process is not seamless or 
simple, the result is a net positive; it is the “cancellation of the conflicts as conflicts.” The 
point of the Greek theater was not to leave devastated audience members in its wake, but 
rather to produce citizens reconciled, even satisfied, with the march of historical events, 
which themselves were the manifestation of Spirit in history. For Hegel, tragedy is 
affirmative and productive. 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
The Birth of Tragedy was Nietzsche’s first book, published in 1872, when the 
young classicist was 28 years old. It was written very much under the influence of 
Wagner and his “music-dramas,” soon to be performed at the new Bayreuth Festival, and 
with the desire that a tragic culture would be reborn in the modern age. 
Though Greek tragedy was born in the fifth century BCE, Nietzsche locates the 
social conditions that required it a few hundred years before. Before the age of Homer, he 
writes, the Greeks “knew and felt the terrors and horrors of existence,” but they lacked 
any religious consolation to comfort them.25 It was an unsustainable dynamic. In order to 
avoid lapsing into nihilism, they had to invent gods for themselves, the Homeric heroes 
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who, conjured in the eighth century BCE, provided the Greeks with a stable and orderly 
view of life. Stories of the Homeric heroes are what Nietzsche terms “Apollonian art”: 
that which reflects the nisus of discrete individuality, boundaries, moderation, and ethical 
standards. It also includes an instinct for beauty and is responsible for noble art; hence 
Nietzsche describes Homer himself as “the archetypically Apolline, naïve artist,” and his 
epic poetry presents the Apollonian drive in a particularly transparent way.26 The 
Apollonian drive (Triebe) exists alongside another drive, the Dionysian. These drives are 
immanent in the world, quite apart from any human intervention, somehow ingrained in 
nature itself.27 
Dionysian art is of a different sort than the Apollonian. Using Archilochus as his 
example, Nietzsche writes that the Greek lyric poet “frankly terrifies us with his cries of 
hatred and scorn, with the drunken outbursts of his desire.”28 The contrast could not be 
more stark: “Both the sculptor and his relative, the epic poet [i.e., the Apollonian artists], 
are lost in the pure contemplation of images. The Dionysiac musician, with no image at 
all, is nothing but primal pain and the primal echo of it.”29 The Dionysian is the opposite 
of the boundary-keeping Apollonian. The Dionysian exists instead in the realm of anti-
differentiation, the overcoming of individuality, and the restoration of the original 
monistic unity of all things. This can be expressed as universal brotherhood. In the 
Dionysian frenzy, the lines that demarcate person from person are erased, and suddenly 
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the slave is a freeman, now all the rigid, hostile barriers which necessity, caprice, 
or ‘imprudent fashion’ have established between human beings, break asunder. 
Now, hearing this gospel of universal harmony, each person feels himself to be 
not simply united, reconciled or merged with his neighbor, but quite literally one 
with him, as if the veil of maya had been torn apart, so that mere shreds of it 
flutter before the mysterious primordial unity.30 
The result is a kind of transfigured ecstasy. This state is manifested in music in particular, 
devoid of images, with its “seductive, magical melodies” resonating with the vibrations 
of the irrepressible Dionysian drive: “Excess revealed itself as the truth; contradiction, 
bliss born of pain, spoke of itself from out of the heart of nature.”31 To the human 
participant is revealed that excess which is an elemental non-differentiation, “the highest, 
most blissful satisfaction of the primordial unity” which the participant experiences 
“amidst shivers of intoxication.”32 This is experienced as rapturous song. In Greek culture 
the Apollonian and Dionysian drives existed “side by side, mostly in open conflict” until 
that day when “by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic ‘Will’ they appear paired” in 
what we call Attic tragic drama.33 Tragedy is art that is “Dionysiac and Apolline in equal 
measure,” able to hold in tension these two opposing drives.34  
By eliciting tragic joy, the interaction of Apollonian and Dionysian in Greek 
tragedy combats the existential crisis and despair that is part of the human condition. This 
is only possible, however, because of the displacement that is able to occur when this 
interaction happens on the stage. The stage forms a kind of shroud that protects the 
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audience from unmediated contact with the reality of life. The Apollonian form provides 
the “healing balm of a blissful deception” suggesting that what is happening on the stage 
is occurring only at the level of a single mythical individual.35 This is for the best: to 
participate directly in the Dionysian is to court madness, even destruction. The 
Apollonian deception relieves the participant of “the pressing, excessive burden of the 
Dionysiac.”36 However, the genius of Attic tragedy, which was both spoken and sung, is 
to have the Apollonian deception revealed as deception by the Dionysian element of 
music, which escapes the Apollonian grasp. The drama itself is then raised to its tragic 
heights, as the audience glimpses the power of the Dionysian within the form of Apollo: 
“Dionysos speaks the language of Apollo, but finally it is Apollo who speaks that of 
Dionysos. At which point the supreme goal of tragedy, and indeed of all art, is 
attained.”37  
For Nietzsche, the world is able to be affirmed through this tragic joy, not because 
it is an inherently joyful place, but out of the recognition that the primordial unity carries 
on with a superabundance of life force, regardless of the contingencies of individual 
human lives. The tragic hero is annihilated, but his destruction enables further creation, 
and in his annihilation he is restored to the primordial being itself. In a sense, the 
spectators watching him are restored too, as they realize that “Despite fear and pity, we 
are happily alive, not as individuals, but as the one living being, with whose procreative 
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lust we have become one.”38 That participation transcends Aristotle’s fear and pity, 
because it is revealed that there is nothing to fear and nothing to pity. The world is the 
working out of Will, which will carry on with exuberance and fertility regardless of the 
fates of individual lives. The recognition of that fact is what produces tragic joy in the 
spectator. 
Nietzsche raises two points that are of particular importance to this project. The 
first is the role of affirmation of the world. In their writings on tragedy, both Hegel and 
Nietzsche are intervening in discussions of philosophical theodicy, among other topics. 
Nietzsche feels urgently that a post-Christian theodicy is required, one that does not posit 
the existence of a moral God. The Greeks did not know such a deity, and they affirmed 
life. One of the ways (according to Nietzsche) that they could affirm the world was to 
find joy in its destructive energies. There is a particular kind of joy that comes from being 
able to observe the cycle of creation and destruction with detachment.  
Nietzsche may not, however, be entirely convincing on this point. To valorize 
suffering itself as a creative act and to laud the annihilation of the tragic hero, not only on 
stage, but in life, is to remain at a safe remove from the actual experience of suffering. 
The effect of intense pain, for example, is “the unmaking of the world” for an individual, 
wherein reflection is impossible.39 Truly to find joy in annihilation is only a possibility 
when one is finding joy in the annihilation of another, not of oneself; when the 
experience of physical suffering is personal and intense, joy is impossible because 
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reflection is impossible, because language itself is impossible. This kind of experience is 
not intrinsically edifying, though Nietzsche claims the contrary: “Only great pain is the 
liberator of the spirit,” he writes. Even if “life itself [becomes] a problem,” nonetheless, 
through pain “we know a new happiness.”40 To have suffered experiences of pain is not to 
make impossible any potential future experiences of joy, nor is it the case that 
experiences of pain somehow cannot be “liberators of the spirit” or instruments of soul-
making. However, to claim that those benefits are intrinsic to the experience itself is not 
supported by consideration of the subject. 
The second issue is that of particularity. In Nietzsche’s system, particularity has 
no real role; in a monistic view of the primordial unity, there are no individuals as such. 
In his own way, Hegel highlights difference, even though he privileges the unity of Geist, 
but Nietzsche seems to deny fundamental difference. In fact, for Nietzsche, individuation 
is the source of the pain of existence, and individuation must be overcome in the 
collective Dionysian rebirth. For Nietzsche to renounce particularity in a discussion of 
tragedy, however, is to avoid the scandal of tragedy: that it happens to specific people at 
specific times in specific ways. Pain (for instance) happens to individuals, and one of its 
effects is to isolate individuals. Tragic drama may be a collective recognition, but it is a 
collective recognition of individual destruction.  
I have discussed only these three theorists—Aristotle, Hegel, and Nietzsche—
because they continue to exercise considerable influence over even the most 
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contemporary theorizing about tragedy. To hold that tragedy can be a theological 
category within the Christian tradition or any other, it is necessary to place one’s own 
proposal relative to these three. Aristotle’s discussion of tragic poetics is the classical 
definition, but need not be normative. Nonetheless, he sets the terms of the debate. A 
serious question can be made as to whether Hegel’s is a Christian teleology. Indeed, 
whether Hegel’s philosophy overall is a Christian one is a matter of some contention.41 
Nonetheless, Hegel remains a touchstone for theological discussions of tragedy. 
However, in its being teleological and making tragedy affirmative, his philosophy also 
removes some of the sting of tragedy. Nietzsche, in his own way, also mitigates the 
scandal of tragedy by discounting the role of individual suffering and attempting to find 
affirmation in the suffering itself—to affirm the world not in spite of, but because of, 
tragic experiences. 
These proposals help locate my own. But a secondary lesson learned from reading 
these theorists on tragedy, and the many others who have been inspired by them (of 
whom there have been countless), is the extent of the freedom of possibilities for 
theorizing tragedy. The final chapter will contain my constructive proposal for this 
subject, but the license to do so can be found here, in the fact that while Aristotle may 
have been the first to study tragedy philosophically, and Hegel and Nietzsche the most 
influential modern thinkers, defining tragedy in a particular way in order to develop a 
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particular idea—in this case a realist doctrine of creation—is an ongoing project within 
Western philosophical inquiry. 
However, the very fluidity of these definitions, and the ambiguous nature of the 
tragic itself, means that those who engage in this exercise must do so modestly. That is, 
as I define tragedy in a particular way in order to show how it can be a descriptive tool 
for considering creation theologically, I do not therefore mean to exclude from the tragic 
altogether any elements that do not fit the theory I am attempting to expound. Nor would 
I want to stifle further work in tragic theory that does not hew to my definition. Far from 
it: study in this area clearly benefits from a pluralism of perspectives. Nonetheless, as I 
move forward in articulating the conception of the tragic that is descriptive of creation 
theologically considered, I will do so picking and choosing, as it were, the elements of 
the tragic that I intend to include.  
Theology and Tragedy 
If Hegel and his intellectual heritage are not to be preferred, however, the 
question remains to be answered as to whether tragedy can be Christian in a way that 
does not smooth off the rough edges implicit in tragic drama. It is worth noting that it is 
not only religious views of one kind or another that have the tendency to locate an 
affirmative telos in tragedy. Consider what is said in Hegel’s defense, for example, by 
philosopher Julian Young: 
Hegel’s fundamental claim is that great tragedy is a ‘learning experience’.… By 
contrast, one might find an element of futility, tedium even, in the idea of writing 
tragedy after tragedy that amounts to nothing more than a cry of protest to the 
probably non-existent deity against the fragility of human goodness. Hegelian 
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tragedy has an at least potential significance in the economy of human life as a 
whole which it is hard to attribute to fateful tragedy.42  
As this quotation shows, it is not only the religious who have a desire to find comfort, 
rather than shock, in tragedy. Nietzsche identified a peculiar comfort from his point of 
view—knowledge that one’s life is of no importance in relation to the primordial unity 
that is the real being—and Hegel identified another for his. One can see in Young’s 
quotation a desire for tragedy to have utility as well, from a non-theistic point of view.  
Christianity in particular, however, has been seen to make tragedy impossible for 
two reasons: the eschatological horizon of the faith, on the one hand, and the secularism 
that developed out of Christianity in the early modern period, on the other hand. Still it 
must be recognized that an eschatological understanding will have some effect on a 
Christian understanding of the nature of creaturely existence; there must of necessity then 
be some differentiation between a view that includes eschatology and one that does not. 
This is true even when the primary focus remains on the immanent, as it does in a 
doctrine of creation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the topics in Christian 
systematic theology are intertwined in a way that makes conclusions about any particular 
theme consequential for other themes. This is not to imply that any of these terms or 
concepts are uncontested. On the contrary, argument over what exactly the eschatological 
horizon is, or even if there is one at all, has been a feature of Christian theology since its 
initiation. Nonetheless, there are some general ideas that have emerged in the classical 
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tradition as normative and these are what any proposal must act in relation to in order to 
have convincing power in the wider theological community. 
Some of these eschatological understandings do have an influence on the 
immanent and the literary critic I. A. Richards put the consequent criticism in classical 
form: “The least touch of any theology which has a compensating heaven to offer the 
tragic hero is fatal.”43 In this view, any potentially positive eschatology is antithetical to 
tragedy. So it is with Richard Sewall as well: “In point of doctrine, Christianity reverses 
the tragic view and makes tragedy impossible.”44 Gadamer writes that “the idea of 
Christian tragedy presents a special problem, since in the light of divine salvation the 
values of happiness and haplessness that constitute tragic action no longer determine 
human destiny.”45 In my own critique of Hick and Swinburne above, I made a point not 
wholly unlike that of Richards: to posit that victims of suffering will receive adequate 
compensation for their suffering in the great hereafter is to run the very great risk of 
minimizing their present-day experiences.  
The second objection has been articulated by George Steiner. For Steiner, 
contemporary tragedy is impossible in part because of the religious demythologization 
that started not long after Shakespeare wrote his famous plays. It is the Enlightenment, in 
this view, that is the real culprit. Steiner writes, “The triumph of rationalism and secular 
metaphysics marks the point of no return. Shakespeare is closer to Sophocles than he is to 
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Pope and Voltaire.”46 Further, Steiner identifies the antagonists here as some of the 
writers reviewed in chapter one, as they set out to systematically dismantle the argument 
from design: “Oedipus and Lear instruct us how little of the world belongs to man.… But 
at the touch of Hume and Voltaire the noble and hideous visitations which had haunted 
the mind since Agamemnon’s blood cried out for vengeance, disappeared altogether or 
took tawdry refuge among the gaslights of melodrama.”47 In the modern mindset, the 
world can at least theoretically be brought under human control. Outcomes are a matter 
of will, not providence. This is the opposite of the experience of Oedipus, for example, 
who learns the impossibility of mastering destiny at the cost of his own destruction.  
The continuing relevance of Steiner’s criticism can be seen in the fact that the 
heritage of philosophical and theological considerations of tragedy, even in the manner 
characterized by Hegel and Nietzsche, waned in importance in the nineteenth-century. 
This was for a number of reasons. In part it was due to the rise of scientific positivism, as 
mentioned in the first chapter of this dissertation. In the twentieth-century, the rise of 
analytic philosophy, especially in the Anglo-American context, also kept the questions 
raised by tragedy a minority concern, nor was tragedy part of the mainstream 
conversation in Continental philosophy. There have nonetheless been a few philosophers 
and theologians, from the mid-twentieth-century on, however, who have utilized tragedy 
philosophically, and the balance of this chapter will examine the work of three of them: 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Donald MacKinnon, and Rowan Williams. Rather than making 
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the case for tragedy as a possibility for Christian theology directly, I will spend the 
remainder of this chapter showing what it looks like as instantiated by these three 
representative thinkers. 
Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905–1988) 
With the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar, we see the beginning of contemporary 
considerations of tragedy from a Christian theological point of view. These approaches 
seek to draw out the resources of tragedy in a reading of Christian scripture and tradition. 
Though Hegel had held that Jesus Christ was the exclusive incarnation of God, and he 
made the Trinity profoundly important in his metaphysical system, he self-identified as a 
philosopher, not a theologian; in an 1830 lecture on the anniversary of the Augsburg 
Confession, he said that he was humbly submitting his thoughts simply as a layman, and 
specifically not as a theologian.48 Many modern scholars agree: Cyril O’Regan refers to 
Hegel’s philosophical theology as “a profound act of misremembering” the Christian 
tradition.49 Nietzsche’s position on Christian theology is well-known. Against both of 
these, Balthasar’s discussions of tragedy are explicitly Christological and he, at least, 
considered them orthodox. This is typified by his theology of Holy Saturday, that liminal 
day between Good Friday and Easter, in which, as the Apostles’ Creed puts it, Christ 
“descended into hell,” descendit ad infernos.  
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It may be necessary to note at the start that nearly all of the theologians writing on 
the topic of the descent recognize that seeking to describe what happens between the 
crucifixion of Jesus and his resurrection is speculative to the extreme. Mark McIntosh 
points out that Balthasar is hesitant even to use the term “descent” in order to avoid 
becoming mired in mythology.50 Balthasar wrote that, following the crucifixion, “then 
comes a sharp break, a drop: ‘He descended into hell.’ He arrives in the realm where time 
and space are nonexistent.”51  
Nonetheless, what is said to have happened during this “time” after Jesus’ death 
becomes of crucial importance to Balthasar’s theology. Aidan Nichols refers to the 
descendit as Balthasar’s “principal interest,” which forms the center of his Christology. 
Nichols writes that “Balthasar sees the One who was raised at Easter as not primarily the 
Crucified, but rather the One who for us went down into Hell.”52 This primacy of Holy 
Saturday for Balthasar is echoed by nearly all Balthasar scholars, including those who are 
critical of his position.53 
Balthasar’s reading of the descent into hell was not in the mainstream of the 
tradition at the time of his writing, even if the idea of Christ suffering in hell was not 
unknown. Balthasar’s position would even be tentatively endorsed by, for example, 
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Joseph Ratzinger. In Ratzinger’s book Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, first 
published in German in 1977, the future pope wrote, “The true Boddhisattva, Christ, 
descends into Hell and suffers it in all its emptiness.”54 However, it is important to 
recognize the extent of Balthasar’s divergence from the customary reading of the creedal 
formula and the Scripture on which it is most closely based. An explicit reference to Holy 
Saturday is found in 1 Peter 3:18-22: 
For Christ also suffered for sins once for all, the righteous for the unrighteous, in 
order to bring you to God. He was put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the 
spirit, in which also he went and made a proclamation to the spirits in prison, who 
in former times did not obey, when God waited patiently in the days of Noah, 
during the building of the ark, in which a few, that is, eight persons, were saved 
through water. And baptism, which this prefigured, now saves you—not as a 
removal of dirt from the body, but as an appeal to God for a good conscience, 
through the resurrection of Jesus Christ, who has gone into heaven and is at the 
right hand of God, with angels, authorities, and powers made subject to him. 
The customary interpretation of this passage is that Christ’s time in hell was a time of 
intense and glorious activity, preaching the gospel “to the spirits in prison.” In more 
colorful Christus victor narratives, Jesus descended into hell with a sword, slew the devil, 
ending the devil’s reign, and unlocked the chains that had kept the dead in bondage. It 
was a Christ who was victorious after his crucifixion, in other words, who descended into 
hell, bringing hope to the land of the dead and light to the darkness, which did not 
overcome it. This is the heroic model of Christ’s descent.  
Balthasar’s description of the descent is quite different. Since the descent of 
Christ is so central to Balthasar’s theology overall, discussions of it are found in many 
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places throughout his voluminous writings, but particularly in the monograph that is 
focused on the great three days of Good Friday, Holy Saturday, and Easter, Mysterium 
Paschale. Balthasar’s description of the descended Christ is also of a Christus victor, but 
it is a “victory” more in the sense that Good Friday is a victory than in the sense that 
Easter is a victory. Pitstick, in her monograph critiquing Balthasar’s descent doctrine 
from the perspective of traditional Roman Catholic theology, finds that while Balthasar 
would be able to affirm that Christ’s descent was glorious, as the traditional doctrine 
teaches, “his reinterpretation turns largely on what is implied by glory.”55 One might 
summarize the difference between Balthasar’s view and the traditional view by saying 
that, for Balthasar, the descent into hell is an event that is continuous with the crucifixion, 
while in the traditional view the descent is continuous with the resurrection. In the latter 
case, the triumph of Easter began immediately upon Jesus’ giving up the ghost, and the 
appearance to the apostles on Sunday was a delayed revealing of what had truly been 
fully, and finally, accomplished on Friday. In the former case, however, it is the descent 
into hell that is the final end of Jesus’ death. In this view, hell is the point to which he had 
been heading from the time that his face was turned toward Jerusalem; from the very 
moment of his incarnation, Jesus’ final destination was not Golgotha, but hell. In this 
view, the descent was “the term and aim” of the incarnation itself.56 “Indeed,” Balthasar 
writes, “it is for this sake of this day [Holy Saturday] that the Son became man.”57  
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A critical issue in adjudicating this difference in opinion is the question as to 
whether Jesus was truly dead—dead in the final way that human beings experience 
mortal death—in the time between Good Friday and Easter. Balthasar resolutely affirms 
that he was, and marshals a great deal of evidence from both Scripture and the catholic 
tradition to support this view. The crux of the importance of this issue is for Balthasar 
fairly simple: if there was no real death, then there was no real resurrection. In order for 
the resurrection to have its shocking power, the death that it overcomes must be genuine 
and complete. The Holy Saturday narrative is an important part of this: discussing 
Balthasar’s view of why Holy Saturday, not only Good Friday, is an important part of the 
Son’s mission, Jacob Friesenhahn writes, “On Good Friday the Incarnate Son dies; on 
Holy Saturday the Incarnate Son is dead.”58 
Certainly, it must be as genuine and complete as any other human death has been. 
Further, for Balthasar the question of Jesus’ mortal state in hell is a question of whether 
or not God the Son took on the fullest extent of humanity in the incarnation; the 
alternative, Balthasar would say, is Docetism, in which Jesus only appeared to be human. 
Only in experiencing the consequences of mortality can it be claimed that Jesus was truly 
in solidarity with human beings. “In the same way that, upon earth, he was in solidarity 
with the living,” Balthasar writes, “so, in the tomb, he is in solidarity with the dead.”59 
And if Jesus is in full solidarity to the end, to the point of entering into death, only then 
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can it be said that he has completely taken on the experience of human life. Thus, 
Balthasar finds it theologically imperative that in the non-temporal “time” between Good 
Friday and Easter, Jesus was truly dead, with all of the passivity and alienation that 
implies.  
This solidarity, however, is not only the solidarity of a created nature kept 
separate from sin. Balthasar’s position includes the assumption that Jesus, the Word made 
flesh, truly took upon himself the sins of the whole world (1 John 2:2). Having died on 
the cross, he then suffered the damnation proper to the sinful; Balthasar writes that Jesus 
was “dead with the death of those who are accursed.”60 In addition to being neither a faux 
death nor a temporary slumber, therefore, Jesus’ death is followed by the descent into the 
hell of the damned, as one of the damned. Having taken on their sins, he suffers their 
punishment, which is alienation from the Father. Balthasar quotes Nicholas of Cusa: 
“Christ’s suffering, the greatest one could conceive, was like that of the damned who 
cannot be damned any more. That is, his suffering went to the length of infernal 
punishment.”61 It is a state of separation that would be unexpected from the intimate 
terms in which Jesus had spoken of the Father during his ministry, but which was 
foreshadowed by the cry of dereliction from the cross, “My God, my God, why have you 
forsaken me?” (Matthew 27:46; Mark 15:34). A suffering death is not only the province 
of the guilty, after all; Jesus’ judicial conviction by Pontius Pilate, and its consequent 
punishment, co-existed with a sinless life—indeed, it may be the inevitable consequence 
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of a sinless life in a sinful world. Christ’s post-mortem suffering, however, is the result of 
his assumption of sin: “The necessity whereby Christ had to go down to Hades lies not in 
some insufficiency of the suffering endured on the Cross but in the fact that Christ has 
assumed all the defectus of sinners.”62 Balthasar describes this post-mortem dereliction in 
the expressive Heart of the World, imaginatively narrating Christ’s experience: 
“Father,” you cry out, “if it is possible…” But now it is not even possible. Every 
fragment and shred of possibility has disappeared. You cry into the void; 
“Father!” And the echo resounds. The Father has heard nothing. You have sunk 
too low into the depths: how are those up in heaven still to hear you? “Father, I 
am your Son, your beloved Son, born from you before time began!” But the 
Father no longer knows you.63 
To suffer one ought to know how to love. But you no longer love: your love, 
which once pealed solemnly like a massive bell, now clatters as pitiably as a rattle 
on Good Friday. It would be too easy to suffer if one could still love. Love has 
been taken from you. The only thing you still feel is the burning void, the hollow 
which it has left behind.64 
In this way, the incarnate God enters into the fullest possible manifestation of human 
estrangement from God, which is the ultimate degradation of human life. It is an event of 
cosmic proportions. With Jesus’ estrangement comes the estrangement of all human 
beings. If the Son is the way to the Father, the descent of the Son into the depths of hell, 
alienated from the Father, means that the opportunity for a relationship between 
humanity—indeed all of creation—and the Father has been lost. Therefore Holy Saturday 
                                                 
62
 Ibid., 164. 
63
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Heart of the World, trans. Erasmo Leiva (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1979), 
109–110. 
64
 Ibid., 115. 
259 
 
is the day “when the Son is dead, and the Father, accordingly inaccessible.”65 The sky 
goes dark; the world falls silent. 
In Rowan Williams’ discussion of Balthasar’s doctrine of the Trinity, Williams 
addresses the soteriological significance of the descent. It is not obvious, after all, that the 
desolation of Christ in hell has any significance beyond itself. And, indeed, it would not 
if not for the fact that the Son is the Son of the Father, with the concomitant “non-
identical identity” that much Trinitarian theology maintains. This is, after all, what makes 
the desolation so piercing. Thus Balthasar’s contribution to soteriology through his 
writing about the descent is that, when examined in light of the doctrine of the Trinity, it 
“enables us to reconcile the traditional theme of substitution, Christ suffering in our 
place: to be anywhere where the awareness of the Father is absent, he can stand in the 
place of the lost and condemned, and by standing there constitute it as the place of God’s 
habitation.”66 That it is a “place of God’s habitation” could be to frame this act as another 
Christus victor account, in which the experience being described is only faux suffering. 
This is something that Balthasar is intent to deny, for both the descent and the 
resurrection, in the fourth volume of the Theo-drama. Balthasar writes, “the fact that 
[Christ’s] (now eucharistic) body has passed to a state of eternal life beyond all death 
(Rom 6:9) does not remove him from the drama of his passage through the world of sin. 
His wounds are not mere reminders of some past experience.”67 Thus, in Balthasar’s 
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description, “there remains the acknowledgment that what is taken up in the saving 
account of Christ is real historical dereliction, unconsoled and unmeaningful failure or 
suffering.”68 
This is, again, the dialectic (the “nearly impossible” dialectic) that is critical to 
Balthasar’s proposal but which depends on the combination of continuity and 
discontinuity that he claims between death and resurrection. As Geoffrey Wainwright 
puts it, for Balthasar death remains “the hiatus, the caesura, beyond which it is not given 
us to see.”69 Because the knowledge of resurrection remains beyond any human grasp, its 
attainment remains a hope, not a guarantee. The way that the hoped-for resurrection 
could function as redemptive, without annihilating the “real historical dereliction,” 
remains a mystery, however unsatisfying such ignorance may be. If this principle of 
Balthasar’s is found intellectually wanting, then Balthasar’s proposal does not succeed. 
Baltahasar’s descendit theology is not a theodicy. There is not a defense of God 
offered, nor are calculations made as to whether the sum total of pleasures exceeds the 
sum total of pains in the world. It is, however, an accounting of a specific tragedy that is 
relevant to other contexts as well, and considered in a theological vein. For Balthasar, the 
descent into hell is an implicit recognition of the seriousness of all human experiences of 
tragedy in their own particularities, from the perspective of a particular faith tradition. 
Balthasar makes the point that the concept of tragedy itself requires a kind of faith, since 
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the recognition of some event or situation as tragic requires the belief that it should be 
another way. He writes that 
the encounter of these two words, ‘tragedy’ and ‘faith’, is deeply significant, for 
that which is broken to pieces in the tragic presupposes a faith in the unbroken 
totality. If, however, the state of brokenness is a fact of our experience, something 
we know, then the totality that is shattering into fragments (or has already been 
shattered) can be only the object of a faith, perhaps a faith that flies in the face of 
all reason.70 
Hegel and Nietzsche alike had that faith: for Nietzsche it was the “primordial unity”; for 
Hegel, Geist. Balthasar makes the case that the ancient Greeks had that faith too, which is 
why the original tragedies were religious performances, as well as political assemblies. 
One of the things that the Greeks were seeking to accomplish was to “bring into the open 
the fate of man in the dark light of the gods.”71 This was done in a way that did not 
attempt to find an easy consolation for the existential situation, but neither did it remain 
exclusively in the realm of immanence. The gods played many different roles in the 
dramas, and sometimes that role was absence from the scene, though obviously not 
absent from the religious or artistic imagination. Balthasar shows that this dynamic is not 
unknown in Christian community’s liturgical life either: in Attic drama “man is held up 
into the light and into the darkness of the gods in the same way as the Flesh and Blood of 
Christ are held up at the Consecration, so that all those who stand around (the 
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circumstantes) may see it and so that the divine Father himself may turn his eye to it.”72 
In the moment of Eucharistic consecration, like that of dramatic katharsis, a glimpse of 
the whole is seen, and affirmed. The Christian community follows the “incomprehensible 
power of the Greek heart” which “says Yes to this existence both in the light and in the 
darkness of the Absolute: a pacified Yes that has collected with care all the reasons to say 
No, in order despite everything to transcend these reasons.”73 In the descent narrative, the 
dead Christ, accountable to the Father for the sin of the world, enters into this divine 
darkness, not in order to overcome it, but in order to share it with all of the afflicted 
creation. He affirms his vocation of being a resident of that place where all hope is lost. 
Paradoxically, that is the place—indeed, it can be the only place—in which reconciliation 
with the divine is found. Within the heart of the contradiction itself, and nowhere else, 
comes “the very last synthesis, which can be brought about by God alone. For the Greek, 
this was perhaps a Deus ex machina theatri, for the Christian, it is a Deus vivus ex 
mortuis.”74  
The trouble, as Balthasar recognizes, is that this dialectic—that hope is only found where 
all hope is lost; salvation is only possible when salvation is impossible—is difficult to 
hold together at a single moment. For one thing, the description of a contradictory 
religious truth in the form of a dramatic narrative is risky: “The danger is very real that 
we, as spectators of a drama beyond our powers of comprehension, will simply wait until 
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the scene changes.”75 This is the risk of a conception of Christ’s journey to hell as a brief, 
if unpleasant, intermission. It is an understandable evasion, but unfortunate. There is also 
the tendency to see the three states (death, descent, resurrection) as equivalent events. 
Balthasar writes, “The infinite difficulty is that the believer can scarcely take in at a 
single glance what is de facto played out here: viz., that it is truly a tragedy that ends in 
the uttermost darkness and that this end leads incomprehensibly into the Resurrection, 
which is not in any way a fifth act with a happy ending added on but stands in an utterly 
incommensurable relationship to the conclusion of the tragedy.”76 Both of these facts 
exist at the same time, without one evacuating the importance of the other. This is, after 
all, what makes it tragic, in the dramatic sense: it is not the resignation of despair, nor an 
expression of facile optimism, but a grappling with the contradictions of existence in a 
way that does not elide any of its various facets, while still affirming that existence itself. 
These facets, of course, include both immense suffering and surprising joy. Dramatic 
tragedy gathers together all of the jagged contradictions of existence in a theatrical space; 
Christian tragedy gathers it together in history, in the person of Jesus Christ, whom 
Balthasar calls “the heir of all the tragedy in the world.”77  
It should be clear, then, that Balthasar’s identification of Christ’s experience of 
hell as a tragic story that carries him to the utmost darkness of divine alienation is a way 
to avoid one of the great risks of the Christian resurrection narrative: seeing it as a 
cheerful ending to what has gone before, fully continuous with it, in a way that can make 
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the previous states of embodied existence inconsequential. This is a common enough 
view. But embodied existence, for humans and nonhumans, is consequential; as I have 
tried to show to this point, the suffering of individuals matters and must not be 
overlooked. For that reason, we must not see Christ’s descent into hell, on the one hand, 
and the Resurrection of Christ, on the other, as seamlessly continuous. Rather, they exist 
in a kind of dialectical relationship that avoids a conception of resurrection as a grand 
finale. There is, of course, a continuity in the person of Christ before and after the 
resurrection; he is (partially) recognized by his disciples after the resurrection. However, 
there is also a difference in kind between the two forms of life; he enters locked rooms, 
for example. One does not lead smoothly to the other. There is an incommensurability 
between the life of Jesus, including his descent, and the resurrected life of Jesus, which 
makes the narrative both continuous and discontinuous. And this discontinuity, which is 
true of Jesus, is the model for what could be true of every other human being as well. 
Balthasar writes, “Between the death of a human being, which is by definition the end 
from which he cannot return, and what we term ‘resurrection’ there is no common 
measure.”78 For Balthasar, resurrection is not the big reveal at the end of a particularly 
tense movie, but a newly transfigured reality. To insist on the full continuity—
resurrection as “happy ending”—would be to minimize the depth of hell that Christ 
plumbed.  
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Balthasar’s discussions of tragedy do not usually focus on nonhuman suffering, 
but the pain of human existence. Evolution by natural selection was certainly not a major 
topic of concern for Balthasar, though there are references both to natural evil in general, 
and evolution in particular, in the Theo-drama. For example, he writes, “However much 
weight we attach to the consequences of moral evil in mankind, it by no means exhausts 
the sum of suffering in the world. There remains all the physical suffering to which 
animal nature is exposed as a result of birth and death; for nature exists by eating and 
being eaten.”79 (This is followed by an extended discussion of the theology of Teilhard de 
Chardin.) Nonetheless, the doctrine of Christ’s descent, even and especially in its 
interconnection with questions of incarnation and the doctrine of the Trinity, lends itself 
to being made use of for a doctrine of creation that includes tragedy, in all the multivalent 
senses of the term, including the dramatic. In a discussion of the theatric presentation of 
tragedy in the contemporary world, Balthasar writes, 
Functioning as a mirror, the theatre retains its ambiguity. It could emerge that 
existence, understood in Christian terms, cannot essentially be perfected, not just 
because of the world’s implication in guilt, but simply by virtue of its 
creatureliness. In that case it would be necessary to look around for something 
beyond it that would bring it fulfillment. Cut loose from its origin and goal (which 
is ‘supernatural’), creaturely existence would be bound to appear tragic in its 
immanent structure, and the perfecting of the structure—in God’s becoming 
man—would both set its seal on this tragic dimension and bring it to an end.80 
There is, then, an eschatological dimension to Balthasar’s thought, but the “tragic 
dimension” that he identifies is not dissolved by any eschatological future. He denies that 
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possibility when he writes that “Suffering in the world, more than anything else, makes it 
difficult for people to approach God.… It cries too loudly, yesterday, today and 
tomorrow, to warrant any consolation in terms of a remote future.”81 He differentiates, 
however, as I wish to do in the present dissertation, between the dissolution of history, as 
one eschatological option, and its redemption and transfiguration, as another. “In the new 
heaven and the new earth,” he writes, “the world will not begin again from the beginning; 
God’s old creation will be drawn into his life and so transfigured, and man’s works will 
‘follow him’ and help to shape his blessedness. If this is the case, creation’s suffering 
must also attain its transfiguration in a way that is beyond our imagining.”82 In the 
resurrection, that suffering is redeemed and transfigured, but it is not ahistorically 
annihilated. The risen Christ still bears the scars of his crucifixion. 
Kevin Taylor, however, raises a question of crucial importance for Balthasar on 
this issue. In presuming that Christ includes and exceeds every tragedy, Taylor writes that 
Balthasar “assumes a certain static nature to suffering, that it is inherently meaningful and 
ennobling.”83 This is a most important criticism. That Balthasar takes suffering seriously, 
with a refusal to overlook the depth of the passion, is edifying for Christian theology. His 
appeal to Christ’s descent makes visible the dark shadows inherent in, for example, the 
Christian Eucharist, in a way that shows it to be more accurate to the totality of human 
experience than it might otherwise be considered. However, Taylor raises the issue that 
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Balthasar’s identification of Christ as “the heir of all tragedy,” who gathers up all other 
experiences of suffering, runs the risk of providing an interpretative lens through which 
to view all of those other experiences, and this interpretative strategy may lead to a 
distortion of the individual creature’s experience. In his theology Balthasar is taking 
seriously those jagged edges of existence, but he nonetheless fits those jagged edges into 
a single and well-defined container: the descent narrative of the person Jesus Christ.  
These criticisms may or may not affect his potential contribution to a doctrine of 
creation. Nonetheless, they do raise questions about a risk of what we might call 
empathetic imperialism. This is a risk for Balthasar, as it is a risk for any discussion of 
tragedy, including the present one, that uses tragedy as a descriptive term to sum up a 
diversity of experiences. It is important to maintain a tentative caution. 
Donald MacKinnon (1913–1994) 
Donald MacKinnon is a seminal figure in the genre of English-language 
philosophy and theology that is appreciative of tragedy. It is one of MacKinnon’s 
particular contributions to this conversation that he affirmed a phenomenological realism 
that takes creaturely experiences seriously. “Whatever else we may question,” he writes, 
“we may not question the reality of the pain from which sufferers from various forms of 
cancer are suffering even as this lecture is delivered.”84 The mutations that result in the 
introduction of adaptive features of living organisms, including the complexity that 
allows for human consciousness, also result in fatal disease, and MacKinnon sees the 
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attempt to redeem the suffering of the cancer victim by putting it in the context of 
evolutionary history as unjustifiable. It is an aversion to addressing directly the pain of 
another, to absorb and accept it as pain (“the reality of pain”), not as a means to a further 
end, or part of a grand design that points to something ultimately good. He writes, “No 
form of the ‘argument from design’ has ever finally silenced the cry elicited by tragic 
experience,” that of Job “defeated in the attempt existentially to reconcile experience of 
personal catastrophe with confession of beneficent and just design.”85 The view of pain as 
an edifying corrective comes in for scorn as well. It not only commits the error of 
attempting to redeem suffering by pointing to its positive effects, but MacKinnon also 
criticizes its simple ineffectiveness: “If the ‘world is a vale of soul-making’, it shows 
many signs of being a badly botched job.”86 This is an ethical issue for MacKinnon, and 
to address it honestly involves laying aside projections about the world and the 
individual. 
MacKinnon finds the appeal to providentially-ordered design made not only by a 
certain kind of progressive evolutionist; it is an error sometimes found in the Scriptures 
themselves. He thus finds elements of tragedy both expressed and suppressed in the 
Scriptures. For example, MacKinnon undertakes a fascinating reading of the story of 
Ananias and Sapphira from the fifth chapter of Acts of the Apostles. In the story, Ananias 
and Sapphira sold a piece of property, but did not give all the financial proceeds to the 
community, as was the community’s practice: “Now the whole group of those who 
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believed were of one heart and soul, and no one claimed private ownership of any 
possessions, but everything they owned was held in common” (Acts 4:32). (MacKinnon 
refers to Acts as “the early church’s essay on communism.”87) Instead, the couple 
reserved a portion of the proceeds for themselves. The apostle Peter confronted Ananias 
about this, accused Ananias of lying not only to the community, but also to God, at which 
point Ananias promptly died. Sapphira, Ananias’ wife, came to the community next; 
Peter confronted her about the missing money; she promptly died as well. The Lucan text 
then continues without comment, the context indicating that these consequences were, 
indeed, the couple’s just deserts. MacKinnon notes the irony that it is Peter, whose denial 
of Jesus was at least as serious an infraction as that of Ananias and Sapphira, but who 
nevertheless was forgiven for it, who facilitates this divine punishment. This Petrine act 
sets the pattern for future church-sanctioned cruelty; MacKinnon writes that, in this story, 
“We are presented with a picture of a struggling emergent institution already behaving to 
those who seem by dishonesty to threaten its policies with that ruthlessness which has 
across the ages characterized virtually every style of ecclesiastical institution. The 
survival of the institution … justifi[es] action that is none the less morally monstrous 
because it is presented as achieved by supernatural means.”88  
MacKinnon’s objection is not that what Ananias and Sapphira did was, in fact, 
ethical, but that Acts presents their deaths as being part of a stable and divinely-
sanctioned moral order, somehow triumphant and justified: “The most devastating 
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intellectual and spiritual temptation to which indeed some of [the Scripture writers, i.e., 
Luke] … yielded was that of presenting the catastrophic course of events as expressive of 
the working of a traceable providential order.”89 The text proceeds as if Ananias and 
Sapphira had to die in order to establish beyond question that every action of the ecclesia 
is the outworking of God’s plan on earth. That their judge is guilty of worse crimes, yet 
not punished, but forgiven for his transgression, is chalked up to providence. For 
MacKinnon, this is a way of avoiding the tragic element that is embedded in the Christian 
story itself: in the decades that followed the death of Jesus Christ, “What is clear is the 
emergence of an apologetic style which seeks to make the intolerable bearable, even 
edifying, which seeks also to eliminate the element of unfathomable mystery by the 
attempt to move beyond tragedy.”90 This aspect of the developing faith is what is “facile” 
about its teleology: that Luke (in Acts, though not in his gospel) and every “ecclesiastical 
institution” seek to smooth over the rough edges of the human experience of the world. 
“The language of Caiaphas [‘it is expedient for us, that one man should die for the 
people’] … is that of ‘ecclesiastical statesmen’ all down the ages.”91 To smooth the rough 
edges for the benefit of expediency is to pretend that Christianity is an ongoing positive 
movement toward paradise, something that MacKinnon finds unsupported either by 
human experience or by the witness of other places in the gospels. For example, 
regarding positivistic readings of the narrative of the Gospel of John, MacKinnon writes, 
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“To suggest that we are presented with a developing ministry successfully achieved in 
consequence of superficial failure, the latter swallowed up by its obliteration in the 
progress that it makes possible, is a travesty of the book’s disturbing and complex 
reality.”92 The suffering and even failure embedded in the life and death of Jesus is a 
narrative of “a murder and a defeat,” not a straightforward victory. If there is any victory 
it all, it is one “achieved at an appalling cost, indeed at the cost of irretrievable defeat.”93 
In a similar vein, he refers elsewhere to a comment made by the Duke of Wellington, 
responding to a woman who was gushing about his glorious accomplishments in battle; 
the Duke replied coldly, “Madam, a victory is the most tragic thing in the world, only 
excepting a defeat.”94  
That forced narrative of victory also suggests that Christianity offers some kind of 
answer to the problem of evil, by fitting it into a schema whose eventual end is a 
straightforwardly happy one. In his essays, MacKinnon insists over and over again that 
this is patently false, writing, “Where the treatment of ‘the problem of evil’ is concerned, 
we reach an area in which in very various ways, theologians have allowed apologetic 
eagerness to lead them to suppose they had reached solutions, when in fact they had 
hardly begun effectively to articulate the problems.”95 On the other hand, MacKinnon 
admires writers like P. T. Forsyth, who insist that no “speculative dialectic” can wash 
away the blood that drips from the Cross; the stain remains, complicating the efforts that 
                                                 
92
 MacKinnon, Problem of Metaphysics, 128. 
93
 Ibid., 133. 
94
 Ibid., 126. 
95
 Ibid., 124. 
272 
 
“trivialized the tragic depth of human existence, making even of Gethsemane itself a 
charade.”96 Not so for MacKinnon, who reports that he would “cease to believe altogether 
unless I believed that Jesus had indeed prayed that the hour might pass from him, had 
indeed been left alone to face the reality of absolute failure.”97 MacKinnon believes that 
this theological antipathy to the acknowledgement of suffering qua suffering is not 
innocent, and has consequences. He explicitly ties this aversion, this looking away from 
the site of immense suffering, to the lack of Christian response to the Holocaust:  
The events of the present century and in particular what happened in Germany 
between 1933 and 1945 rob any serious theologian of the remotest excuse for 
ignoring the tragic element in Christianity. It was in the long Christian centuries 
and by the styles of persistent Christian behavior that the ground was prepared for 
the acceptance of the holocaust of the Jewish people.98  
To be sure, acceptance is not participation; MacKinnon is not laying the responsibility for 
the guarding of the prisons or the running of the trains on the shoulders of speculative 
idealists. Nonetheless, he sees the willingness to abide the suffering of others by fitting 
that suffering into a pre-established schema called providence as laying the groundwork 
for the lack of dramatic response to the actions of the Nazis.  
Indeed, MacKinnon held that the brute fact of the atrocities that happened in Nazi 
Germany should crush theological illusions and restore a strong sense of ethical and 
theological realism, and that the Holocaust must affect not only the Christian approach to 
suffering, but also the Christian understanding of itself as a whole, specifically its 
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doctrine of Christology. He makes this most explicit in a 1986 essay on Hans Urs von 
Balthasar.99 MacKinnon found Balthasar to be one of the few theologians who took the 
implications of the Holocaust seriously. Though Balthasar himself rarely wrote of the 
event explicitly, MacKinnon saw it reflected in the German theologian’s work, especially 
in his famous theology of Holy Saturday, and MacKinnon acknowledges his “very great” 
debt to Balthasar for MacKinnon’s own theology.100 MacKinnon writes, “There is a great 
division between contemporary writers on the kind of issues that here occupy Balthasar’s 
mind, and that is their awareness or their disregard of the fact that in the terrible twelve 
years, 1933–1945, six million Jews were deliberately murdered.”101 MacKinnon expresses 
a belief that it is this singular event that sets the context for any twentieth-century 
theology worthy of the name. He continues, “The refusal to reckon with this appalling 
fact gives to any treatment of fundamental theological issues a sort of shallowness that no 
modernist expertise can conceal.” That “appalling fact” belies any attempt to minimize it 
in the name of an overarching good, as if what happened in Western Europe during the 
second world war can somehow be made palatable by a belief in the glory about to be 
revealed (to paraphrase Romans 8:18). MacKinnon admires that Balthasar, more than 
most theologians, “refuses to turn aside from the overwhelming, pervasive reality of 
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evil.”102 This reality exists in the concrete world of the lives of individuals and 
communities, not in an idealist realm of moral lessons and spiritual mythology. One of 
these concrete, particular lives, of course, is that of Jesus of Nazareth, whose story is the 
story of how God engages with that same world, to the point of becoming a victim of it. 
In that story, the “sheer disaster”103 that is the conclusion of Christ’s ministry reflects the 
sheer disasters that preceded, were contemporaneous with, and would follow, his life. In 
public life to this day, MacKinnon writes, it remains expedient for one man to die for the 
people: “The tragedy which reached its crisis in Pilate’s Praetorium is one that is still 
being played out in this present century. There is a line traceable from that hail of 
judgment to the death camps of twentieth century Europe where millions of the Jewish 
people perished in circumstances of unspeakable indignity.”104 
This relentless focus on the tragic element of Christianity may seem overly 
despairing, but MacKinnon insists that he, and Balthasar, refuse to fall into “any facile 
cult of pessimism.”105 Pessimism and despair fall prey to the same temptation as idealism, 
which is the temptation not to deal with people and events in their particularity, but to 
instead fit them into a pre-existing pattern or generalization. Instead, the 
acknowledgement of the concrete reality of suffering, unmitigated by an aversion to 
addressing it as it is, enables an understanding of what redemption must entail; or, more 
accurately, deepens the mystery of that redemption. The glory that is revealed on the 
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cross is, MacKinnon writes, a “strange glory,”106 and not unambiguous: MacKinnon notes 
the tragic irony in the fact that Jesus’ crucifixion, at which the “foundation of [the 
world’s] hope” is glimpsed, also has the eventual consequence of facilitating a horrible 
anti-Semitism that would continue for centuries, and longer.107 MacKinnon notes that 
“part of the price paid for [the crucifixion and resurrection] was the unmentionable horror 
of an anti-semitism whose beginnings can perhaps be traced in the New Testament itself, 
and whose last manifestation in our time was Christian acquiescence in the ‘final 
solution.’”108 In other words, the ambiguity of the Christ event not only remains even 
after the resurrection, it deepens.  
Nonetheless, it is that ambiguity, that “strange glory,” that the Christian claims is 
somehow brought to peace, if not to a recognizable resolution, by the cross and 
resurrection. The faith in that peace is what MacKinnon finds in Lux Mundi theologian H. 
Scott Holland. Holland, MacKinnon believes, acknowledges both the historicity and 
savageness of the crucifixion, and the hope that it enables. “We need to be reminded,” 
MacKinnon writes (uncharacteristically), “of the ultimate sweetness of things.”109 The 
ultimate sweetness is something that can be realized only after “the abysses of existence 
are sounded and the ultimate contradictions of life plumbed and explored.”110 But it is 
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realized, and that note must continue to sound. The believer lives in the tension where she 
“will not be fobbed off by a trivial optimism,” nor will she “be betrayed into a nihilistic 
despair.”111 The risk of “glory[ing] less in the Cross than in the disintegration of human 
societies and in the coming of despair”112 was a real one, especially for those living both 
in the aftermath of Nazi Germany and at the advent of atomic weaponry. At the moment 
of Christ’s dereliction on the Cross, however, 
it was made plain that in the Son of God’s acceptance of the ultimate triviality and 
failure of human existence, whose deeps at that moment he finally plumbed, the 
whole language of perplexity, uncertainty, bewilderment, hopelessness and pain, 
even of God-forsakenness, was laid hold of and given a new sense by the very 
God himself and converted into the way of his reconciling the world unto 
himself.113 
In other words, the suffering was not obliterated, nor revealed to be illusory, but 
redeemed. This does not make suffering necessary; it does mean that suffering is not the 
last and final word in an ultimate sense. There is a teleology in this view, to be sure, but it 
is not the “facile teleology” about which MacKinnon complains in The Problem of 
Metaphysics. Rather, it is one that takes the world as it is, and holds to the fact that it is, 
somehow, the site of redemption. Neither “trivial optimism” or “nihilistic despair” is 
therefore called for, and thus Christianity is marked by a characteristic “peculiar tension 
between optimism and pessimism.”114 MacKinnon requires that the doctrine of 
redemption not be separated from its basis in the doctrine of atonement; sinful actions 
have consequences, consequences that can result in the immense suffering of innocents. 
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Those consequences do not disappear in an instant. MacKinnon was concerned that too 
many modern theologians do not recognize that about which the classical tragedians 
wrote: “the deepest contradictions of human life,” written about “without the distorting 
consolation of belief in a happy ending.”115 The torture, death, and descent of Christ into 
hell is inseparable from the great benefits of the Resurrection. There is an ending, but it is 
not a happy one, or at least it is not happy in a straightforward way. If Christianity is to 
have any relevance in the modern world, it will be because it recognizes and does not 
look away from the “pervasive reality of evil,”116 but rather somehow absorbs it, without 
reduction or idealism, into what it means to be redeemed. It is a kind of recognition of the 
difficulties of human life in the untamable natural world, considered in its fullness. In a 
passage concluding the first section of the essay “Finality in Metaphysics, Ethics and 
Theology,” MacKinnon writes,  
The threat is of something much more profound than that of Cartesian malin 
génie, it is the menace of a backlash somehow built into the heart of things that 
will lay our sanity itself in ruins. We are face to face not with a grisly theodicy 
that allows historical greatness to provide its own moral order (there are more 
than hints of this in Hegel), but with a cussedness which seems totally recalcitrant 
to the logos of any justification of the ways of God to man. And here the last word 
is with the cry for redemption.117 
What is sometimes lacking in MacKinnon’s work is the acknowledgment that the 
cry for redemption is sometimes also voiced alongside a song of praise. In MacKinnon’s 
unremitting refusal to come to rest, he makes it nearly impossible to pause long enough to 
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celebrate Easter at all. Is it true that “the supremely revealing and supremely authoritative 
moment in human history … was that in which [Jesus] cried upon the Cross: ‘My God, 
my God, why hast thou forsaken me?”118 What about the silent moment in the garden, 
with the stone rolled away? Even a sympathetic reader, who agrees that while “we crave 
security,”119 Christ’s answer in response is interrogation, and that the repetition of this 
interrogation is the job of the liturgy (during which “we must seek to increase rather than 
eliminate tension”),120 finds himself seeking a break long enough to catch his breath. 
When the Greeks gathered for the Dionysian festivals they watched both tragedies and 
comedies; while still mourning for Patroclus, Achilles organized funeral games. Not 
every camp is Auschwitz; not every ecclesiastic is Caiaphas. Yes, resting can be a moral 
laziness. But it can also be salubrious, a time of Sabbath. Christian realism is recognizing 
both the prevalence of suffering and the surfeit of grace. To acknowledge both without 
reduction is the task of tragedy. 
Rowan Williams (b. 1950) 
A recognition of the tragic is also a hallmark of the work of Rowan Williams, a 
student of MacKinnon’s. The resonances between MacKinnon’s work and Williams’ can 
be seen throughout Williams’ oeuvre: the opposition to philosophical closure, the 
emphasis on tragedy and literature, the influence of Balthasar. To be sure, neither their 
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projects nor their vocations are identical: Williams is more appreciative of Hegel than 
MacKinnon was, Willliams is far more historically-minded, and Williams’ characteristic 
philosophical hesitation is missing in MacKinnon’s writing. Nonetheless, one can hear 
MacKinnon’s influence in much of Williams’ work. Like MacKinnon, Williams takes 
seriously the tragic for the purposes of his theology. This affects the way he sees theology 
interacting with culture, for example. In an essay contrasting Balthasar and Karl Rahner, 
he writes, “for Balthasar, dialogue with ‘the world’ is so much more complex a matter 
than it sometimes seems to be for Rahner; because the world is not a world of well-
meaning agnostics but of totalitarian nightmares, of nuclear arsenals, labor camps and 
torture chambers.”121 He continues, “Balthasar’s Christ remains a question to all human 
answers, and to all attempts at metaphysical or theological closure.” 122 One could say the 
same about Williams’ view of the world, and his view of Christ, as this section will show. 
The recognition of tragedy is part of that resistance to closure. 
The realism that is called for in a doctrine of creation is found in an essay 
Williams wrote in 1986, “Trinity and Ontology,” prepared for a conference honoring 
MacKinnon.123 His evaluation is both appreciative and critical. First, he writes 
appreciatively of MacKinnon’s unyielding realism, the insistence that philosophy, 
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theology, and ethics stay grounded in the concrete facts about the world and not escape 
into the many different kinds of mythology (not all of them religious) that are found 
throughout the philosophical tradition; Hegel is a prime example of this. In MacKinnon’s 
view, derived from Kant, the world exists independently of our perceptions of it, even 
though we do not have unmediated access to it: we do not create the world, and it does 
not exist as an interlocking system designed to meet universal necessities. If the world 
was able to be brought fully under human control, then tragedy fully expressed cannot 
occur, since the most devastating loss can be put into a more general overall narrative. It 
is a primitive discovery of human experience that this is not the case.124 The wildness of 
tragedy eludes easy schematization, and thus justification. This is the risk of much of the 
discourse around theodicy. Human beings do, in fact, experience “tragic loss, senseless, 
inexplicable, unjustifiable, unassimilable pain,” the particularities of which chafe against 
teleological explanations that seek to tame them by putting them into a logical, even a 
necessary, pattern. The effort to force those particularities into “comprehensive 
explanatory systems” can result in an evasion of the world as it is.125  
The problem for the theologian, of course, is that to speak of God in this context 
takes one very close to engaging in exactly that same evasion; whether the justification 
for suffering is laid at the doorstep of Darwin’s evolution, human progress, or God’s 
providence, one still performs the same justifying action, and thereby engages in the 
same untruthfulness. The theologian, therefore, must attempt to talk about God without 
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letting talk about God become a way of ignoring particularities, and consequently 
ignoring suffering as suffering, by using God as an organizing principle, which makes 
God entirely abstract from human experience. The way the Christian tradition has found 
to prevent that, Williams writes, is by telling and retelling the story of Jesus: his life, his 
death, his being raised from death.126 The telling of this story is obviously the beginning, 
not the end, of any such effort, but at all times that conversation must remain close to the 
specific outlines and details of the Gospel witness in order to stay focused on the concrete 
and avoid the mythical. As Williams writes, “A religious discourse with some chance of 
being honest will not move too far from the particular, with all its irresolution and 
resistance to systematizing.”127 For that reason, Williams approves of MacKinnon’s desire 
that theologians pay attention to the tragic element of Jesus’ life, including the 
consequent anti-Semitism mentioned above, as well as the fate of Judas Iscariot, for 
whom it would have been better had he never been born (Matthew 26:24; Mark 14:21). 
These two horrible situations were precipitated by, even inseparable from, the event 
Christians believe is central to salvation. There is therefore inevitably a tragic element to 
Jesus’ life because it was an adult, human life, and that involves making decisions that 
inevitably have consequences that are no less harmful for being unforeseeable and 
unintentional.128 To speak of God by staying close to this particular human life is to speak 
of God only “in the context of limit—the limits of particularity, of bodiliness and 
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mortality, of moral capacity, of creatureliness.”129 Remaining limited in that way may be 
philosophically unsatisfying, since it means foregoing any attempt to speak of God in se, 
and lacking in principle a comprehensive, teleological view of history that could make 
sense of senseless suffering. It may articulate the problem of suffering more truthfully, 
but that also means that it cannot resolve it in any comprehensive way. It is this limitation 
that makes the tragic an inevitable element in human life, since “the tragic by definition 
deals with human limit; that is, with what is not to be changed. There is pain in the world 
that is, so to speak, non-negotiable. The suffering that has happened and cannot be made 
not to have happened … is, in spite of various kinds of vacuous, insulting and brutal 
rhetoric, religious and political, unchangeably there for us.”130 
Resistance to the rationalization of suffering involves letting go of claims of final 
resolution, and remaining uneasily with the inevitable ambiguity of all human action, and 
the consequences of that action, with what Williams calls “the unconsoled nature of 
historical pain.”131 The further recognition of each individual’s complicity in the 
sufferings of others, however, including Jesus’ own complicity (anti-Semitism and the 
person of Judas Iscariot), should act as the spur both to penitence and to protest, while 
remaining cognizant of the inevitable limits imposed by temporality. All of this is only 
possible, however, once historical specificities are taken seriously in themselves. 
Williams adopts the slogan “Complexity as a source of resistance” from playwright 
Howard Barker as a summary of MacKinnon’s project; this complexity refuses easy 
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consolation and “false and would-be painless consciousness.”132 The details of life, taken 
honestly and on their own terms, indicate that the truth is elsewhere.  
The tragic is a reflection of that complexity, which means that tragedy is not only 
a matter of pathos. The complexities of history mean that even the suffering of victims is 
ambiguous. There is no pure victimhood, as the oppressed can also be oppressors 
themselves in some other realm. In Resurrection, Williams, citing Luther, criticizes 
theologians who conflate the suffering of Jesus with their own suffering, giving them, as 
it were, a “guaranteed share” in Christ’s glory.133 He criticizes the perspective that 
assumes that “Jesus as victim is the image of myself as victim. God, making himself a 
victim in the death of Jesus, affirms me in my suffering: he is (in Whitehead’s celebrated 
phrase) the ‘fellow-sufferer who understands.’”134 In this view, Christ on the cross is like 
me on the cross; we are two suffering victims, equally persecuted, equally innocent. 
Williams worries that that can make even true suffering a cudgel, which can result in the 
deployment of the cross as an ideological weapon: if I am suffering at your hands, clearly 
the right is on my side; if I am with Jesus, then you must be with Pilate. Suffering 
becomes a weapon.  
This is the result, Williams writes, of arresting one’s understanding of Jesus at 
Good Friday, with the present and graspable Jesus there on the cross, dying a martyr’s 
death, inspiring a persecuted Christian community that is able to identify with his 
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suffering.135 That crucifixion is not the end of the story, however. Unlike the Christ of 
Good Friday, the Christ who is met on Easter morning makes clear the distance between 
himself and the apostles. The Easter Christ is a stranger, not a mirror, and someone who 
now slips from any grasp: “Do not hold on to me,” the risen Jesus says to Mary 
Magdalene (John 20:17). Williams writes, “If we come in search of the ‘God of our 
condition’ at Easter, we shall not find him. ‘You seek Jesus of Nazareth who was 
crucified … he is not here’ (Mark 16:6). While Holy Week may invite us to a certain 
identification with the crucified, Easter firmly takes away the familiar ‘fellow-
sufferer.’”136 The risen Christ reveals that in the Passion of Jesus Christ the Christian 
plays the role of Pilate, not the role of the crucified, and to recognize this as being the 
case is to get an insight into suffering itself, and one’s accountability for it. Easter 
confronts each Christian with her own abdication of responsibility, the personal attempt 
to elude accountability. Williams writes, 
Sooner or later, we must all drive into the extermination camp and confront 
without illusion the most unbearable truth about what it is to be human, the truth 
that benevolence and rationality are not at the heart of people’s actions.… Faced 
with the destructive fruits of what we have done as individuals—or as a whole 
civilization—it is not surprising that the cry springs to our lips, “An enemy hath 
done this.” … Not I or we. How could we? This is not what we meant. How can I 
be responsible for what I did not mean? Yes, it is a child’s cry, and it sounds so 
painfully like the child’s evasion of responsibility—the refusal to be an adult and 
accept the consequences of our actions.137 
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The risen Christ stands not only with, but over against, the people of the world, not only 
as their fellow-sufferer, nor only as their victim, but also as their judge. The foreignness, 
unrecognizability, and frankly strangeness of the resurrected one, as reflected in his 
bizarre post-resurrection physicality, who both draws all people to himself (John 12:32) 
and refuses to remain in hand (“do not hold onto me”), militates against the cross being 
utilized as a weapon or a tool for the manipulation of others. “Easter means coming to the 
memory of Jesus, looking for consolation, and finding a memory that hurts and judges, 
that sets a distance, even an alienation between me and my hope, my Saviour.”138  
This insistence on the divine distance, on God’s inability to be domesticated into 
human religious constructs, is a recurring theme in Williams’ work. Williams repeatedly 
resists a retreat into religious fantasy. The author of a recent book on Williams’ theology, 
appropriately titled Christ the Stranger, writes that “If Williams’ thought has any 
absolute criterion, it is this conviction that truth is never merely consoling, that it has to 
be hard and angular, purged of the distorting influences of the ego.… I do not think it is 
an exaggeration to say that a dread of self-deceptive fantasy is, in fact, the secret engine 
of Williams’ work.”139 This “self-deceptive fantasy” has many potential manifestations: 
the excuse that “an enemy hath done this”; the view of one’s self as a victim only, not a 
perpetrator as well; a belief that the world will bend to our will if only we try hard 
enough; the conviction that there is a system available (religious, political, economic, or 
otherwise) that can comprehensively account for the sum of all human experience. For 
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Williams, this is the fantasy about God, and about humanity, that Christ comes to 
destroy: he “is the ‘ray of darkness’ in the world of our religious fantasy,” come to make 
opaque as well as illuminate,140 not to make divine things plainer, but to make them 
darker.141 
Indeed, one of the things that Jesus makes darker and more opaque is any human 
grappling with the tragic, and it may not be a surprise that Williams writes in opposition 
not only to explanations of suffering that appeal to teleology of the Hegelian or 
Darwinian kind, but also even more traditional theodicies. In 1991, Williams presented a 
paper, later reprinted in Wrestling with Angels,142 that was a response to Marilyn McCord 
Adams, a philosopher of religion who has written extensively on the problem of evil.143 
Adams holds that there are evils that are so severe that they give reason to believe that the 
person who has experienced them can no longer regard their life as good, as worth living. 
In these situations, it appears that no conceivable human mediation could resolve the 
suffering that has occurred in such a way that healing could be effected. For these kinds 
of horrendous evils, Adams holds that nothing less than the supernatural goodness of God 
is required.  
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In Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, Adams identifies the hypostatic 
union of divine and human natures in Jesus Christ as the way that God “cancels the curse 
of human vulnerability to horrors.”144 Only God can incorporate these “horrendous evils” 
into a life that can be considered good, and God has done so by becoming a human being 
who undergoes these horrendous evils himself, identifying with humanity by suffering in 
both Divine and human natures.145 Suffering in both natures, while not a classical 
teaching, Adams sees as necessary because the scope and variety of human sufferings 
requires a consciousness suitably vast enough to “feel the feelings of all participants in 
horrors at every place and every time,” while also responding appropriately to each and 
every situation, “with perfect attention to nuance and detail.”146 Because this kind of 
consciousness is not available to a human, however, and thus this comprehensive 
suffering is not truly a human experience, Christ’s human nature “compensates” by 
suffering from the perspective of a limited human being. Since Christ’s human nature 
cannot suffer comprehensively the way the Divine nature can, Adams is “inclined to be 
satisfied with what seems within reach: namely, that Christ, in His human nature, 
participates in a representative sample of horrors sufficient to guarantee His appreciation 
of the depth of their ruinous potential.”147  
Because God suffers them comprehensively, these experiences, instead of being 
debilitating and life-destroying in an existential sense, therefore “become secure points of 
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identification with the crucified God.”148 To be sure, they remain horrendous and 
“ruinous” to the person who is the victim of them, and Adams is explicit that this does 
not make the evils any less horrible. Nonetheless, the post-mortem individual is able to 
realize that those experiences were ante-mortem times of the greatest and most secure 
intimacy with the Divine. In addition, from the comfort of the beatific vision, not only 
would the sufferer not wish that those experiences had not happened, but she will even be 
able to view the horrific experience itself as part of the good life.149 In this way, the evils 
will be incorporated into God’s salvific plan for humanity, and therefore become 
something valuable. This is possible because of the reach of God’s incommensurable 
goodness. With this as the hope and promise, and founded upon the incarnation, 
crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ as fully God and fully human, even present-
day experiences of suffering are meaningful because they help realize to the fullest extent 
the most important and life-giving relationship that a person has: her relationship with 
God. 
Williams finds two areas of concern in Adams’ proposal. First, Adams describes 
the experience of horrendous evil as an atomistic unit that stands potentially 
independently from the rest of a person’s life, and thus externally identifiable and able to 
be evaluated from the outside. In fact, the way an experience affects a person depends on 
any number of other factors, including personal history, cultural context, and so on. This 
is readily observable in the fact that an experience that is debilitating for one person may 
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not prove to be so in another person, even if the events themselves seem quite similar.150 
He refers to King Lear’s statement as he holds the dead Cordelia in his arms; when Lear 
sees what might be an indication that she is in fact still alive, he cries out that, were she to 
live, that fact alone would “redeem all sorrows that ever I have felt” (which at that point 
were quite a few). Because very similar events can be experienced in vastly different 
ways by different people, it is impossible to look at the event itself and predict what 
could be sufficient to ameliorate the suffering it entails, independent of the biography of 
the person being affected by it. This makes comparison of horrendous events on the basis 
of their effects nearly impossible to do with any faithfulness to the person’s experience. 
For the same reason, it is then premature to decide that nothing at all could provide any 
kind of mitigation to an experience of evil. There are “incalculable elements” when one 
talks about these issues, and they complicate efforts to speak about what could or could 
not count as redemption separate from the particularity of the individual situation and 
person. This is not to say that some events may not be experienced as irredeemable, only 
that external theorizing about the issue does not stay true to the concrete circumstances. 
In fact, this is the root of Williams’ concern about much of the language of theodicy: 
abstract theorizing about suffering can privilege the perspective of the abstract theorizer, 
not that of the sufferer himself.151 The difficulty at hand then becomes a difficulty for the 
observer, not the participant, and an intellectual difficulty at that. The procedural 
“calculus” in which the observing theologian engages is manifestly not the way the 
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experience is engaged with by the subject. Such a disconnect between data and theory 
suggests that one should “be suspicious of the whole discourse,” though Williams, like 
Adams, also insists that his effort is not intended to minimize the experiences by 
suggesting that healing may be possible where it seems to the outside observer 
impossible.152 
Second, Williams finds Adams’ descriptions of God regarding the issues of divine 
suffering and divine action inadequate as well for several reasons. Williams holds the 
classical position that, as the creator and not a created being, God is not an agent among 
other agents; God is not a being with a history. It is problematic for theological reasons to 
hold that God in se experiences the pain of created being in the same way that people do. 
He writes that the Passion and death of Christ certainly “warns us that we shall find more 
to say about God by talking of vulnerability than by talking of the unqualified triumph of 
a sort of individual will over recalcitrant circumstances. But this is not to authorize 
fantasy about the ‘feelings’ or ‘experiences’ of God.”153 This is to fall prey to a collapsing 
of the distinction between humanity and God by placing God within some kind of context 
external to God, one that humanity shares. While a certain amount of anthropomorphism 
in description is inevitable, speech about God’s vast consciousness comprehensively 
experiencing the pain of the world is speaking too easily about God’s internal life.  
In addition, the idea of the beatific vision cancelling out any terrible experiences 
seems, again, to ignore the specific ways that diverse kinds of experiences affect 
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individual people in different ways: “The ‘indifference’ of divine love is in danger of 
becoming an abstraction that ultimately devalues particular histories.”154 Under Adams’ 
view, the great flood of divine love overpowers any negative experiences that oppose it. 
If that is the case, however, then the negative experiences are implicitly seen to be 
uniform in kind, varying in degree as larger or smaller examples of a single substance. 
This is the view of personal experience that Williams has rejected because it does not 
account for the diversity of ways in which negative experiences affect the individual 
person, nor the diversity of ways in which healing can be effected, by the divine or 
otherwise. Further, in this view the difference between God’s mediation and human 
mediation of suffering is, in fact, not incommensurable, as Adams had claimed; the 
difference is quantitative, not qualitative. God’s healing power is not of a different sort 
than the kinds of healing that are effected by the myriad ways in which healing happens 
otherwise; rather, it is just far more effective, because it is far more powerful. Both 
positing that God suffers in se, and positing that God is able to heal through methods 
more powerful than, though not meaningfully different in kind from, other methods, 
share a common theme, which is a diminution of God’s transcendence. God is not non 
aliud in this conception, just much bigger and much stronger. It is the God described by 
Ludwig Feuerbach as “human” shouted in a loud voice.  
A similar critique of an ascription of psychology to God holds for Adams’ 
conception of divine action. Williams holds that Adams has a view of divine action that 
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bears a resemblance to “crisis management”: God steps in when things become too out of 
line, “reacting to a situation which we have to suppose God failed to provide for in 
advance.”155 The classical critique of this view is that it erroneously holds that “God is 
(like us) an agent in an environment, who must ‘negotiate’ purposes and desires in 
relations to other agencies and presences”; Williams refers to it as “the mythological 
notion of a God who reacts to circumstances.”156 If God is not an agent in an 
environment, however, then “God’s action can never have the form of an episode 
intruding into the history of created causality or finite agency. It must not be in 
competition for a shared logical space,” referencing Augustine’s rejection of a view of 
miracle as “direct divine interruption of finite agency.”157 If God is truly 
incommensurable, non aliud, then the idea of “competition for a shared logical space” is 
impossible, and so is the mythological language about God stepping in to affect natural 
processes using natural mechanisms, as one efficient cause among others. While he does 
not address it in the essay regarding Adams, Williams has written further on similar 
issues, and specifically makes the point that this kind of divine/human competition, even 
when God is guaranteed to win out, as in Adams’ telling, has the effect of maintaining 
that a contest over resources is foundational to the life of both God and creation: “to 
claim that divine action can be trusted to prevail … is only to claim that, in the long run, 
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God has more resources than other agents.”158 The issues involved continue to revolve 
around power as what is most fundamental, and “what is left unchallenged is how power 
is conceived.”159 Instead of trying to balance positives and negatives either ante- or post-
mortem, Williams writes in the essay on Adams, “I believe we should hold out for 
genuine incommensurables: the incommensurability of the worlds of the happy and the 
unhappy, and the incommensurability of God’s agency and ours.”160 
If Williams truly wants to hold out for genuine incommensurability, however, in 
both cases, then he must also forego the attempt to come to a solution, even a provisional 
one, to the problem of suffering, considered generally. Instead, he calls theologians to 
attend not to the generalized and abstract problem, but to the individual experiences 
themselves. “We are brought back constantly … to the uncomfortable question of who 
theodicy is being done for.”161 Is it being done for the philosopher? Or for the one who 
suffers? He points out the fact, referred to above, that some of those for whom the 
problem of suffering should be most pressing inexplicably do not find it so at all. He 
identifies an implicit objective in Adams’ work as being a way to theorize in such a way 
that in consequence “the world of human experience [is] capable of being contemplated 
without despair.”162 But contemplated by whom? If the answer is “the observer” then two 
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risks immediately appear: “either there will be pressure to argue that the situation is not 
as bad as it seems, or there will be the urge to arrive at a perspective that is in principle 
not accessible to us, a position where we are not obliged—as here and now we are—to 
know suffering as unhealed and, often, humanly unhealable as far as we can see.”163 
Williams’ Wittgensteinian influence can be heard in his insistence that religious 
philosophy should “reacquaint us with our materiality and mortality,” calling on 
philosophers of religion “not to appeal blandly to the mysterious purposes of God, not to 
appeal to any putative justification at all, but to put the question of how we remain 
faithful to human ways of seeing suffering.” This could be uncomfortable, because it will 
mean the acknowledgement of experiences of suffering “without explanation or 
compensation,” unmitigated by any knowable teleology, unjustified by any cause, to all 
appearances entirely without hope. It will also mean, however, the recognition that “there 
are unpredictable, unsystematizable integrations of suffering into a biography in the 
experience of some,” though such a possibility may seem utterly unachievable from the 
outsider’s point of view.164 Both experiences may be the case, but that will only be known 
when suffering is seen in its concrete particulars, “this, here, for this person, at this 
moment, with these memories.” It is better, Williams writes, to be “worried by evil” and 
attentive to it than to have it put into a suitable philosophical framework. This attention to 
the concrete “keeps obstinately open the perspective of the sufferer, the subject, for 
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whom this is never a question of aesthetics.”165 For Williams, this is not only a question 
relevant to the problem of suffering, significant enough as that is: “The suffering of a 
historically particular other must be a paradigm for the kind of knowledge that will not 
allow us to stop listening, because we cannot completely internalize or domesticate it.” 
This is a better description of the world as a whole than a description that constructs a 
comprehensive conceptual scheme that can contain it all. “The subject’s account of their 
pain most basically reminds me that the world is a world of differences and so of 
converse and so of listening,” he writes.166 
From the descriptions of Williams’ writing about the problem of suffering 
described here, it should be clear how he provides an example of how the tragic can be 
used as a restraint on overly-ambitious theology. The ambiguity of lived experiences—
both as victims and as perpetrators—can only be recognized within a realist stance that 
maintains a focus on the preservation of particular voices.  
Conclusion 
With these theorists in mind, one can see the diversity of ways in which tragedy 
can be utilized for Christian theology. While these three theologians differ in their 
emphases and topics under consideration, the fact that they have those differences shows 
the potential for further work in this area. All three demonstrate that doing theology with 
a recognition of the tragic can be fruitful and illuminate previously neglected areas of 
theological inquiry. As Balthasar shows, it can also facilitate a rediscovery of aspects of 
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the tradition that have been deemphasized in the modern period. In particular, the three 
thinkers share an opposition to teleological justifications of suffering. In O’Regan’s 
theological critique of Hegel, O’Regan writes that one way Hegel’s philosophy 
“compromises the dramatic Christian view is in his thoroughly dialectical view of life 
and death, in which death is the instrument of life, indeed greater life. This instrumental 
understanding effectively removes the tragic element from death and effaces its 
horror.”167 But a theological system that effaces the horror of creaturely suffering is 
untrue to creaturely experiences, and any system that is untrue to creaturely experiences 
is insufficient for a doctrine of creation. In the final chapter, therefore, I will demonstrate 
the possibilities of utilizing tragedy as a theological category in contributing to the 
construction of a contemporary doctrine of creation.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The dissertation to this point has laid the groundwork for the claim that tragedy is 
an appropriate category to use in describing some aspects of creation. I have asserted that 
this is so, particularly given what is now known about evolution by means of natural 
selection. An acknowledgment of the tragic nature of the natural world is lacking in much 
contemporary writing about the problem of natural evil, and I hold that the problem of 
natural evil should be included in any realist doctrine of creation.  
In chapter one, I explored the diversity of responses to the problem of natural evil, 
beginning with the book of Job. A survey of Augustine, Aquinas, Pierre Bayle, Leibniz, 
and Hume concluded with a reading of William Paley’s Natural Theology. Published in 
1802, Paley’s book was a phenomenon. It became required reading in many British and 
American schools and was intensely popular at the time of the publication of Darwin’s 
Origin of Species in 1859. Darwin’s monograph was published at a cultural moment in 
which natural theology was functioning in part as a theodicy. As a theodicy, however, 
Paley’s text lacked the sophistication of earlier writers, and he left himself particularly 
vulnerable to later developments in the sciences.  
Chapter two described the development of Darwin’s theory, and the process of 
natural selection in particular. Natural selection was Darwin’s unique contribution to 
evolutionary theory. While the problem of suffering in nature was not unknown before 
Darwin, natural selection aggravated it by revealing that predation and starvation is a 
significant part of the engine of evolution. The later discovery of the molecular basis for 
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these inherited characteristics showed that this mechanism is ingrained at the most basic 
level of organic life.  
In chapter three, I reviewed a representative, though hardly exhaustive, sample of 
the evolutionary theodicies that have been written since the publication of the Origin. The 
writers under consideration were the Lux Mundi authors, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, John 
Hick, Richard Swinburne, and Christopher Southgate. These existing theories fall short in 
their discussions of natural evil and, in various ways, make critical mistakes. While some 
are laudably concerned with what Hick termed “dysteleological suffering,” these 
episodes are taken to be exceptions to an overall understanding of creation and natural 
evil. However, as chapter two showed, these episodes are not exceptions, in the sense of 
being peripheral to the general manner of nature, but are rather built into the structure of 
creation itself. Any evolutionary theodicy that treats them as exceptions to a general 
principle is necessarily going to be incomplete. I introduced the notion that tragedy, 
considered as a theological category, should be a constituent part of any realist doctrine 
of creation as a way of addressing the natural evil that is the consequence of evolution by 
natural selection. 
It is not obvious, however, that tragedy is an appropriate category for Christian 
theology at all. Many writers, both Christian and non-Christian, hold that it is not. 
Therefore, in chapter four, I showed how a concept of the tragic has been useful in 
Christian theology already. I used the work of three thinkers as representatives who have 
done so: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Donald MacKinnon, and Rowan Williams. Balthasar’s 
placement of the descent of Christ into hell at the center of his theology is an example of 
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how a retrieval of the tragic can be accomplished, locating the tragic at a pivotal place in 
the Christian tradition and in the community’s liturgical life. MacKinnon and Williams, 
on the other hand, show in different ways the defects of traditional theodicy and how 
tragedy can do important theological work. 
In this final chapter, I will articulate the benefits of the idea of the tragic in a 
Christian understanding of nature and show how it makes a helpful contribution to any 
realist doctrine of creation. It is one way of addressing the natural evil that is the result of 
evolutionary processes. I use the word “addressing” here intentionally. I do not think that 
it is the job of the theologian to “solve” the theological problem of natural evil, nor do I 
think it appropriate to take on the responsibility of defending the righteousness of God—
the literal meaning of the word “theodicy.” However, addressing natural evil is an 
important responsibility for theologians that take nature as an object of concern. 
Having reviewed the theories of tragedy from Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Hegel, and 
having showed how tragedy functions in the theology of Balthasar, MacKinnon, and 
Williams, it would now seem appropriate to give a specific definition of tragedy relevant 
to the thesis at hand. This I will not do, however, and quite purposefully. To put specific 
parameters around the tragic is to tame it, but the genre itself resists domestication; this is 
part of the benefit of using it to address the problems of suffering and natural evil, which 
themselves resist domestication. Kevin Taylor writes, “How can one work with 
something that remains undefinable? Yet this is the reality of tragedy—its indefinition. 
Tragedy is precisely the boundary places, the places without definition or clear 
conceptualization: areas of madness, suffering, extremes, irony, unpredictability, and 
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uncontrollable passions. It is something that in its nature resists definition, and instability 
is one of its hallmarks…. It is a slippery concept and word.”1 It is not only that the 
definition of tragic drama is slippery; the term “tragedy” itself is used both for real-life 
and fictional events, referring both to things that are of the highest estate (Aristotle’s 
preference), as well as, in the modern era, the more quotidian (Steiner’s objections 
notwithstanding). Rather than being a fault, however, the ambiguity of the term is one of 
its greatest virtues in the application of tragedy to a doctrine of creation. 
Though it resists definition, there are qualities to be found in tragic drama that 
make it helpful for a doctrine of creation. In addition to its multivalent ambiguity, I will 
make the case in this chapter that the benefits of tragedy for a doctrine of creation are its 
intrinsically dramatic nature, its acknowledgment of the presence of divinity, that it takes 
suffering seriously, the way it allows for particularity, its displaying of the natural 
world’s ability to frustrate will, and the tension it reveals between nature and culture. One 
can find these benefits illustrated in some of the plays themselves. For that reason I will 
next provide a reading of Sophocles’ Philoctetes to illustrate how a specific Attic 
dramatic tragedy can contribute to a Christian theological reading of nature. 
Philoctetes by Sophocles 
In its treatments of humanity, divinity, and nature, Philoctetes is highly relevant 
to the thesis at hand; the classicist Norman Austin refers to Philoctetes as “theological 
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through and through.”2 However, Philoctetes is one of the lesser-known of the author’s 
dramas. It is believed to have been written late in Sophocles’ career, and chronologically 
followed plays by the same name written by Aeschylus and Euripides. The plays by the 
latter dramatists have not survived. Like Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus, his Philoctetes 
tells the story of an older man, looking back on his past and what he has undergone—
perhaps as Sophocles himself was doing during its composition. The play won the 
Dionysian festival in 409 BCE; Sophocles died three years later.  
Philoctetes himself is a minor character in the Homeric epics; Diskin Clay refers 
to the story of Philoctetes as a “legend at the edges of the Iliad.”3 Philoctetes’ fleet, 
carrying an army of hundreds of archers, is mentioned at the beginning of the poem, in 
the Catalogue of Ships found in the second book. Homer passingly references 
Philoctetes’ fate of being abandoned on “Lemnos’ holy shores” and then writes 
significantly “but soon … the Argives would recall Philoctetes, their great king” (2.826).4  
The Iliad only reports on one specific period in the Trojan War: the conflict 
between Achilles and Agamemnon, and the death and burial of “Hektor, breaker of 
horses.” It is part of the necessary background to Philoctetes that, following the death of 
Hektor, and thus not included in the text of the Iliad itself, Odysseus had captured 
Helenos, one of the Trojan prophets. Upon threat of death, Helenos revealed that Troy 
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would not be taken until two conditions were met: first, that Philoctetes returned from 
Lemnos, bringing with him the bow of Herakles, which never misses its target; second, 
that Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, was brought from Skyros, where he was being raised 
in his father’s absence. Odysseus then set off to collect both of his charges. The play 
Philoctetes is the story of Odysseus’ efforts to get Philoctetes to rejoin the Greeks outside 
of Troy, having already retrieved Neoptolemus. The Athenian audience would have 
known that, in the events that follow the play, Philoctetes did go to the Greeks and used 
the magical bow to kill Paris. With both Paris and Hektor dead, the chain of events began 
that would lead to the victory of the Greeks and the wholesale destruction of Troy.  
In Sophocles’ telling, Lemnos is an abandoned island, and the Philoctetes that 
Odysseus and Neoptolemus find on Lemnos is a pathetic character indeed. The reason 
Philoctetes had been abandoned on Lemnos by the Greeks was that he had been bitten by 
Chryse’s snake outside the temple of Apollo, on an island by the same name located 
between Greece and Troy. The snake had been guarding the temple. The snake’s bite was 
terrible and would not heal. In exposition at the beginning of the play, Odysseus tells 
Neoptolemus that, “his foot [was] / all but consumed by / the disease with which it 
festered” (vv. 9-11). Philoctetes’ cries of pain resulting from the bite—“Groaning: 
howling” as Odysseus describes them (v. 15)—were so intense that they would interrupt 
the necessary religious sacrifices that the Greeks were trying to make in their camp, 
putting the divine support for their campaign at risk. That is why Philoctetes had to be 
sent away. He was on Lemnos without human companionship for nine years before 
Odysseus and Neoptolemus appeared. 
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Given his treatment at their hands, Odysseus knew that Philoctetes would 
obviously be uninterested in helping the Greeks—quite the opposite—and Odysseus, a 
character well known for being wily and even deceitful, also knew that he would have to 
engage in trickery in order to retrieve the invincible bow. For the deception, he needed 
Neoptolemus’ assistance. The need for what would normally be a dishonorable act of 
deception was obvious: Philoctetes would never come with Odysseus willingly, nor 
would he be interested in helping the Greeks succeed, yet, without him, the long 
campaign for Troy would be a failure. However, Neoptolemus, the son of the great 
Achilles, inhabits a different moral universe than Odysseus. Convincing Neoptolemus to 
go along with the plan is difficult; though he initially agrees, he has a change of heart late 
in the play after obtaining the bow and returns to Philoctetes. Neoptolemus accepts that, 
to be honorable with Philoctetes, Neoptolemus must accompany the injured and 
aggrieved man back to his home, and not to Troy. This would mean the defeat of Greece. 
This action is only put to a stop by the deus ex machina of Herakles’ appearance. 
Herakles instructs Philoctetes to go to Troy with his magical bow in order to fulfill the 
prophecy. The Athenian audience knew that Philoctetes would be healed by Asclepius 
upon rejoining the Greeks, enabling him to successfully loose the arrow that would kill 
the hated Paris. So instructed, the play ends with Philoctetes limping toward Odysseus’ 
ship, bound for Troy and glory, accompanied by a sympathetic Neoptolemus.  
One of the tragic elements in the play is the moral choice faced by Neoptolemus: 
he must decide how to act in a situation in which two ethical goods conflict. This is 
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Hegelian to the core, and indeed Hegel uses it in the discussion of his theory of tragedy.5 
For Neoptolemus, to be fully honest with Philoctetes is to risk not being able to get him 
off the island, and thus risk losing the Trojan War; to participate in his deception is to buy 
into the debased Odyssean guile that differed from the traditional Greek honor code that 
was so valued by Neoptolemus’ father, Achilles. Odysseus lacks these scruples; his only 
moral code is expediency.6 “Where a man is needed, of whatever kind, I am such a man,” 
he tells Philoctetes. “If the time called for just and upright men, / you would find no one 
more noble than myself. / However, I was born desiring absolute victory….” (vv. 1167–
1170). Odysseus keeps to this code, and Philoctetes keeps to his, but much of the play is 
about Neoptolemus going back and forth in his thinking. It is only the intervention of 
Herakles that can overcome the impasse. 
But Neoptolemus, Odysseus, and Philoctetes are not only acting in the context of 
the collision of different moral frameworks. All three are sharing the stage with a fourth 
“character” in the play: the abandoned island of Lemnos itself, where Philoctetes lives in 
what is as close to a state of nature as appears in Greek drama. The moral predicament 
itself has come about because of Philoctetes’ forced intimacy with the natural world, 
unmitigated by traditional creature comforts. The abscess on his foot is the most obvious 
example. It is the result of an interaction between two living creatures, the man and the 
snake (albeit a magical snake), each pursuing its own respective natural good in the way 
specific to its species. To put it in Thomistic terms, the evil of Philoctetes’ debilitating 
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sickness—a sickness that makes the tragedy arise in the first place—is the consequence 
of a particular being doing what is “good”: in biting Philoctetes, the snake did what 
snakes do when they are seeking their own perfection. And, Aquinas holds, that is exactly 
what they should do. 
Philoctetes therefore dramatizes the potentially destructive consequences of being 
a body in the world. Philoctetes is routinely paralyzed by the pain caused by the abscess. 
It alternatively stuns him into silence and possesses his body to emit a scream that cannot 
be transcribed (e.g., v. 754). In other words, this organic process temporarily breaks 
Philoctetes, who for a few moments loses that fundamental mark and facilitator of human 
social life: language.7 In those moments, the audience sees the “unmaking of the world” 
that Scarry describes, as Philoctetes’ existence is reduced to that one excruciating point 
on his foot; by it he has been “utterly destroyed” (v. 249). That pain becomes the sole 
characteristic of his life, but one that cannot be shared with others: it is “Fearsome—
untellable….” (v. 781). Odysseus does not even want to try; in describing to 
Neoptolemus what it was like for Philoctetes to be at camp with his disease, he suddenly 
stops: “Why speak of it now? This is hardly the hour for long speeches” (vv. 17–18). 
Odysseus’ deception literally adds insult to injury. 
It is only because of the beneficence of Herakles, who had gifted Philoctetes the 
bow at the occasion of Herakles’ own death, that Philoctetes can live on Lemnos at all. 
Given his injury and consequent lack of mobility, without the bow that always hits its 
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target, he would starve. But having to hunt for his food is not the only result of his living 
in a state of nature. The challenging geography of Lemnos is such that Philoctetes must 
live in a cave. Odysseus, ever the propagandist, describes it as pleasant, instructing 
Neoptolemus at the beginning of the play, before Philoctetes’ appearance, to “look for 
where these rocks become a double-mouthed cave— / forming in winter a sort of twin 
sun-seat, / while in summer a breeze can send sleep through the cave at both ends…. / 
Below it, to the left, you should see / a small spring of drinking water….” (vv. 23–27). 
Neoptolemus, however, sees “a sort of house” outside of which there are rags soaked 
with pus, drying in the sun (vv. 39, 45). In contrast to Odysseus’ description of a 
pleasant, temperature-adjusted abode, Philoctetes describes it as “hot sometimes; 
sometimes, like ice” (v. 1201). It is a “house, not exactly a house” (v. 540), or as Lloyd-
Jones translates it, a “home that is not a home inside….” (v. 534).8 
The abscess on his foot, his dependence on what he can kill for food, and his 
exposure to the elements: Philoctetes on Lemnos is devoid of the comforts of civilization. 
Shakespeare’s King Lear refers to Poor Tom as “the thing itself, unaccommodated man” 
that is “a poor, bare, forked animal” (III.4), which is the human being unprotected in the 
natural world. Poor Tom is acting; Philoctetes is not. It is that “unaccommodated man” 
that Odysseus and Neoptolemus find on Lemnos. Philoctetes therefore illustrates the 
seemingly adversarial character with which nature sometimes faces human beings and 
other creatures. This supports Ruprecht’s contention that it is not the case that all Greek 
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tragedies end badly; many of them do not. Rather, all of the tragedies begin badly.9 This 
tragedy begins with Philoctetes’ vulnerability to nature. Insofar as there is destruction in 
Philoctetes, it is not the result of Trojan spears or arrows, but the result of bodily life in 
the world, which includes the possibilities of snakebites and abscesses that do not heal. It 
is only because Philoctetes finds himself such a part of nature that the moral difficulty 
arises for him and for Neoptolemus: if Philoctetes had the protections of a comfortable 
home, a healthy body, medical care, and access to food, presumably he would not be as 
easy to manipulate, nor would he have to make the choice between home and Troy.  
The natural world is not the background to the play. Philoctetes is not a visitor to 
nature. He, more than any other character, is part of nature, a constituent element of the 
ecosystem of Lemnos, and that fact is the source of his suffering. To use later terms, 
moral evil and natural evil are not so easily separated in Philoctetes; they are inextricably 
linked. Certainly, the Greeks had made the choice not to care for him and to abandon him 
in a hostile land, but they had faced a similar moral dilemma as Neoptolemus: if he had 
remained in camp, he would have single-handedly put the army at risk of defeat. 
(Unsurprisingly, it was Odysseus who convinced them to send Philoctetes to Lemnos.) 
They too had been forced to decide as a result of the natural evil that had afflicted 
Philoctetes. 
This state of nature, which includes aspects by which Philoctetes is “utterly 
destroyed,” is the world that a doctrine of creation seeks to consider theologically. 
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Therefore, drawing from this reading of Philoctetes, in the next section I will show some 
of the interrelated lessons of tragedy for a doctrine of creation. This is not to say that 
Philoctetes is the pinnacle of Greek drama nor that it exhausts the possibilities for tragedy 
considered theologically, or even for a doctrine of creation. It is one example, however, 
that illustrates how the tragic drama can have resonances with a realist doctrine of 
creation.  
The benefits of tragedy 
Dramatic 
First, tragedy is dramatic, in that it is a narrative depicting action over time. To 
explicate the advantage of this aspect, it is worth highlighting the generic differences 
between tragedy and other ways of addressing suffering. Classically, the way philosophy 
has dealt with the problem of suffering has been propositional, and rightfully so: the 
careful explication and analysis of ideas can clarify thinking and reach conclusions that 
would be difficult to reach otherwise. One of the great benefits of the advent of analytic 
philosophy in the modern era has been this insistence on clarity. But there is also a 
recognition, even within philosophy and religious studies more generally, that this type of 
language cannot encompass the full breadth of human experience; that is not its goal.10 
When dealing with the problem of suffering, however, the full breadth of human 
experience is what is in question. As I wrote in chapter three, the limit experiences that 
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complicate efforts to theorize natural evil should not be marginalized but must be part of, 
even central to, what is at issue. 
Because of the difficulty of such a project, it is therefore worthwhile to explore 
additional resources when trying to engage with creation considered in its fullness, even 
in its most difficult aspects. It is not my goal to supplant all other genres of discourse—be 
they analytic or continental philosophy, or anything else—but rather to bring to light 
possibilities that are already latent within the Western tradition and that form the horizon 
of Christian theological thought. Greek philosophy is obviously one of the wellsprings of 
Christian theology, but it may be that, as Taylor wrote in a discussion of Plato, “The real 
handmaiden to Christianity is … not Greek philosophy but Greek tragic drama.”11 Again, 
tragedy lacks the precision of analytic philosophy. However, this is appropriate to the 
topic as it is the inherent generality of analytic theodicy that frustrates its ability to deal 
successfully with this area of concern. The problem of suffering escapes such simple 
categorization. It therefore does not lend itself to conversation in philosophical 
propositions only, though those kinds of propositions are nonetheless still helpful, just in 
different ways. Thus the dramatic nature of tragedy makes it helpful for these 
discussions. 
Balthasar’s depiction of Holy Saturday is a theological example of this. Where 
Philoctetes’ suffering is manifested in howls of pain, Christ’s is manifested in the silence 
of death in the depths of hell. The movement and details of the birth, ministry, 
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crucifixion, death, and descent of Jesus is what makes the story of the life tragic, not only 
one or another element of it taken in isolation. The subtlety and ambiguity of natural evil 
is only realized in processes over time. Aristotle made this point: the plot matters. 
The dramatic nature of tragedy has its resonances not only with Christian 
theology but with the praxis of the Christian community. The re-creation of the drama of 
Jesus’ life and death, along with the prolepsis of resurrection, is re-enacted in each 
celebration of the Eucharist. One way to see what is happening in that celebration is to be 
reminded of what Balthasar wrote about tragedy and the Eucharist in the essay “Tragedy 
and Christian Faith”: Christ’s suffering is held up in front of God in that moment of 
consecration, almost as a protest against the depths of suffering that not only Christ but 
the assembly has entered into or seen others enter into. This is not an explanation for any 
kind of suffering, but it is a refusal to allow it to be forgotten or ignored, even by God. 
The fact that this happens at every Eucharist shows the prominence those aspects of 
experience have, or can have, within the primary act of the Christian tradition, at least in 
its more catholic manifestations. That it is a liturgical act, however, shows that it is 
possible to evoke dramatically what cna less successfully be expressed propositionally. 
This is in some sense a Wittgensteinian insight: the liturgical form of life provides insight 
into the nature of creation in a way that philosophy does not. As drama, tragedy then 
provides what philosophy cannot, such that both are important components of any 
theology of creation. 
Or at least it usually does not. Again, Hegel and Nietzsche may come closest to 
this recognition of the importance of drama. Both of their philosophies are dramatic: the 
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development of Geist in Hegel is a dynamic act, as is what Nietzsche describes as the 
unity of all things that happens in the moment of tragic awareness. I have noted my 
differences with them both already, but it is significant that this dramatic focus occurs 
within projects in which they are both explicitly engaging in the task of theodicy. It is 
also significant that both of them are especially idiosyncratic figures in the history of 
modern philosophy. While Neiman has demonstrated that the problem of evil has been 
the motivating factor in much modern philosophy, she also establishes how it has not 
been explicit, but rather formed the shadowy, unacknowledged backdrop. It was not 
unacknowledged by either Hegel or Nietzsche, nor should it be unacknowledged by 
theologians. Neiman’s book is historical and descriptive; it does not recommend another 
way of doing philosophy. I argue, however, that tragedy is a useful resource for moving 
theology forward: it is explicit about what philosophy has historically hidden, and its 
dramatic nature is better able to address the nature of the experiences themselves. Drama 
and philosophy are not opposites, much less oppositional. Rather, they are complements, 
each providing what the other is less able to deliver. 
Creation in the presence of divinity 
The liturgical emphasis that is internal to Christian theology demonstrates a 
second resonance between dramatic tragedy and theology. As Balthasar notes, tragic 
drama depicts the extremities of human experience while still showing an awareness of 
the presence of the gods. A specifically Christian tragedy, in that sense, is more like Attic 
drama than that of Schopenhauer’s pathos. Schopenhauer’s is another way of addressing 
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experiences of suffering, of course: pessimism as a comprehensive outlook in a world 
that is exclusively immanent and suffering (alone) as a natural and inevitable state of 
affairs. “Misfortune, in general, is the rule,” he writes.12 The ambiguity found in both 
tragic drama and in the celebration of the Eucharist is missing there, as is any sense of 
transcendence. 
Attic drama, on the other hand, affirms that the world exists in the presence of, 
and even under the influence of, the divine. This is obviously a religious impulse, but it is 
a religious impulse that is not uncritical, since the dramas themselves also exhibit a 
recognition that suffering interrupts the ability to find refuge in any trite religious 
formulations. In Philoctetes, the Chorus repeats the traditional religious tropes in a way 
that reveals them to the audience as empty, inadequate to the extremity of the situation at 
hand; this is part of what makes Philoctetes “theological through and through.” After all, 
the background to the play is the fact that Philoctetes’ own pain, the result of a snakebite 
outside the Apollonian temple, had exceeded the ability of his community’s religion to 
assimilate: its intensity was such that his screams in response disrupted the customary 
religious practices. It thus had to be excluded and expelled.  
Two points are thus made. First, the presence, and especially the influence, of the 
gods do not guarantee safety. “Creation in the presence of divinity” is not, for Philoctetes, 
an unalloyed good; on the island of Chryse, the absence of the god and anything she had 
to do with would have been far better. Instead, her presence was felt even when she was 
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not present. Second, religious practices themselves do not guarantee comfort. The 
Greeks’ piety reached its limits in the case of Philoctetes. While their practices may have 
been sufficient for most circumstances, the case of Philoctetes served as a limit case for 
the practices’ comprehensiveness, and the practices came up short. It is no wonder, then, 
that Philoctetes bitterly complains about the gods. In spite of this, however, his very 
complaints show that it is also Philoctetes—as it was with Job—who insists on divine 
justice and protests its absence: “How to account for this, how approve it / when in 
looking upon matters divine, I find the gods / themselves are evil?” (v. 452–454). Yet it is 
still the gods to whom Philoctetes cries out in his pain, that they come to him as “kind 
protectors” (v. 760), or that they “come with gentleness” as David Grene translates it (v. 
738).13 
This unsuccessful insistence on the justice of the gods highlights the otherness of 
the gods that is found in Greek tragedy. Greek gods are not accountable to mortals. They 
do not share the same moral codes, and their ways are sometimes inexplicable. The 
parallels with traditional Christian understandings of God are limited, of course. The 
inhabitants of the Greek pantheon do not have the radical otherness of the Christian God, 
and this radical otherness is an integral part of any theology that engages with tragedy. 
For the theologian, the radical otherness of God means that the relationship with God and 
the forces that cause suffering are not that of two agents with a shared background. 
Francesca Aran Murphy, in the course of a discussion about tragedy, summarizes the 
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classical position by writing, “Although infinite good and evil both exist, they don’t co-
exist, because the way in which God exists is different from that in which anything else 
does.”14 There is no category of which God is a member. Strictly speaking, “God” and 
“creation” are not opposites because they do not have a shared context in which to differ. 
The way in which God exists, as described by Aquinas for example, means 
simultaneously that God is not an object in the world, and that God can be immediately 
present to the world nonetheless. In Christian theology, for creation to exist in the 
“presence” of God, therefore, is not for creation and God to be two participants in a 
drama.  
This was not the thought-world of the Athens of the fifth century BCE, of course; 
Herakles and Poseidon were certainly participants in a drama, and there was no 
conception of them as esse ipsum. Nonetheless, unlike the bleak modern world of many 
modern dramas in the West, for instance, in which only the traces of divine presence 
remain (Waiting for Godot, for example), the gods are acknowledged in Greek tragedy as 
central, even when they are absent. This can be seen in Euripides’ Trojan Women. One of 
the ways that the dramatist indicates just how impious the Greeks are being in their 
sacking of Troy is to have the gods depart from Troy at the beginning of the play.15 Troy 
then becomes literally godforsaken, and the unremitting terrors that follow reflect that.  
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The cry of dereliction from the cross is the supreme Christian parallel to this. The 
godforsaken son of God charges the absence of God against the absent God. Yet the 
gospel narrative plumbs depths deeper than that of dramatic tragedy, whether Philoctetes 
or Trojan Women. The silence of the descent into hell, which follows the cry of 
dereliction, thereby makes impossible even the possibility of that shouted protest of 
abandonment: language is one of the things that has been lost. Further, as Balthasar notes, 
when the Father is absent to the Son, he is by consequence inaccessible to all of creation; 
it is as if Philoctetes’ alienation were to become the alienation of the cosmos as a whole.  
The traces of this alienation remain in the Christian consciousness even after the 
resurrection. The dialectic of presence and absence is the annual drama of the Triduum. 
As noted earlier, the emptiness of Holy Saturday shows an awareness of the possibility of 
that alienation at the center of Good Friday and Easter. Further, this Triduum drama is 
encapsulated in abbreviated form in each celebration of the Eucharist, in which the 
person of Jesus serves as the (tenuous?) link between the otherness of God and the 
created world. The created world in its entirety, including but not limited to human 
beings, is thus recognized as contingent and its existence dependent on grace. This 
contingency and potential for alienation resonates with Attic tragedy, even as it exceeds 
it.  
Takes suffering seriously 
As we have seen, theodicies, whether of the evolutionary or another kind, have 
traditionally too easily slipped into justifications of suffering. Many of them ignore the 
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way that those experiences can define some human lives—as they do, at least 
temporarily, for both Philoctetes and Oedipus. In a critical discussion of Hegel’s 
philosophy, Susan Neiman wrote ironically, “Good theodicy makes everyone feel that his 
troubles were justified.”16 This quest for justification may be motivated by an aversion to 
acknowledging the fragility of the human being in the world. There is a tendency in 
modern philosophy to seek to escape from the vulnerabilities of bodily life—a tendency 
that has been documented by many scholars, in various specialties17—resulting in 
affinities for idealism and against realism. The quest to evade vulnerability is, as Murphy 
writes, “an unwillingness to suffer reality.”18 It is less likely that one will deny one’s own 
suffering—that is hard to do—but more likely that one will deny the sufferings of others, 
whether in an abstract way, such as theory, or in a more immediate and concrete way. Yet 
a utilization of tragedy can reflect that suffering is not peripheral to what it means to be 
an embodied human being; in some cases it is determinative of that experience. To 
recognize evolution by natural selection as the engine of organic development is to see 
how suffering is built into nature as well. To take life seriously in its fullness is to take 
suffering seriously in its fullness.  
The assumption in this argument is that taking suffering seriously means not 
moving automatically into explanatory systems. There are not fully-realized explanatory 
systems in Greek tragedy. Certainly, one can see how one event leads to another; the 
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incidents of suffering do not arise ex nihilo, but are the result of processes that are in 
theory observable. It is the fact that individuals are embedded in history that makes the 
incidents possible. Nonetheless, these processes are not explanations in an ultimate sense.  
However, one may ask why suffering should be taken seriously in this way and 
what taking it seriously would mean in this context. The focus on suffering exists because 
it is part of the reality of the experience of sentient beings—a part that is too often 
omitted in theological discourse—such that not to take it seriously would be to be in 
denial about an aspect of reality. Murphy writes, “A bit of the human mind is in denial 
about reality because it is in denial of suffering.”19 Philosophy should be accountable to 
what is observable, while granting that observations can be in error and that observations 
are only made in part. Insofar as the truth can be spoken, therefore, that truth must 
include acknowledgment of the presence of suffering. In the present context, taking it 
seriously involves addressing the previously described discoveries of evolutionary 
biology.  
Particularity 
Part of “taking suffering seriously,” however, is acknowledging that it occurs in 
particular experiences. As suffering that is the result of natural evil should be taken in its 
particularity, tragedy itself reflects that focus in the makeup of the drama itself. Taylor 
and Waller write, “Tragedy resists … reductions and generalizations. Indeed, the very 
resistance of tragedy to an adequate and totalizing general theory might be taken to be 
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one of its key features.”20 As in life, “in encountering tragedy, especially on the stage, we 
are always confronted with a particular character, embodied by a particular actor. 
Narratives and experiences of suffering cannot easily be wrenched from their dramatic 
context and extrapolated into general theories or maxims.”21 This particularity is a virtue 
of the adoption of tragedy as a way of addressing natural evil. The propensity of much 
Western thought is otherwise, a propensity that is articulated in both high-brow and low-
brow ways. Hegel wrote that the philosopher, perusing the history of civilization and its 
progress, must not be bogged down in the details: “Reason cannot stop to consider the 
injuries sustained by single individuals, for particular ends are submerged in the universal 
end.”22 In a less scholarly vein, it is said that Charlie Chaplin once quipped, “Life is a 
tragedy when seen in close-up, but a comedy in long-shot.”23 I have been making the case 
that a realist doctrine of creation should attend both to the close-up and to the long-shot. 
This means engaging with individual experiences and paying attention to details. The 
presentation of individual characters—Philoctetes, Odysseus, and Neoptolemus in the 
present example, but also Job, Judas, and Christ as well—is a way of acknowledging that 
particularity. This also means acknowledging particular responses to suffering; as 
Williams pointed out, what an observer might expect to be a debilitating and definitive 
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experience may not be seen as such by the one who actually undergoes the event. 
Particularity can also result in unpredictability. 
Particularity thus resists traditional theodicies, and even in Philoctetes this 
dynamic is evident. In an early dialogue between Neoptolemus and his Chorus of sailors, 
the Chorus expresses his sympathies for the pitiable state that Philoctetes is in: “I pity the 
man. No one cares for him, / he has no one to look to. Wretched. Alone, always. / He 
suffers this terrible disease…. / How does he keep going?” (vv. 179–182). The plight of 
Philoctetes is unjust: “Stratagems of the gods—unlucky race of man, / to whom there is 
no fair measure in this life” (vv. 183–184). In response, Neoptolemus—unconverted at 
this point—immediately plays the role of the theodicist, finding justification for 
Philoctetes’ state in the design of the gods, which, rather than having “no fair measure,” 
actually expresses what is meet and right. He says, 
None of this surprises me. 
For, as I understand it, these sufferings are the will of the gods, 
and came upon him from savage-minded Chryse, 
and the things that he now endures, companionless, 
these too must be the design of the gods, 
so that he cannot send his invincible weapons against Troy 
until the time when it is determined that Troy must be destroyed 
by those weapons (vv. 191–199).  
His unsurprised justification is interrupted by the Chorus, who, hearing a sound, shouts, 
“Silence!” Neoptolemus, however, cannot hear what prompted the Chorus’ exclamation, 
deafened, as it were, by his own generalizations. “What is it?” he asks. The Chorus 
responds, 
I heard a sound—as of someone in great pain— 
here, or—or over there. 
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It’s coming to me, yes: the voice of one who makes his way in agony— 
from afar, a man suffering—heavy groans— 
his lament coming clearly (vv. 201–205).  
It is the voice of one. It is the Chorus who is able to hear the crying out of the individual 
person Philoctetes, and it is the Chorus who, though participating in the deception, 
expresses his concern in the following dialogue between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes. 
The Chorus only has a few lines in this section, which precedes the arrival of a disguised 
Odysseus, but they are expressions of sympathy: “Like the strangers who have come here 
before, / I too pity you, son of Poias” (vv. 313–314); to Neoptolemus they say, “Pity him, 
my lord” (v. 518). To be sure, these sentiments may be wholly feigned, and they are 
echoing the duplicity undertaken by Neoptolemus. Nonetheless, the ambiguity of the 
Chorus’ role is evident in the way in which he brings Neoptolemus’ attention back to the 
person standing before him. Perhaps in doing so, even unintentionally, the Chorus helps 
facilitate Neoptolemus’ later change of heart. It is only when Neoptolemus enters into 
Philoctetes’ world, symbolized by his entrance into Philoctetes’ cave, that he stops his 
generalizations and interacts with the individual named Philoctetes: not as an example of 
a principle but as a particular person in a particular situation. 
Such a benefit is not without a concomitant risk, to be sure. An individual’s 
insistence on her own uniqueness—that her experience places her entirely separate from 
others—may be its own form of self-absorption. There are more than traces of this in 
Philoctetes; Sophocles’ depiction of the character is not entirely sympathetic toward 
Philoctetes’ stubbornness, a stubbornness that veers into the territory of 
counterproductive obstinacy. Philoctetes is cutting off his nose to spite his face, so to 
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speak; going to Troy may be some kind of victory for Odysseus, but it would also result 
in the alleviation of Philoctetes’ pain. Until the intervention of Herakles, Philoctetes is 
clinging to his pain almost as a point of pride.  
Ironically, dramatic tragedy itself may be a way of mitigating, though not 
alleviating, this risk in the lives of individuals. In watching a performance of a tragedy, 
one may see that all experiences are both unique in one sense, but also not entirely so. 
This was, after all, one of Aristotle’s observations: the recognition of similarity between 
the audience and the character, even though its particulars differed. The “fear” part of 
“pity and fear” comes from the audience’s recognition that something like what is 
happening on stage could happen to them.  
This commonality in the midst of particularity is illustrated in a famous scene in 
the Iliad itself. When Achilles’ wrath about Patroclus’ death causes Achilles to abuse the 
body of Hektor, Zeus sends Priam, Hektor’s father, to visit Achilles in the Achaean camp, 
where he begs for Hektor’s body. Priam invokes Achilles’ own father and the love father 
and son had for each other. For a brief moment, Priam and Achilles, mortal enemies, 
share a moment of common grief, weeping and remembering better days. Their 
circumstances differ, but both have experienced tragic loss, and this draws them together. 
This empathy does not last; Priam slips out of the Greek camp that night. Later, Priam 
will be killed during the sack of Troy. His death will come at the hands of Neoptolemus. 
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The frustration of will 
To see the tragic aspect of nature is also to be aware of the way in which a being’s 
will can be stymied not only by other wills but also by the structures of the environment. 
A recognition of evolution by natural selection shows that the problem of suffering is 
ingrained in nature. Natural beings are both active and passive, doing and being done to. 
In tragic drama, destiny plays this role, but it is destiny that is frequently accomplished 
by natural means (i.e., without the direct intervention of the gods). Oedipus is the 
ultimate example of this. Oedipus took all possible steps to avoid what had been 
prophesied to happen to him: he took the initiative to strike out on his own; he displayed 
endurance and discernment, and so forth. He is portrayed as wise, solving the riddle that 
had entrapped Thebes. And yet, it was just those efforts that resulted in his becoming the 
agent of his own destruction. He gained a truer wisdom, both about who he was and 
about the finality of destiny, but the knowledge he obtained from his effort was horrible. 
Philoctetes also, no matter how much he wanted to heal, was not able to do so; the 
entirely natural suppuration of his wound kept him in his desperate state. Tragic drama 
shows that simple will, even of the most tenacious kind, is not enough. Greek tragedy 
especially is aware of the limitations of free will, particularly in the complicated 
relationship between free will and divine design. Whether the complication is nature or 
the gods, however, the spirit may be willing, but mortal flesh is weak and inadequate to 
the task, hobbled by its own contingency. 
Tragic drama therefore reflects how natural beings are not in full control of their 
experiences; some of the experiences may have an aspect of predetermination to them, 
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shaped to greater or lesser degrees in ways quite external to will. In the process of 
organic development, for example, this can be seen in the random errors made in DNA 
replication—random errors that can determine the course of a person’s life, resulting in 
blessings and curses in an unpredictable way. A free will cannot control genetic 
mutations. This particular message of tragedy is one that is quite countercultural in a 
contemporary world that valorizes the self-made person, for whom where there is a will 
there is a way. Greek tragedy does not evince this unambiguous trust in the power of will. 
Tragedy’s approach to the individual will is far more ambivalent, and that ambivalence is 
seen even in Philoctetes itself. Austin refers to it as a “contradiction” that is found in 
every play. The relationship of will and destiny  
was the great question with which all the tragic poets wrestled, and the 
contradiction is to be found in every tragedy. What are the relations between the 
human will and divine Necessity? Where to draw the line in human affairs 
between the cosmic forces impinging on the human and the human’s own power 
of choice? Like many Greek tragedies, this play entertains both hypotheses 
simultaneously, or rather, expresses now one, now its opposite.24 
It is an ambivalent approach, however, not a univocal one. If tragedy shows how 
the natural world, or destiny, can frustrate will, it also makes evident that the natural 
world does not eliminate will. The latter part of Philoctetes is specifically about the 
character’s free will; at least until the appearance of Herakles, it is his decision as to 
whether he goes to Troy or not, and Austin shows that how he makes that decision is the 
great conflict of the play. Philoctetes, in those moments when his pain ebbs, is very much 
the determiner of his fate, having to choose between a return to Thessaly or continuing on 
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to Troy, between revenge and glory. It is not that free will is utterly ineffective; even in 
Greek tragedy, destiny is not the only factor. Free will operates within certain given 
parameters, however, and the characteristics of those parameters are set by factors 
external to the individual.  
Ambiguity 
This presence of ambiguity is one characteristic that separates Greek tragedy from 
some more modern mindsets. As MacKinnon showed, both despair and optimism, 
lacking that ambiguity, seek thereby to elude the extreme situations of suffering. A 
mindset of despair is resigned, and thus the difficulty that the tragic poses is dulled. 
Conversely, a utopian optimism about the immanent by itself similarly dulls the 
pointedness of the present by its faith in the future. We have seen Schopenhauer’s 
exclusive focus on pessimistic despair in his considerations of tragedy. However, there 
are joyful experiences, and the joy itself can be found in the same creation that can also 
be so antagonistic to organic life. This is seen not only in the fact that the Athenian 
spectators watched both comedies and tragedies at their festivals but also in that classical 
tragedies themselves do not always end with existential despair. The ambiguity operates 
on a number of levels, as this section will show.  
In fact, Greek tragedy is far more ambiguous than is often realized. Greek 
tragedies are not simply stories of total desolation in all cases. Again, as Ruprecht points 
out, half of all extant tragedies do not end badly; rather, they all begin badly.25 That is (to 
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go beyond Ruprecht), they begin within a created world that is not designed solely for 
creaturely comfort and safety, and the unfolding of the drama occurs in that context. On 
the other hand, it is that created world that makes tragedy possible in the first place, 
including whatever resolutions are found within it. 
This is especially obvious in Philoctetes. As mentioned above, one of the most 
devastating aspects of Philoctetes’ sickness is the way that it alienates him from other 
human beings. It has resulted in his exile, of course, as well as the debilitating attacks that 
reduce him to paralyzed silence, animalistic grunts, and the screams of horror that led to 
his expulsion in the first place. Yet in the course of the play, the respites that come allow 
for communication with Neoptolemus, and they lead to what is almost a religious 
conversion for the son of Achilles, and it is a conversion that, Austin writes, introduces 
what is a new virtue for the Hellenic code: compassion for the weak.26 Philoctetes is so 
disgusting to the Greeks that he cannot be allowed within the bounds of the community at 
all; Philoctetes’ presence is seen as putting civilization itself at risk. He exists outside the 
realm of commerce with the gods, since his manner of life on Lemnos does not provide 
him with the opportunity to make the necessary sacrifices. Yet this interaction with 
Philoctetes’ suffering is what leads to Neoptolemus’ change of heart, and if Austin is 
right, this Sophoclean plot is a moral innovation for Greek civilization. Reading 
Philoctetes, one is seeing the moral development of a culture occurring right before one’s 
eyes. 
                                                 
26
 Austin, Sophocles’ Philoctetes and the Great Soul Robbery, 118–124. 
326 
 
Does this justify the plight of Philoctetes? Can a reader who resides in a culture 
that draws on the influences of the Attic world, a culture that values compassion, 
therefore see divine design at work in the narrative? Is this a place where we can again 
make the argument that Philoctetes’ pain is justified because of the goods that it brings 
about? Philoctetes himself certainly does not think so. In the play, once Odysseus has 
dropped the disguise and revealed himself, Philoctetes groans “Must I endure this too? / 
that this man shall drive me by force from this island?” (vv. 1080–1081). Odysseus seeks 
to pacify him, taking refuge in divine design: “It is Zeus—if you must know— / Zeus, the 
ruler of this land / by Zeus himself that these things have been determined— / I merely 
serve him” (vv. 1082–1085). Philoctetes rejects this as religious idiocy of the worst kind: 
the kind that justifies an occasion of suffering, which in reality has its origins in works of 
human beings, in order to manipulate the behavior of others. It is an argument that is 
always won by the political creature, to which the victim has only the power to protest in 
response. The issue of theodicy in the discussion is clear:  
PHIL. Hateful one, what lies you’ve found to say.  
You put the gods before you like a shield, and in so doing,  
you make of the gods liars. 
ODY. No—it is the truth—and this road must be traveled. 
PHIL. No! 
ODY. Yes! You’ve no choice but to obey. 
PHIL. Ah, then I am damned indeed (vv. 1086–92). 
Odysseus then holds out as an incentive the glory that Philoctetes will receive as victor 
over the Trojans, but again, at that point, Philoctetes really has no choice either way. 
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When Herakles appears ex machina at the end of the play, he does draw a connection 
between Philoctetes’ suffering and the glory that he is to receive. This is like the 
experience of the god himself, who, though he died on a pyre as a human being, was 
raised to semi-god status on Mt. Olympus. Herakles says to Philoctetes, “All this you can 
see in me now, / all this must be your experience too: / out of this suffering to win a 
glorious life” (vv. 1421–23). This is decidedly not a justification, however, but a simply a 
statement of the difference between what is the case now and what is to come. The Greek 
gods do enforce their design; they do decide who will be victorious and who will be 
defeated, but there is no suggestion that this fits into a scheme that overall manifests 
justice. Justice is not the primary concern of the gods. 
However, the adversarial characteristic of nature is not unmitigated either. Before 
he is to go to the ship, Philoctetes says that one of the reasons he needs to go back to his 
cave is that there is a balm there: “I have an herb, with which I always dress this wound; 
it eases the pain” (v. 664). Somewhat surprisingly for a play that is so critical of 
Odysseus, Philoctetes’ use of the herb for a balm confirms one of the mitigations that 
Odysseus suggests at the beginning of the play when he says of Philoctetes that, “He may 
know of some herb that eases the pain” (v. 50). It turns out that Odysseus was at least 
partially right. Philoctetes’ time on Lemnos has not been a time of unalloyed suffering. 
The entirety of nature is not against him. Like many medicines, however, the same 
substance that is a source of healing in one context can be a source of pain in another. 
There is no suggestion here that the herb that Philoctetes uses is also a poison. Rather, the 
balm that is also a poison is the natural world itself. It eliminates communication; it 
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facilitates communication. It destroys the physical life of Philoctetes; it improves the 
moral life of Neoptolemus.  
When the play ends, Philoctetes is still suffering from his wound. The audience 
knows, however, that he will be healed when he rejoins civilization, and he and 
Neoptolemus together, now joined together in fraternal affection, will receive the glory 
that comes when Troy falls. In one last tragic twist, however, the two will share the credit 
with another Greek warrior: Odysseus. The wiliness Odysseus evidences in Philoctetes is 
the same wiliness that enables him to conceive of the “Trojan horse” strategy, the final 
episode in the epic that is the Trojan War.  
This aspect of Philoctetes illustrates that a “tragic” creation is not by necessity 
only pathos. It can be; it can also not be. The act of affirming that it can be, however, that 
there is an ambiguous quality to the natural world that extends to its most constituent 
elements, differentiates this proposal from others.  
Nature & culture 
As was shown in the reading of Philoctetes, the relationship between nature and 
culture is another topic frequently explored in tragic literature. In a discussion of 
Oedipus, J. M. Bernstein writes, “The truth is that every death, every stillborn, every 
infant mortality, but also every sickness and undeserved pain is pollution: unmasterable 
nature haunting civilization.”27 We see that culture can never completely sanitize nature; 
this is closely related to the way in which nature frustrates human will, as discussed 
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above. The bite of a snake can significantly affect an individual life and a decade-long 
military campaign. The natural world in particular contains elements within it that remain 
intractably hostile; to quote Steiner, “What I identify as ‘tragedy’ in the radical sense is 
the dramatic representation or, more precisely, the dramatic testing of a view of reality in 
which man is taken to be an unwelcome guest in the world.”28 The resonances between 
tragedy and natural evil then become clear. As mentioned in the first chapter, the 
earthquake at Lisbon was particularly traumatic for eighteenth-century Europe because of 
the way in which the collapse of the cathedral itself was so fatal, as the city gathered on 
one of the Church’s most important holy days. The Gothic cathedral—the height of 
Christian architecture, developed over the course of centuries—was destroyed by 
“unmasterable nature” and so were all who were worshiping within it. Nature not only 
overcame culture; in this case, culture’s greatest accomplishments were used against it. 
This is a dynamic that can be found in tragic drama as well, as Bernstein writes: 
“Tragedy reveals the limits of culture: the authority of nature we thought we had left 
behind returns. Tragedy reveals the limits of freedom: we make the world, but not under 
the conditions of our own choosing.”29 
This is relevant to the issue of natural evil as well. There is a positivistic, 
behavioral view, that claims that with proper training, incentives, and so on, moral evil 
can be reduced and the harm persons do to one another, if not eliminated, can at least be 
lessened. This leads to improved quality of life for those affected. However, the problem 
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of natural evil pushes against an interpretation that further claims that this could be a 
scheme that is comprehensive in its effectiveness, because of that “unmasterable nature.” 
This is what is meant by the intractability of tragedy: the inability of pain and suffering to 
be eradicated from the lives of sentient beings, no matter how intense the effort to do so. 
Bernstein again:  
Tragedy reveals that life is apoetic, that life is not unconditionally or self-
sufficiently rational, consistent, orderly, lovable, intelligible, safe, lawful, or 
moral. Consider this list of items as collectively comprising what we think of as 
the achievements of culture and civilization. Tragedy brings into view what the 
triumphs of civilization—what philosophy rationally celebrates—have sought to 
repress, dominate, discount, deauthorize, and empty. Tragedy is the return of the 
repressed.30 
With this return comes the tempering of confidence in the potential success of human 
effort. The natural world resists having its effects be pacified by culture. It’s worth noting 
that some would nevertheless cling to this confidence in human possibility, even in the 
face of the Lisbon earthquake. Philosopher Claudia Sanides-Kolrausch identifies four 
responses to the earthquake that were made in its aftermath and finds there a continuation 
of earlier thought: “The central goal of the system of Pope and Leibniz was humanity’s 
moral improvement, and … the four characteristics [of reactions to the earthquake] … 
were a consequence of ideas about how to achieve that purpose.”31 Part of the crisis of 
late eighteenth-century European thought, however, was the undermining of confidence 
in achieving that goal, which seemed an insufficient response to the loss suffered.  
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Similarly, this also undermines a confidence in the promises of technology, which 
is its own way of seeking to manipulate the world. In a world in which suffering is part of 
the fabric of creation, technology will not be able to do away with suffering completely. 
The world eludes human control, particularly human control of nature. Charles Segal 
points this out when writing of Oedipus Tyrannus. There, Sophocles makes a distinction 
between “‘land’ as a political territory, which is usually denoted by chōra, and the ‘earth’ 
(gē or chthōn) as the site of what is unknown or hidden from human knowledge.”32 
Humans forget the distinction at their own risk. The political territory is the responsibility 
of human rulers, who can administer it in different ways, as they see fit. The “earth” 
represents those aspects of the world that do not submit to human jurisdiction. At one 
point early in the play, Oedipus claims that he can influence both chōra and gē; he 
claims, in other words, a mastery of nature. This claim to mastery is to prove his undoing: 
the “extension of Oedipus’ [perceived] power from chōra to gē anticipates the confidence 
in the human mastery of natural (and, in the Greek view, also divine) forces that events 
prove so misguided.”33 Those events show that “Oedipus’ control over this earth is no 
more secure a feature of his life than his relation to the rest of his identity.”34  
Though it is not Sophocles’ terminology, one can refer in shorthand to these latent 
negative forces of nature simply as “death.” Whether they result in biological death or 
not, they do represent the destruction of some instance of goodness. David Bentley Hart 
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points out that this is the terminology that is used in the New Testament.35 There, death 
itself is named the “last enemy” to be destroyed (1 Cor 15:26). This points to a Biblical 
recognition of the permanence of these forces; they can be expected to operate at greater 
or lesser intensity until the eschaton. Like tragedy, this is a way of acknowledging the 
influence of these forces in any conceivable immanent world. Also like tragedy, this 
conception does not seek to justify these forces as intrinsically edifying and thus 
something to be valued. They are simply powers that resist domestication to the detriment 
of sentient beings, and their final destruction is part of the Christian notion of the future 
as something that is hoped for but not guaranteed. 
Implications for a doctrine of creation 
All of these characteristics show that a view of creation that includes recognition 
of the tragic can contribute to a specifically realist doctrine of creation. It is a matter of 
describing things as they are, not as one’s theology might wish them to be. It is true that 
all observations are going to come with interpretations built in. All data is theory-laden, 
but there are better and worse ways that theology can attend to the manner by which 
nature pushes back against theoretical concerns. However, it is also one of the lessons of 
tragedy that, even though natural evil is a constituent part of the state of the world, not all 
experiences are gloomy. To describe creation as tragedy is not to describe it as dominated 
by pathos to the exclusion of all else. It is, however, reflective of a desire to acknowledge 
the full spectrum of experiences, including those of sentient creatures other than human 
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beings. The incorporation of this full spectrum has not always been part of philosophical 
discourse. In Plato’s Phaedo, referenced in chapter four, the distraught Xanthippe is sent 
away from the scene of execution; her “crying hysterically” cannot be abided in 
philosophical company. To draw on tragedy theologically, and specifically to raise up 
dramatic tragedy as a way of addressing the problem of suffering, is to acknowledge what 
Socrates exiles from philosophy’s presence: the tears of Xanthippe. This will inevitably 
affect the way in which Christian theology discusses creation.  
First, it becomes clear that a utilization of tragedy is an insistence on the inclusion 
of evidence that has traditionally been excluded. Tragedy serves as a critique of a 
straightforward teleological view. This teleology can be found in many different areas of 
philosophy and theology. We have seen how Balthasar resisted a view of the Triduum as 
teleological, and MacKinnon was critical of a philosophical idealism that he saw as 
overly teleological. Various interpretations of evolutionary biology, some seen in chapter 
three, have utilized a teleological perspective to argue for biology’s consonance with 
religious faith. A utilization of tragedy, however, resists any interpretation that sees 
history, including biology, as a seamless process of development. The philosophical 
insolubility of the problem of natural evil has been used to show how teleological 
interpretations of the natural world stumble when they attend closely to the facts of 
evolutionary biology. A recognition of tragedy is thus less of a prescriptive or 
constructive stance than a critical one. To return to Rowan Williams’ formulation, it is a 
“source of resistance.” Resistance is not prohibition, however. This is not to rule out of 
court theologically and scientifically robust doctrines of creation, nor is it to dismiss the 
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constructive work of analytic or continental philosophy. Such a proscription would act as 
its own exclusionary mechanism and prevent the possibility of new insights.  
Second, the conception of tragedy in light of evolution offered here argues against 
an anthropocentric doctrine of creation. The second chapter’s recounting of the 
evolutionary process reveals two factors that resist anthropocentricism. The discovery of 
the common origin of all organic beings must expand an understanding of what creation 
consists of. The differences between human beings and other beings are important: in 
some cases there are vast differences; in others, there are close similarities. Regardless, 
there is no doubt that these differences mark off human beings as unique among 
creatures. Nonetheless, these differences are ones that have arisen over the course of time 
as species diverged from a common origin. If a doctrine of creation is going to aim to be 
realist about the existing state of affairs, it should also be realist about the historical 
precedents of the present. In addition, it also reveals the interrelationality of all living 
creatures. Interdependence functions in many different ways, of course. Cooperative 
relationships exist between species as their complementary functioning allows each to 
flourish in a given niche, just as cooperative relationships within species do. One can also 
describe predatory and competitive relationships as relational, however; interdependence 
does not mean concord. The process of organic development taken in the aggregate is not 
a process of individual species evolving in complete isolation but evolving while their 
environment, including the other organisms present, also changes. This obviously 
includes human beings, but if the story of creation is told exclusively in terms of a single 
species it will be terribly incomplete.  
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Third, this dissertation’s focus recognizes the tragic nature of bodily experience. 
It reveals the ambiguity of embodied existence. To be embodied—a notion much 
celebrated in contemporary theology—comes at a high price. (This may be why it has 
been resisted for so long.) It makes one vulnerable in a way that pure speculation does 
not. More recent research into embodied cognition has revealed the way in which bodies 
affect thinking, quite contra Cartesian dualism.36 This ambiguity is captured well in 
Philoctetes, as the protagonist suffers from the vulnerabilities associated with human 
flesh, while that same embodiment also enables the relationship with Neoptolemus that 
results in its own kind of social healing. Social healing and physical healing are not 
entirely separated; neither are social exclusion and physiological illness. By including 
both sides of this consequence of embodiment, the consideration of tragedy resists a 
romanticization of the natural world. Again, this is not to say reductively that nature is 
“red in tooth and claw” to the exclusion of all of its other characteristics. It does however 
resist the romantic tendency to identify the natural world as a harmonious place when it is 
free of the pollution of human influence. On the other hand, it also resists the opposite 
tendency to identify the cosmos as a cold, bleak place without any human comforts. A 
realist doctrine of creation must therefore recognize the potentially tragic risks of created 
nature; these risks are not peripheral to physical contingency, but are very much a part of 
it.  
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Challenges 
There remain a number of objections to this thesis, and in the remainder of this 
chapter I will address some of them, in the order of what I consider to be lesser to greater 
challenges. First, the question of the possibility of hope in a tragic creation is an objection 
made from a slightly different point of view than the others. Second, the issue of 
eschatology, a topic critical for this dissertation, is addressed. Third, I discuss whether an 
awareness of the tragic aspects of created nature entails a belief in a tragic divine nature; 
that is, the issue of impassibility. Fourth, an objection mentioned in the previous 
chapter—that of tragedy itself being a totalizing method of discourse—is discussed at 
more length. Finally, I address the objection that such discussions reify tragedy, thus 
leading to the elision of particular experiences.  
Is hope possible? 
One of the concerns that is addressed in this dissertation is whether tragedy has 
any potential fruitful relationship to Christianity. I hope to have shown that there are 
aspects of the Christian story that are amenable to tragedy, and that the natural world fits 
with that conception. Other readers, however, may have a critique that comes from the 
opposite direction. These readers may agree with some of the central claims that have 
been made herein: the problem of natural evil has proven to be an enduring difficulty in 
the Christian theological tradition; evolution by natural selection aggravates that problem; 
no evolutionary theodicy since 1859 has been an adequate answer to that problem; a 
theology that acknowledges the presence of tragedy in the world is a good response. 
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However, they may be less sanguine about the idea that any traditional conception of 
Christian hope is still possible and, with different theological commitments, reject the 
proposal from the other side: since tragedy is relevant to the natural world it is thus an 
orthodox Christianity, not tragedy, that should be rejected. It is the task of this section to 
gesture toward a response to this critique and show how Christian hope is still possible 
and not antithetical to tragedy.  
It should first be noted, however, that the Greeks’ conception of their own 
dramatic tragedy was not one that was devoid of hope. This may be most obvious in the 
plays’ setting itself: the Dionysian festivals were religious festivals in which sacrifices 
were likely made to the gods. Sacrifices are only made when there are gods to be 
assuaged regarding future activity. While the details of the festivals’ activity may now be 
forever inaccessible, one can be fairly certain from extant evidence that the tragedies that 
were performed were not indicative of a comprehensive, fatalistic pessimism. There was 
a profound interweaving of the dramatic and the sacrificial/religious in the Greek 
imagination. Whatever it was exactly that the plays accomplished in the life of the 
community, even Nietzsche agrees that the effect was most likely affirmative. Complete 
despair was not the final resting place for the Athenian spectators. To seize on the 
moment of tragedy’s most despair-inducing moment and remain there, and only there, is 
to make an idol of the experience itself. That was not the practice of the Greeks insofar as 
we can tell. 
In addition to historical objections, however, there are also theological resources 
that would prevent the elimination of hope. The first Christian theological principle that 
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makes hope possible, even while acknowledging tragedy, is the otherness of God, briefly 
referenced above. It is the radical conception of divine otherness—or, and perhaps better 
said, God’s “not-other”-ness as Nicholas of Cusa terms it37—that allows both hope and 
tragedy to coexist. The hope that is maintained is not of the same type as an immanent 
hope. As stated above, the Triduum is not teleological; what comes on the other side of 
the descent into hell is not a restoration of a previous state of affairs, but a redemption. It 
is a redemption of every wound and experience. The means of that redemption are 
mysterious, but resurrection is not resuscitation. If God is truly not-other and 
eschatological life is participation in the life of God, then the reality that is hoped for is 
not a fairy tale with a happy ending, but a different reality altogether. This is along the 
lines of the claim made by many theologians working with tragedy and tragic literature, 
that the Christian narrative does not evacuate tragedy, nor does it overcome it. Rather, the 
descent shows that God’s very self enters into the deepest tragedy. Describing Balthasar’s 
view, Taylor writes, “God does not gloss over the world-stage and its tragic drama by 
annulling or renouncing it, but by entering into its tragic depths to heal it. He does not 
enter into this inheritance of tragedy by surpassing it (which would fail to answer and 
heal these tragedies), but by entering and sharing in this tragic suffering. Tragedy is both 
upheld as true, and transcended by its culmination in Christ.”38  
Second, the belief that hope is impossible is its own kind of elision of tragedy in 
two ways. The first way is that the potential existence of a different state of affairs is 
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what makes tragedy itself possible. This was Balthasar’s point in “Tragedy and Christian 
Faith”: “that which is broken to pieces in the tragic presupposes a faith in the unbroken 
totality.”39 Similarly, Philoctetes’ predicament on Lemnos was tragic because it could 
have been another way. The snake did not have to bite him; the Greeks did not have to 
expel him; Odysseus did not have to be the one to retrieve him. There was an aspect of 
tragedy in the choice he faced in going either with Neoptolemus back to his homeland or 
with Odysseus to the Scamander plain precisely because his decision could conceivably 
have been different.  
Second, a banishment of hope is its own way of finding refuge from contingency. 
To quote Murphy, “To isolate tragedy as an absolute or finality is one way of avoiding it. 
If the abyss to which it leads is taken as a dead-end, a pier that hangs out to sea and does 
not circle back to land, then the abyss is not integrated into experience. Thus held at a 
distance, it becomes entertainment or distraction.”40 This is related to the earlier critique 
of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer’s view of tragedy is that it is a genre that, as Douglas 
Hedley describes Schopenhauer’s position, “merely confirms the ghastliness of 
existence.”41 This was not the function of tragedy then or now, however. Hedley 
continues, “The centrality of sacrifice confirms an element within classical tragedy that is 
linked, however obscurely, to the making sacred of sacrifice. What is required is both a 
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sense of the dark and violent dimension of human existence and the redemptive hope that 
sacrifice points to.”42 
Perhaps the suspicion that tragedy precludes hope, including Christian hope, 
comes from an expectation that a true recognition of the tragic by the Christian tradition 
would be a resolution of the theodicy difficulties that have been such a plague. That is to 
misunderstand the tragic itself, however. What tragedy precludes is closure, by constantly 
raising up objections to neat systems—including neat eschatological systems—that 
would seek to integrate suffering into themselves in a smooth way. Tragedy is not an 
answer but a stimulus for exploring further questions. Far from eliminating the potential 
for there to be hope, it provides for hope’s possibility within a nonetheless realist frame. 
Murphy again: “The point is not to square suffering with ultimate harmony, but rather to 
show the two hanging together, in suspension.”43 Whether or not a utilization of tragedy 
is the best way to maintain that suspension, it is the thesis of this dissertation that it 
makes a valiant effort that is worthy of theological consideration.  
Not dissolved by eschatology 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to a use of tragedy is the place of eschatology. 
Christian theology could be seen as Sewall described it, quoted in the previous chapter, 
when he referred to it as offering a “compensating heaven.” The emphasis of the 
dissertation has been on immanent tragedy, but the eschatological hope has as its end a 
redemption of tragedy. The emphasis on the tragic nonetheless remains for this project, 
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however, because it can serve as a corrective to overly optimistic or triumphalist 
theologies. It was the argument of the third chapter that the major approaches to 
evolutionary theodicy to date have veered too far into the triumphal. Thus, tragedy serves 
as a useful corrective. The Christian narrative itself is therefore a source of resistance to 
modes of thought—including some theologies—that attempt to overlook the reality of the 
experiences of sentient beings. 
However, the charge that Easter makes tragedy impossible is not limited to 
Sewall. The counter thesis is this: a Christian knows that it is possible that at the end of 
days a redemption of tragedy will make better all of the pains of existence. Therefore, a 
truly Christian mindset is unable to enter fully into the real depths of tragedy. In this 
view, there will also be a “yes, but…” that follows any Christian consideration of 
tragedy, whether it is spoken or remains unsaid. Iris Murdoch has been especially 
articulate with this challenge, as has George Steiner, as was seen in the previous chapter. 
For Murdoch, art should not console; if it consoles at all, it cannot be great art.44 As long 
as there is a potential eschatological consolation in Christianity then it cannot truly 
acknowledge tragedy. 
However, Trevor Hart, in an essay titled “Unexpected Endings,” posits an 
interesting response. Hart adopts from J. R. R. Tolkien the term “eucatastrophe.” 
Eucatastrophe means “good catastrophe”; it is “an outcome … which itself stands in stark 
opposition to much that precedes it, and pulls the rug cleverly out from beneath the feet 
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of our expectations and predictions.”45 For Hart, the resurrection is such a eucatastrophe 
since it is not something that is of the same type as what came before. The eschatological 
hope is similar. Whatever else it represents, it does not pass over the pain and suffering 
that attend bodily existence. Hart writes, “In the account of Christ’s passion, there is no 
attempt to sanitize or dignify human suffering or to lighten its darkness … and death is 
owned as a genuine threat, a dangerous enemy threatening to devour us.”46 
The eschatology of this theology is not of the kind that dissolves the experiences 
of those who suffer because it holds that history is not obliterated by any coming time. 
Since history remains meaningful, eschatologically significant, there is a sense in which 
Christianity even sharpens the knife’s edge of creaturely experience; as Poole put it, “if 
Christianity provided new forms of hope, it also supplied new forms of despair.”47 The 
belief that there is never a time when what has happened simply disappears means that 
suffering is of more substance, not less.  
For a Christian theology, therefore, there will be a constant tension between tragic 
experience and final hope, both existent, without one dissolving the other. Indeed, each 
derives its significance from the other. Hart references Tolkien’s belief that “the reality of 
dyscatastrophe, sorrow, failure and doom, our futile struggle with a hostile world, all this 
is not at odds with but furnishes the necessary conditions for the truly eucatastrophic 
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climax.”48 Without Good Friday, Easter is pointless; without Easter, Good Friday is 
meaningless despair and thus without significance. However, “furnish[ing] the necessary 
conditions for” does not mean the same thing as “entailing.” Good Friday does not entail 
Easter. The fact that Easter comes out of Good Friday is entirely unpredictable. “What 
eucatastrophic consolation denies, therefore, is not the reality, the scale or the awfulness 
of the struggle, but ‘universal final defeat’, and it does so, [Tolkien] notes, in the face of 
much evidence.”49 But, of course, “universal final defeat” was not the stopping point of 
Greek tragedy, either.  
This unstable dialectical position is one way that tragedy differs from the 
teleological explanations for suffering offered by most evolutionary theodicies. They 
consistently elide particular experiences of suffering; the fate of individual bodies is 
made invisible in favor of a celebration of the fruits of that suffering for the collective 
good. However, Balthasar’s depiction, which Hart follows, of an un-synthesized, 
dialectical relationship of final death and new resurrection is concordant with the 
intertwining of suffering and progress in the natural world, and a realist doctrine of 
creation acknowledges both aspects, without allowing one to overcome the other. This is 
a theology that interacts with the world as it is, not as we would prefer it to be. As 
Balthasar shows, this tragic vision is not alien, but internal, to Christianity. It is reflected 
in the events of Holy Saturday, in which the beauty and horror of creation coexist within 
the frame of a single human life. 
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However, it is difficult to identify how logically to adjudicate the difference in the 
two positions: the position that remains eternally suspicious of Christian claims of tragic 
awareness, and the other that insists that the depths of Holy Saturday were really 
plumbed by the Son of God. The critics of theology and tragedy accuse the Christian 
theologians of playacting when the theologians speak of the devastation of Good Friday 
and the faith’s true acknowledgment of tragedy. The theologians insist on their sincerity. 
The critics insist on the sincerity’s impossibility. If this is an insoluble logical conflict, I 
suggest that actual shared participation in a Triduum cycle may be the best way for the 
theologians to make their case: theory meeting praxis, concrete evidence being utilized. 
For example, in the course of a particular Good Friday liturgy, within some particular 
congregation, is the event handled shallowly—not in principle, but in actual liturgical 
practice? Are there indications that the worshippers on Good Friday consider the passion, 
crucifixion, and death of Jesus as playacting? In actual practice, does it seem that the 
intractable elements of reality are ignored? Describing MacKinnon’s theology, Hart 
writes that “The ‘flesh’ which the Son of God assumed and made his own in the 
incarnation was precisely tragic flesh—flesh marked, that is to say, by weakness, 
triviality, contingency, failure, perplexity, bewilderment, hopelessness and at the last 
even god-forsakenness.”50 Does this description resonate with the liturgical practices of 
the eight days that begin with Palm Sunday and end with Easter? If it does not resonate, 
then the critics’ claim is strengthened. If it does, then practice would seem to support the 
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theologians’ view. A similar tack could be taken with regard to the texts themselves. Do 
the Gospels (the “Good News”) downplay the tragedy that is implicated in the mission of 
Jesus—from the massacre of the holy innocents, to the beheading of John the Baptist, 
Gethsemane, the cry of dereliction, and the fate of Judas? How are they interpreted by the 
tradition? Like the theologian, the critic, too, must be accountable to the facts of the 
matter. 
The risk that these edges could be sanded off by an overly realized eschatology or 
a blindness (willing or inadvertent) to suffering is a real one. Nonetheless, it is not the 
case that Christian conceptions of eschatology shows tragedy to be irrelevant or 
meaningless by definition. It is the case, however, that tragedy itself pushes theology to 
articulate in new or different ways what redemption means for a suffering creation. 
On impassibility 
Others have reacted to the depth of the presence of suffering in nature by 
proposing other changes to traditional Christian doctrine. An especially popular one has 
been to amend the doctrine of God’s immutability in order to locate suffering itself within 
the being of God. I mentioned a few of my own responses to this in the third chapter but 
will here dwell at more length on this objection because the rejection of impassibility 
could be considered a position concordant with my own, but which I think is not a 
beneficial theological judgment. In fact, it has a number of defects that aggravate, rather 
than mitigate, the problem of suffering. While historical debates about impassibility are 
complex, there are two reasons to reject divine passibility that I find most convincing in 
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this particular context. To sketch them briefly is to do injustice both to the proposal and 
to the viewpoints that oppose it, but hopefully it will be sufficient to complicate the issues 
involved in the “new orthodoxy,” as one writer described the doctrine of the suffering 
God.51 
First, rejecting the concept of divine impassibility effectively makes God the 
metaphysical ground of human suffering and thereby in some sense complicit with it, as a 
divine participant. This is one of the themes of David Bentley Hart’s work, as previously 
stated.52 It is important to remember that the impassible God of traditional Christianity is 
not the God of Aristotle. In fact, it was to distinguish more sharply the God of Israel from 
pagan gods (including Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions, as well as the deities of 
mythology) that the early Church and patristic writers sought to emphasize the radical 
otherness of God.53 This radical otherness does not, however, mean that there is no 
relationship between the creator and creature. This relationship was made most concrete 
in the birth of Jesus Christ and the sending of the Spirit but is also metaphysical in nature: 
God is not only the creator of all things, without which they would not have come into 
being, but also the sustainer of all things, without which they would not continue to exist. 
The apophatic claim of changelessness does not, in regards to God, entail the kataphatic 
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claim of indifference. “Impassibility” is not a term about emotions, but about ontology. It 
is not a way to express God’s lack of something, but rather God’s fullness.  
Therefore, far from expressing the idea of indifference, the Christian claim of 
impassibility has traditionally been that the unchanging God is unchanging love. For this 
reason, however, God’s love is not of an identical type as human love. For God, love is 
not an emotion, nor is it a response; love is what God is. There is nothing behind it, nor is 
there anything prior to it. The infinite God is infinite love; in him there is no darkness at 
all (1 John 1:5). To say that God suffers, however, is to say that God’s love changes in 
response to things that are not God. This has been, of course, the primary motivation of a 
theology of passibility: God suffers with God’s creatures, with empathy and compassion. 
In this telling, God’s identity is affected by all of the terrible things that happen 
throughout all of creation. God changes in response to them in God’s essential being, the 
same way that human beings (unless they are psychopaths) are affected in some respect 
by witnessing the sufferings of others.  
With this understanding of immutability in mind, however, three disagreeable 
consequences to the attribution of mutability to God become clearer.  
(1a) First, passibility means that God’s love, prior to its being expressed as 
suffering, must be in some sense incomplete, because creation’s suffering can cause it to 
be manifest more fully than it had been previously. If this is true, however, then it is not 
accurate to say that God is eternally love itself. God loves in this view, to be sure, but 
God cannot be love itself because God’s love is reactive. God’s love is not the fullness of 
the overflowing plentitude of love without reserve but lacks some expression that is only 
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brought out by human suffering. For example, it is reasonable to say that my own 
expressions of sympathy that occur in reaction to witnessing other people’s suffering can 
change me in a positive way. It may increase the level of the virtues of charity and 
kindness that I have, heighten my understanding of the human condition, and sharpen my 
awareness of the fragility of life, leading to a greater appreciation of it. Further, it is 
possible for a person to have love more at some points than at others, by having a loving 
nature develop in oneself through the practice of being loving. But an infinite love cannot 
have anything added to it, nor can it have anything taken from it. Truly infinite love—
love itself—does not change, not in response to the bad things that people do, nor in 
response to the bad things that are done to them or other creatures. Neither the virtues nor 
vices of God’s creation, neither their joys nor their sorrows, change God’s perfect love, 
which is God’s being.  
(1b) The second consequence is that suffering and evil become their own reality, 
with which God interacts. God’s story (and if the economic/immanent distinction is 
collapsed then we must speak of God’s being, even in se, in psychological terms) then 
becomes one of a contest between good and evil, where God and evil share a single 
conceptual space; they are on the same side of the “ontological frontier,” as Hart puts it. 
This is, of course, the Manichean position, seen in the first chapter. But it is not only 
God’s story that becomes rooted in conflict; in this view, reality itself is grounded in 
conflict. If God’s being interacts with evil on an equal playing field, then that implies that 
there is an ontological violence, not an ontological peace, at the root of all things. Gone is 
the view of evil as nihil, evil as no-thing, a denial of being. Reality becomes agonistic in 
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its essence, not as an exception or as a result of sin. Even if that evil is eventually 
overcome, even perhaps eschatologically annihilated, it is still an independent reality 
with which God has come into contact and perhaps even grappled with almost as a peer. 
The cosmic story is then a story of conflict and in this conflict God operates as an agent 
among other agents; perhaps a very powerful agent, the biggest and most powerful of all 
agents, but still ontologically a being among other beings. A conception of God as wholly 
other is lost.  
(1c) Third, if God’s identity changes in response to suffering, then all suffering 
becomes meaningful because it becomes part of God’s story. In this case, as terrible as 
some events may be, the suffering of creatures helps develop the identity of God because 
it helps God’s compassion be expressed more fully. There is therefore some value in that 
suffering, something positive that comes from it for God, for creatures, or for both; all 
suffering then becomes, in some ultimate sense, intrinsically edifying. But the suffering 
of victims should not be considered prima facie edifying, neither for God, nor for 
creatures. Horrible suffering is horrible and, in the worst cases, there is nothing good to 
be said about it at all. This is not to say that experiences of suffering cannot be edifying. 
They most certainly can, as testified to by Scripture (e.g., Romans 5:3-4, “we also boast 
in our sufferings, knowing that suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces 
character, and character produces hope”) and biography. The question here, however, is 
whether experiences of suffering are edifying intrinsically, and therefore should in all 
cases be valued. I would hold that there is suffering in the world that is not meaningful, 
not edifying, and unjustifiable by any potential benefits that may accrue because of it.  
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Second, if hope can be found in the midst of suffering that is, as far as we can see, 
irredeemable in the course of a particular human life, then it will be a hope that creatures 
will be saved from this suffering. It is a hope that somehow, some way, there is a 
reality—God’s ineffable reality—in which every tear is wiped away from every eye. This 
is, after all, the promise of Isaiah (25:6–8) and Revelation (7:16–17). Part of what 
salvation means in the Christian tradition is being drawn into the saving goodness of 
God, where sorrow and crying are no more; sanctification is creaturely sharing in the 
plentitude of joy that is the divine nature, in which there is no darkness at all. If in the 
divine nature, God suffers too, however, then God in se becomes a victim of suffering as 
well. Suffering along with all creatures, God feels in Godself every cry of agony. Not 
only the human nature of the Christ, then, but the divine nature shared by the Trinity is 
staggered by every blow. This leaves us, then, with two options.  
(2a) First, if God in se is a victim, even a self-giving victim, then there is no 
reality outside of the pain of victimhood. If God is esse ipsum, being itself, then being 
itself is the site of suffering. There is, in that case, no reality at all, ultimate or otherwise, 
that exists without suffering, without pain. Suffering becomes the thread of continuity 
between created nature and divine nature. In a sense, this view results in a kind of 
stoicism: victims should get used to suffering, because there is no reality, not even God’s 
reality, where suffering does not exist.  
(2b) If, alternatively, one wishes to maintain an ultimate reality without suffering, 
then we are left in a situation where God-as-Trinity also needs saving. One aspect of the 
Christian hope is that in the presence of God creatures will find the fullness of 
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unmitigated joy by being drawn up into the divine life. If God is a victim too, however, 
then we must ask who, or what, assuages God’s pain. By what salvator dei is God’s 
suffering redeemed? How is God’s suffering reality restored to its original perfection, the 
perfection that preceded the pain of created beings? If such a thing is not possible—if 
God cannot save Godself—then in what sense is it possible to say that God can save 
creation? A God who suffers in se requires a savior, some way in which the suffering 
essential being of God can be healed. This conception, however, has not only made God a 
god, but a fairly ineffectual god at that. Whitehead’s God, “the fellow sufferer who 
understands,”54 may understand, but it cannot save, or at least not save ultimately, since, 
if saving is even an option, it itself needs to be saved first. In other words, the rejection of 
the doctrine of impassibility has the unintended consequence of making salvation 
impossible. If this analysis is correct, then a doctrine of the suffering God evacuates of 
meaning the Christian promise to those who suffer themselves. If God suffers in se, then 
God’s promise to God’s people of the hope of redemption, the hope of blessed 
everlasting peace, is no longer one that can be taught with theological integrity because 
the conditions for its fulfillment are no longer available. 
Therefore, to ascribe tragedy to creation does not entail ascribing tragedy to the 
divine nature, nor should that ascription be made for other reasons. The costs of such a 
theological move are high and vitiate the convictions that originally inspired it. 
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Totalizing 
The final two objections are particularly challenging, and their forceful critiques 
mark the boundary lines of a utilization of tragedy in theological discourse. The two 
criticisms are related. The first, considered in this section, is the risk that a tragic vision 
of the world can be totalizing. A totalizing philosophy is a kind of universal frame of 
reference; it answers all possible questions and explains any possible phenomenon. A 
totalizing tragic vision could be one in which despair becomes its own escape from facing 
the particularities of human life: they do not need to be attended to, because they will all 
fit within this overarching system. Tragedy then becomes its own method of evasion, 
deployed by the theorist for the theorist’s own benefit. Phillip Tallon writes, “The tragic 
vision does not benefit the dead or those whose psyches are so shattered by evil that they 
can no longer function. There the value of the tragic vision applies only to the spectator, 
not the human spectacle.”55 I find the charge that tragedy is totalizing to be the most 
trenchant critique of theology and tragedy. While I do not think that it invalidates the 
possibilities of tragedy for theology, it does nonetheless identify one of the biggest risks 
that the theory runs. As promised in chapter four, I will use Balthasar’s descent theology 
as an example of the risk, a risk that makes a focus on the descent hew uncomfortably 
close to traditional theodicy. I have made the case for Balthasar in the prior chapter; in 
this section, I will therefore rehearse the critique itself, along with a possible response. 
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First, the descent narrative could be interpreted to assume that Christ’s suffering 
represents the aggregation of all individuals’ suffering. In this view, his taking on the sins 
consists of taking on the pain of the whole world. The experiences of suffering from 
every sentient being, from all places and times, were collected together and absorbed by 
the person of Jesus, and he carried those experiences into hell. However, that description 
is not how suffering works. This depiction reflects one of the liabilities of much 
contemporary theodicy: an implicit view that suffering is somehow quantifiable and thus 
comparable on a theoretically empirical basis. Different experiences of suffering are seen 
as different instances of a single type of thing, differing in degree but not in kind. But this 
is certainly not the case. Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus (6.43) that the world of the 
happy man and the world of the unhappy man are not the same world, and one could 
expand that to say that most unhappy people do not live in the same world as each other 
either. How a person responds to an experience is tied up in the contingencies of one’s 
history, personality, cultural context, and so on. For a sufferer to be told that Christ shares 
her suffering can be heard as “Christ knows how you feel.” But if “how you feel” is 
dependent on those individual contingencies then that is not true, and to be told otherwise 
is a kind of empathetic imperialism. The pain of one person and the pain of another are 
not perfectly translatable.  
A second and related risk is that Christ’s assumption of every experience of 
suffering thereby compromises the extent of another individual’s suffering. If Christ has 
assumed all suffering, and suffering is some quantifiable element, then presumably his 
suffering must have been far worse than any other person’s. One’s own suffering must be 
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fairly minimal in comparison since it is limited to that of a single person. However, to be 
told that Christ has absorbed into himself and suffered all pain is not necessarily helpful 
or relieving. It could be helpful, of course, but that consequence is not entailed 
automatically. If it is a suggestion made by an observer, of course, that could be uniquely 
vexatious. Traditional theodicy has an unfortunate tendency to find ways of describing 
suffering in ways that mitigate it, and this view could be used as an example of that 
practice. 
On the other hand, the case could be made that Christ’s pain does not undermine 
the individual’s own experience because the descent is not intended to compromise any 
other sufferers’ experience. Rather, it is an assertion of Christ’s solidarity with all 
sufferers. For example, it is a common devotional practice that in looking upon the 
agonized face of Christ on the cross, one sees someone who is, to use Whitehead’s phrase 
again, “a fellow sufferer who understands.” All the more so, then, for imagining the dead 
Christ in hell: one sees there someone who suffers in communion with all human beings, 
even if he does not feel it in a direct way, given the exigencies of particularity. However, 
the idea of solidarity is one that is incompatible with the imagery of the descent into hell. 
There is no community in hell since alienation from the Father entails alienation from all 
other persons. The loneliness of extreme suffering is part of its tragedy; in the “different 
worlds” of the unhappy, solidarity is missing. Philoctetes, both in his abandonment and 
the effects of pain on his language, illustrates this dramatically. 
The common theme here is that utilizing the suffering Christ in hell as a way of 
trying to solve the theological problem of human suffering can have the effect of both 
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ennobling suffering and thereby eliding it. It could potentially ennoble a particular 
experience of suffering to say that extreme suffering is something that an individual 
shares with Jesus. If that is the case, suffering is an opportunity to identify even more 
deeply with the person of Jesus Christ. It also becomes ambiguous as to who “owns” any 
individual’s experience. In descending into hell, does Christ take on the experience of an 
individual sufferer? Or, in suffering, does an individual take on Christ’s experience of the 
descent? Does Christ suffer like other creatures do? Or do creatures suffer like Christ 
does? If the answer could be that the individual is taking on Christ’s experience, then an 
experience of suffering is an occasion of more closely approaching the Christological 
life. In this way, the experience itself could be seen as ennobling. 
To be sure, the descent theology itself does not claim that Jesus’ descent was an 
ennobling experience. The risk, however, is that his very presence there could also be 
seen as edifying the subsequent experiences of others’, and a quest to focus on edifying 
aspects of extreme suffering is precisely what one wants to avoid. To edify suffering is to 
ennoble it, and to ennoble it is to elide it. This process amounts to sanding down the 
sharp edges of square pegs of individual experience so that they fit into the round holes of 
theory. To sand down the edges, however, is to compromise the particularity that is the 
mark of those experiences and thus cause them to disappear into some larger scheme. It is 
part of an urge to “forget” the particular experiences themselves that are world shattering 
and meaning destroying. 
These are significant criticisms and provide an important critique. I do think, 
however, that the descent narrative, and thus a related concept of tragedy, retains value 
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for addressing the problem of suffering, as long as its claims remain modest. This is a 
value of a more limited sense, however; it is not the cure for what ails the hopeful 
theodicist. First, instead of being a justification for suffering, as outlined above, the 
descent narrative can serve more modestly simply as a theological recognition of the 
presence of non-edifying suffering in the world. Rather than making the descent a 
victorious march, the Balthasarian descent theology can be used to recognize the 
existence of experiences that resist teleological explanations. Christ’s experience can still 
be acknowledged as unique, as can each person’s. The descent is then a source of 
resistance against the potential closure of a theodicy of justification. The descent is an 
acknowledgment of a fact, not an explanation for it.  
Second, the fact that the descent is a Holy Saturday event shows that this 
recognition of non-edifying suffering is found at the heart of the Christian tradition, in the 
liminal moment between two of the most important days on the Christian calendar. 
Indeed, one could make the point that the Triduum is recreated in each celebration of the 
Eucharist and thus this recognition is a regular part of all Christian Eucharistic 
communities. A recognition of the kind of human suffering that is unredeemed to this 
point, and even immanently a defeat in any conceivable state of affairs, is therefore not 
alien to the tradition. To recognize it is not unfaithful, and to feel it is neither sinful nor 
weak. With Holy Saturday in mind, suffering is not passively accepted, nor is its reality 
denied. It is held up in the liturgy as a possible site of redemption in a way that is hopeful 
but not certain.  
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Third, the descent narrative, precisely because it is not a final answer to the 
question of suffering, again reminds the theologian of the theory-eluding matter of human 
suffering. The fact that the descent narrative, which is a far better way of addressing 
human suffering than many of its alternatives, still cannot domesticate the entirety of 
human experience into a theoretical scheme is a good reminder of the intractability of 
suffering. If even it teeters at the brink of justification, then the problem of human 
suffering will continue to stick in the craw of Christian theology, remaining a question 
insistently asked of every theological answer that posits finality. 
Reification of tragedy leads to its elision 
Finally, some contemporary theologians have raised the objection that the 
reification of tragedy as a defining principle inadvertently leads to the elision of 
suffering. In a representative example of this critique, for instance, Conor Cunningham 
writes, 
The danger is that if one simply renames life as tragic, tragedy disappears, for its 
now “metaphysical” status—its reality—leaves it without the requisite space for 
tragedy to occur. To put it another way, to say that the world is full of suffering 
and so is meaningless, is to dilute the very suffering that initially motivated the 
negative judgment: there is suffering in life, therefore life is meaningless, 
therefore there is no suffering.56  
This is an important critique and one that cuts very close to the heart of this project. 
While the motivating factor of utilizing tragedy is to correct those theologies that would 
ignore suffering by focusing on some other overarching good, critics like Cunningham 
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are pointing out that this very reaction can then become what one expects when 
beholding creation—suffering as not an exception but as a rule. When it becomes the lens 
through which all experiences are seen, however, suffering stops being shocking or 
outrageous. Each experience that is observed becomes just one more example, 
functioning as an affirmation of a preexisting worldview. The experience even becomes 
helpful for the theorist: grist for the mill of one’s favorite theory. To again utilize the 
liturgical imagery, the critique holds that the tragic theorist is proclaiming Good Friday as 
normative, a state of affairs that exhausts the possibilities of creaturely existence. When 
every day is expected to be Good Friday, however, and when the shape of reality is that 
of Good Friday, then the shock of the injustice and the horror of that day are lost. A 
reification of tragedy becomes another excuse for undermining experiences of suffering. 
The consequence here is the opposite of what was intended, and all the more dangerous 
for being so.  
However, Cunningham’s critique does not do justice to the subtlety of tragedy. 
First, to describe creation utilizing the terms of tragedy is to say that there is a gap 
between how creation is experienced and the human perception of how creation should 
be. For an individual or community to assert that there is a way that creation “should be,” 
however, is to refuse to accept the current state of affairs as satisfactory. Contra 
Cunningham, creation is not being “renamed” tragedy such that the two are identical. The 
existing state of affairs in creation may be described as including aspects of the tragic, but 
to describe it as such is implicitly to assume that there is a conceptual alternative, at least 
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in principle. The existence of this alternative, intuited if not observed, is what keeps 
suffering outrageous.  
Second, if “tragic” is a suitable descriptor for creation, it is only so because the 
suffering that inheres in it is not given a metaphysical status. If the suffering was 
metaphysically determinative of creation, “tragic” would not be adjectively accurate, 
precisely because tragedy is a descriptor that refers to the ambiguity of experiences, not 
only abject suffering. When tragic theorists refer to the amorphous sense of “pollution” 
that is found in many tragedies (Oedipus again being the premier example), they are 
referring, in negative relief, to an unpolluted reality. It is the possibility of that unpolluted 
reality—whether it exists in actuality or not—that makes tragic drama tragic. Suffering is 
not a metaphysical reality but a physical one. The focus of this project is to maintain the 
importance of seeing it as a physical reality, but that does not mean that the aim is to 
elevate it into a metaphysical fact.  
Third, rather than showing life to be “meaningless” as Cunningham holds, an 
emphasis on tragedy insists that there is meaning to be had, even in light of the suffering 
in creation. Tragic drama is, after all, grappling with suffering in a world that otherwise 
seems to be infused with meaning. There would be no genre of tragedy at all if such a 
belief in the possibility of meaning were not part of the Athenian (at least) mindset. In 
that same dramatic context, the single tragic drama did not stand alone; the plays 
appeared in groups of three and were followed by a non-tragic satyr play that was comic 
in the non-technical sense. Cunningham’s assertion of a latent assumption of 
meaninglessness therefore is in error. He describes two links in the chain of reasoning 
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that he is opposing as, “there is suffering in life, therefore life is meaningless.” But 
Cunningham again shortchanges tragedy. That there is suffering in life is certainly 
affirmed in Greek tragedy, but the idea that “therefore life is meaningless” is not a 
consequence that, for them, followed. The Greek dramatists were certainly not nihilists, 
who are the primary target of Cunningham’s invective in the book under consideration. 
Far from it: it is only because life is not meaningless that tragic drama is worth engaging 
in at all. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche makes much of Silenus’ claim in Oedipus at 
Colonus that never to have been born is the best state of affairs of all, and the second best 
is to die soon, but it is doubtful that that represents the view of Sophoclean tragedy 
considered in toto. The central conflict in Philoctetes is in regards to what meaning the 
protagonist is going to make through the opportunity with which he has been presented, 
and his decision is portrayed as being of the greatest importance. Indeed, it is his decision 
that makes the entire play operate; the audience sees in Philoctetes a person who is facing 
the decision as to what his life is going to signify—what its meaning is going to be. If 
Sophocles (or his Philoctetes character) thought life was meaningless, then whether 
Philoctetes decided to go to Troy, back to Thessaly, or anywhere else would be of no 
interest to anyone. Perhaps some modern dramatists depict a meaningless cosmos, but the 
Greek tragic dramatists did not.  
Fourth, Cunningham’s argument shows that an oversimplification of tragedy can 
come from either direction. He shows how difficult it is to maintain the dialectic of 
suffering creation and redemptive glory in which neither state dissolves the other. 
Cunningham makes the mistake of believing that to acknowledge the full impact of 
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tragedy is to ignore any alternative state of affairs and to disregard any hope for anything 
else. But to enter into Good Friday fully is not to ignore Easter; it is to allow Easter to be 
revealed as shocking, surprising, and different in kind and not only in degree from what 
came before. Cunningham worries that suffering will be elided if it is given so prominent 
a place in theology, but the effect is entirely the opposite: to shortchange the suffering 
that is an aspect of the present reality is to shortchange the glory that is hoped for in some 
future reality.  
Epilogue 
This dissertation ends where it began: with Job, the blameless man from Uz. It 
may be that the discovery of evolution by natural selection as the driving factor of 
organic development will return Christian theology to the tragic sense of creation that is 
described in that text of Hebrew wisdom literature. The wildness of creation that one 
finds in the theophany was muted in modern theodicy, an omission that is reflected most 
clearly in Paley’s work. There creation is characterized as “teem[ing] with delighted 
existence” and hardly anything else.57 Not so in the theophany, which describes creation 
in far less unambiguously positive terms. The savage Behemoth is the first of the 
creatures of God; God delights in the cruelty of the ostrich.  
The book of Job, with its characters, setting, and plot, shares with tragedy a 
dramatic nature; it is more like a play than like a modern philosophical argument. 
Perhaps this is required given that the issues raised in the book of Job are more searching. 
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Where analytic propositions assume a given set of moral understandings, the book of Job 
puts that very background into question. Newsom writes, “What is in dispute between 
[God and Job] is the nature of reality itself and the forms of moral imagination by which 
it can be grasped.”58 This is part of what makes the theophany so unsatisfying for the 
reader looking for an answer to the problem of suffering: “The confident moral realism 
that Job takes for granted finds little anchorage in the divine speeches.”59 Rather than a 
superficial accounting of suffering in the world, the narrative of Job shows the character 
entering more deeply into the tragic experience. 
In this way, the book of Job, like tragedy, and like a realist Christian theology, 
resists the positivistic claims of theodicy of whatever kind, and acts as a constant critique 
of unvarnished teleology. The reality of suffering is something that Job’s so-called 
comforters could not enter into, for whatever reason. They saw his travail, and they were 
afraid. They were unable to stay in Job’s silence. The book of Job does not invalidate the 
rest of the Hebrew scriptures, nor does it completely invalidate the covenant theology that 
is presented by Job’s comforters. It does take a certain stand against it, however, as a 
“source of resistance.” Job serves a role in the Hebrew scriptures similar to that of Greek 
tragedy in Christian theology: a minority report, a counter-narrative, bringing into the 
light what might otherwise remain hidden. 
Ironically, the resonances that have been found between Job, tragedy, and 
Christian theology in this project may reveal Darwin and Darwinism to be of meta-
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theological importance. By revealing the process of natural selection, and the later 
discovery of its genetic basis, Darwinism calls Christianity back to the kind of grappling 
with suffering that is present in Job and reflected in the Eucharist but not in traditional 
theodicy. Some of Darwin’s perceived destructiveness to religion in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries occurred in the context of a popular religious world unable to 
conceive of a Christianity that really takes suffering seriously. And it is true that 
Darwinism may be destructive of a view that sees the purpose of religion as being 
primarily to bring comfort. Since natural selection is not comfortable, the fear arises that 
natural selection must be anti-religion or destructive of religion. 
Rather than being destructive, however, Darwin’s insight about the characteristics 
of the natural world actually causes the modern Christian to look back to resources at the 
root of the tradition, and these include Job, Holy Saturday, and the sacrament of the 
Eucharist. These resources evince an awareness of the risks inherent in contingency: 
nothing about created existence, in itself, shows it to be safe or self-sufficient. The risk of 
destruction is real; not all tragedies end badly, but some certainly do. The threat of non-
being is a real one: the ambiguity of the end of the book of Job shows it, and it also must 
be an open possibility that the hell to which Jesus descended would be his final 
destination, with nothing to follow. Upon losing his bow and realizing that he was not 
going to be able to return home, Philoctetes laments “I / exist no longer” (v. 1026–27). In 
a world that remains marred by natural evil, one is left with hope for a redeemed world, 
but that is all.  
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To acknowledge the tragic theologically is to live inside that constant tension 
between what is and what should be, without taking recourse in the dissolution of the 
problem. Like dramatic tragedy, what we see depicted in Job is the un-tameable, the 
chaotic, and the suffering in nature. Suffering is just as widespread in nature as any of the 
things we would find of positive value: things like the beautiful, the domestic, and the 
joyful. Those things are listed in God’s catalog of creation as well. But the kingdom 
remains wild. In the book of Job, a tension is maintained between the two, but, 
importantly, no synthesis is offered. Creation is the site of tragedy and the site of 
redemption. To maintain that tension is the task of a realist doctrine of creation.  
Darwinism thus takes us back both to the wildness of the Job story and to the 
intractability of created reality as it is depicted in Greek tragedy. Each one forces the 
observer to acknowledge the extent of the suffering in the world, which is a part of that 
characteristic that can be identified as tragic. From the depths of Holy Saturday come the 
inarticulate screams of Philoctetes. It is the “cry for redemption” of a world in waiting.
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